D'Allessandro v. Lennar Hingham Holdings, LLC

Decision Date03 November 2020
Docket NumberSJC-12891
Citation156 N.E.3d 197,486 Mass. 150
Parties Liz D'ALLESSANDRO, trustee, & others v. LENNAR HINGHAM HOLDINGS, LLC, & others.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Christopher Weld, Jr., Boston, for the defendants.

Hugh J. Gorman, III, Boston, for the plaintiffs.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Edmund A. Allcock & Norman F. Orban, Braintree, for New England Chapter of Community Associations Institute.

David J. Hatem & Jon C. Cowen, Boston, for American Council of Engineering Companies of Massachusetts & another.

Thomas O. Moriarty & Kimberly A. Bielan, Braintree, for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another.

Present: Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

LENK, J.

In this case, we answer a certified question posed by a judge in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts concerning the application of the six-year statute of repose in G. L. c. 260, § 2B, to claims regarding alleged defects in the design and construction of the common and limited common areas of a multi-phase, multi-building condominium. The question, as posed by the District Court judge, is the following:

"Where the factual record supports the conclusion that a builder or developer was engaged in the continuous construction of a single condominium development comprising multiple buildings or phases, when does the six-year period for an action of tort relating to the construction of the condominium's common or limited common elements start running?"

We respond to the certified question as follows: Where a condominium development is comprised of multiple buildings, regardless of how many phases of the development there may be or how many buildings are within each phase, each building constitutes a discrete "improvement" for purposes of § 2B, such that the opening of each individual building to its intended use, or the substantial completion of the individual building and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner or owners, triggers the statute of repose under § 2B with respect to the common areas and the limited common areas of that building. In addition, where a particular improvement is integral to, and intended to serve, multiple buildings (or the condominium development as a whole), the statute of repose begins to run when that discrete improvement is substantially complete and open to its intended use.4

Background. In her decision denying the defendants' partial motion for summary judgment, the District Court judge recited the relevant facts from the summary judgment record. We rely on her recitation of the facts, and on other undisputed facts in the record.

The Hewitts Landing Condominium consists of 150 units, contained in twenty-eight buildings, built over the course of twenty-four "phases" between 2008 and 2015.5 From time to time during the course of construction, the project's architect submitted affidavits to the town of Hingham, swearing that individual units or buildings were "substantially complete" and ready for occupancy, and the town issued certificates of occupancy for the individual units or buildings.

The plaintiffs, trustees of the Hewitts Landing Condominium Trust, commenced this action in the Superior Court on November 3, 2017, seeking damages from the defendants6 for alleged design and construction defects to the common and limited common elements of the condominium,7 among other claims.8 The complaint discussed four main aspects of the common areas in which defects were alleged: "decks and columns," "roofing/flashing," "exterior walls/flashing/building envelope," and "irrigation system." The complaint also stated, however, that "[the plaintiffs'] claims [were] not limited to those described [above]" and that the plaintiffs expressly reserved the right to amend the complaint to assert any additional claims as they were discovered.

After removing the case to Federal court, the defendants sought partial summary judgment; they argued that the plaintiffs' claims were partially barred by the six-year statute of repose set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2B.9 More specifically, the defendants argued that § 2B barred all claims with respect to six of the condominium's twenty-eight buildings.10 The District Court judge denied the defendants' motion after concluding that only two of the plaintiffs' causes of action (negligence and implied warranty) were appropriate for consideration under § 2B, and, with respect to those, that all twenty-eight of the condominium's buildings should be treated as a single "improvement" for purposes of § 2B. Subsequently, upon the defendants' motion, the judge certified the question that is now before us.11

Discussion. As with any statutory provision, § 2B "must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." DiCarlo v. Suffolk Constr. Co., 473 Mass. 624, 628, 45 N.E.3d 571 (2016), quoting Galenski v. Erving, 471 Mass. 305, 309, 28 N.E.3d 470 (2015). See G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third. We begin, therefore, with the plain language of the statute.

Under § 2B, the six-year statute of repose begins to run on the earlier of two dates: "(1) the opening of the improvement to use; or (2) substantial completion of the improvement and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner." The plaintiffs focus their argument on the term "improvement." They contend that the relevant improvement in this case is the entire condominium, based on such factors as the terms of the master deed, which creates a single legal entity; the pace and continuity of construction; and the fact that the particular defendants in this case participated in the construction process from beginning to end. Our analysis of the term "improvement" in the context of the statutory language as a whole leads us to a different conclusion.

As we previously have noted, § 2B does not define the term "improvement," and the "legislative history of G. L. c. 260, § 2B, does not indicate precisely what the Legislature meant the term to encompass." Dighton v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 399 Mass. 687, 696, 506 N.E.2d 509, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953, 108 S.Ct. 345, 98 L.Ed.2d 371 (1987), quoting Milligan v. Tibbetts Eng'g Corp., 391 Mass. 364, 366, 461 N.E.2d 808 (1984). Previously, we have found a dictionary definition of "improvement" instructive on the issue of whether particular work or conduct falls within the scope of the statute. See Conley v. Scott Prods., Inc., 401 Mass. 645, 647, 518 N.E.2d 849 (1988), quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1138 (1961) (defining "improvement" as "a permanent addition to or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs"); Milligan, supra at 368, 461 N.E.2d 808 (same).

The definition, however, has proved to be of limited utility in certain contexts. See Dighton, 399 Mass. at 697, 506 N.E.2d 509 (utility of Webster's definition was "doubtful" in context of "decid[ing] which actors were intended to be comprehended by § 2B"). Such is the case here. It is undisputed, and rightly so, that the development of the condominium and its component parts constitutes "the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property" within the meaning of the statute. G. L. c. 260, § 2B. See Aldrich v. ADD Inc., 437 Mass. 213, 220-221, 770 N.E.2d 447 (2002) (applying § 2B's statute of repose to claim for damages for negligent design of condominium).12 Rather, here, the question is whether the statute of repose was triggered only once (when the entire condominium satisfied the statutory requirements