Czosek v. Mara

• Decision Date: 24 February 1970
• Docket Number: No. 234,234
• Citation: 397 U.S. 25,25 L.Ed.2d 21,90 S.Ct. 770
• Parties: Henry J. CZOSEK et al., Petitioners, v. John R. O'MARA et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

397 U.S. 25

90 S.Ct. 770

25 L.Ed.2d 21

Henry J. CZOSEK et al., Petitioners,

v John R. O'MARA et al.

No. 234.

Argued Jan. 13, 1970.

Decided Feb. 24, 1970.

Richard R. Lyman, Toledo, Ohio, for petitioners.

James P. Shea, Buffalo, N.Y., for respondent employees.

Richard F. Griffin, Buffalo, N.Y., for respondent railroad.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1960, the corporate respondent, Erie Lackawanna Railroad Company, was formed by the merger of the Erie Railroad and the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad. Thereafter, the individual respondents, former employees of the Delaware Lackawanna, continued as employees of the Erie Lackawanna until 1962, when they were furloughed; after the 1962 furlough, the respondent employees were never recalled by the railroad. Deeming the furlough a final discharge, the individual respondents brought suit in the District Court for the Western District of New York against the Erie Lackawanna and against the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, subordinate organizations within the union, and local and national officers of the union. The allegations were that the railroad had wrongfully discharged the plaintiffs in violation of § 5 et seq. of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5 et seq., the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and the agreement between the Erie Lackawanna and its employees entered into to implement the 1960 merger of the Erie and the Delaware Lackawanna; and that the union defendants had been 'guilty of gross nonfeasance and hostile discrimination' in arbitrarily and capriciously refusing to process the claims of plaintiffs, who had 'been replaced by 'pre-merger' employees of the Erie Railroad.' Damages in the sum of $160,000 were sought against the railroad, the union defendants, or both. The District Court dismissed the complaint against the railroad for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Railway Labor Act and for lack of diversity jurisdiction; the court dismissed the complaint against the union because the complaint failed adequately to allege a breach of duty and because the employees could have processed their own grievances.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's decision with respect to the action against the union defendants. O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 407 F.2d 674 (1969). The Court of Appeals held that the complaint was adequate to allege a breach by the union of its duty of fair representation subject to vindication in the District Court without resort to administrative remedies. Dismissal of the complaint against the railroad was affirmed; but on remand the individual respondents were to be granted leave to maintain their action against the railroad if they should choose to amend their complaint to allege that the employer was somehow implicated in the union's discrimination.

We granted certiorari, Czosek v. O'Mara, 396 U.S. 814, 90 S.Ct. 80, 24 L.Ed.2d 66 (1969), and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Although the complaint was not as specific with regard to union discrimination as might have been desirable, we deem the complaint against the union sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. As the Court of Appeals indicated, 'where the courts are called upon the fulfill their role as the primary guardians of the duty of fair representation,' complaints should be construed to avoid dismissals and the plaintiff at the very least 'should be given the opportunity to file supplemental pleadings unless it appears 'beyond doubt' that he cannot state a good cause of action.' 407 F.2d, at 679. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45—46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). And surely it is beyond cavil that a suit against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation is not within the jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board or subject to the ordinary rule that administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort to the courts. Glover v. St. Louis-S.F.R. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969); Conley v. Gibson, supra. The claim against the union defendants for the breach of their duty of fair representation is a discrete claim quite apart from the right of individual employees expressly extended to them under the Railway Labor Act to pursue their employer before the Adjustment Board.¹

Neither the individual respondents nor the railroad sought review here of the Court of Appeals' judgment insofar as it sustained the dismissal of the complaint against the railroad absent allegations implicating the railroad in the union's claimed breach of duty. The petitioning union defendants, however, challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals' decision, insisting that they may not be sued alone for breach of duty when the damage to employees had its roots in their discharge by the railroad prior to the union's alleged refusal to process grievances. Apparently fearing that if sued alone they may...