Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.

Decision Date22 March 2017
Docket NumberNo. 15–649.,15–649.
Citation137 S.Ct. 973,197 L.Ed.2d 398
Parties Casimir CZYZEWSKI, et al., Petitioners v. JEVIC HOLDING CORP., et al.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Danielle Spinelli, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Sarah E. Harrington for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioners.

Christopher Landau, P.C., Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Jack A. Raisner, Rene S. Roupinian, Robert N. Fisher, Outten & Golden LLP, New York, NY, Christopher D. Loizides, Loizides P.A., Wilmington, DE, Danielle Spinelli, Craig Goldblatt, Joel Millar, Jonathan Seymour, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Christopher Landau, P.C., James P. Gillespie, P.C., Jason M. Wilcox, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents Sun Capital Partners, Inc., Sun Capital Partners IV, LP & Sun Capital Partners Management IV, LLC.

Domenic E. Pacitti, Linda Richenderfer, Klehr Harrison Harvey, Branzburg LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Respondents Jevic Holding Corp., Jevic Transportation, Inc. & Creek Road Properties, LLC.

Peter S. Partee, Sr., Richard P. Norton, Hunton & Williams LLP, New York, NY, for Respondent CIT Group / Business Credit, Inc., as Agent for the Lender Group.

Robert J. Feinstein, James E. O'Neill, Pachulski Stang Ziehl &, Jones LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Respondent Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 allows debtors and their creditors to negotiate a plan for dividing an estate's value. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129, 1141. But sometimes the parties cannot agree on a plan. If so, the bankruptcy court may decide to dismiss the case. § 1112(b). The Code then ordinarily provides for what is, in effect, a restoration of the prepetition financial status quo. § 349(b).

In the case before us, a Bankruptcy Court dismissed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. But the court did not simply restore the prepetition status quo. Instead, the court ordered a distribution of estate assets that gave money to high-priority secured creditors and to low-priority general unsecured creditors but which skipped certain dissenting mid-priority creditors. The skipped creditors would have been entitled to payment ahead of the general unsecured creditors in a Chapter 11 plan (or in a Chapter 7 liquidation). See §§ 507, 725, 726, 1129. The question before us is whether a bankruptcy court has the legal power to order this priority-skipping kind of distribution scheme in connection with a Chapter 11 dismissal .

In our view, a bankruptcy court does not have such a power. A distribution scheme ordered in connection with the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.

I
A

We begin with a few fundamentals: A business may file for bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. In Chapter 7, a trustee liquidates the debtor's assets and distributes them to creditors. See § 701 et seq. In Chapter 11, debtor and creditors try to negotiate a plan that will govern the distribution of valuable assets from the debtor's estate and often keep the business operating as a going concern. See, e.g., §§ 1121, 1123, 1129, 1141 (setting out the framework in which the parties negotiate).

Filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy has several relevant legal consequences. First, an estate is created comprising all property of the debtor. § 541(a)(1). Second, a fiduciary is installed to manage the estate in the interest of the creditors. §§ 1106, 1107(a). This fiduciary, often the debtor's existing management team, acts as "debtor in possession." §§ 1101(1), 1104. It may operate the business, §§ 363(c)(1), 1108, and perform certain bankruptcy-related functions, such as seeking to recover for the estate preferential or fraudulent transfers made to other persons, § 547 (transfers made before bankruptcy that unfairly preferred particular creditors); § 548 (fraudulent transfers, including transfers made before bankruptcy for which the debtor did not receive fair value).

Third, an "automatic stay" of all collection proceedings against the debtor takes effect. § 362(a).

It is important to keep in mind that Chapter 11 foresees three possible outcomes. The first is a bankruptcy-court-confirmed plan. Such a plan may keep the business operating but, at the same time, help creditors by providing for payments, perhaps over time. See §§ 1123, 1129, 1141. The second possible outcome is conversion of the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding for liquidation of the business and a distribution of its remaining assets. §§ 1112(a), (b), 726. That conversion in effect confesses an inability to find a plan. The third possible outcome is dismissal of the Chapter 11 case. § 1112(b). A dismissal typically "revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case"—in other words, it aims to return to the prepetition financial status quo. § 349(b)(3).

Nonetheless, recognizing that conditions may have changed in ways that make a perfect restoration of the status quo difficult or impossible, the Code permits the bankruptcy court, "for cause," to alter a Chapter 11 dismissal's ordinary restorative consequences. § 349(b). A dismissal that does so (or which has other special conditions attached) is often referred to as a "structured dismissal," defined by the American Bankruptcy Institute as a

"hybrid dismissal and confirmation order ... that ... typically dismisses the case while, among other things, approving certain distributions to creditors, granting certain third-party releases, enjoining certain conduct by creditors, and not necessarily vacating orders or unwinding transactions undertaken during the case." American Bankruptcy Institute Commission To Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 2012–2014 Final Report and Recommendations 270 (2014).

Although the Code does not expressly mention structured dismissals, they "appear to be increasingly common." Ibid., n. 973.

The Code also sets forth a basic system of priority, which ordinarily determines the order in which the bankruptcy court will distribute assets of the estate. Secured creditors are highest on the priority list, for they must receive the proceeds of the collateral that secures their debts. 11 U.S.C. § 725. Special classes of creditors, such as those who hold certain claims for taxes or wages, come next in a listed order. §§ 507, 726(a)(1). Then come low-priority creditors, including general unsecured creditors. § 726(a)(2). The Code places equity holders at the bottom of the priority list. They receive nothing until all previously listed creditors have been paid in full. § 726(a)(6).

The Code makes clear that distributions of assets in a Chapter 7 liquidation must follow this prescribed order. §§ 725, 726. It provides somewhat more flexibility for distributions pursuant to Chapter 11 plans, which may impose a different ordering with the consent of the affected parties. But a bankruptcy court cannot confirm a plan that contains priority-violating distributions over the objection of an impaired creditor class. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1129(b)(2).

The question here concerns the interplay between the Code's priority rules and a Chapter 11 dismissal. Here, the Bankruptcy Court neither liquidated the debtor under Chapter 7 nor confirmed a Chapter 11 plan. But the court, instead of reverting to the prebankruptcy status quo, ordered a distribution of the estate assets to creditors by attaching conditions to the dismissal (i.e., it ordered a structured dismissal). The Code does not explicitly state what priority rules—if any—apply to a distribution in these circumstances. May a court consequently provide for distributions that deviate from the ordinary priority rules that would apply to a Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 11 plan? Can it approve conditions that give estate assets to members of a lower priority class while skipping objecting members of a higher priority class?

B

In 2006, Sun Capital Partners, a private equity firm, acquired Jevic Transportation Corporation with money borrowed from CIT Group in a "leveraged buyout." In a leveraged buyout, the buyer (B) typically borrows from a third party (T) a large share of the funds needed to purchase a company (C). B then pays the money to C's shareholders. Having bought the stock, B owns C. B then pledges C's assets to T so that T will have security for its loan. Thus, if the selling price for C is $50 million, B might use $10 million of its own money, borrow $40 million from T, pay $50 million to C's shareholders, and then pledge C assets worth $40 million (or more) to T as security for T's $40 million loan. If B manages C well, it might make enough money to pay T back the $40 million and earn a handsome profit on its own $10 million investment. But, if the deal sours and C descends into bankruptcy, beware of what might happen: Instead of C's $40 million in assets being distributed to its existing creditors, the money will go to T to pay back T's loan—the loan that allowed B to buy C. (T will receive what remains of C's assets because T is now a secured creditor, putting it at the top of the priority list). Since C's shareholders receive money while C's creditors lose their claim to C's remaining assets, unsuccessful leveraged buyouts often lead to fraudulent conveyance suits alleging that the purchaser (B) transferred the company's assets without receiving fair value in return. See Lipson & Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: The Article I Judicial Power, Fraudulent Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts, 2013 Wis. L.Rev. 1161, 1220–1221.

This is precisely what happened here. Just two years after Sun's buyout, Jevic (C in our leveraged buyout example) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. At the time of filing,...

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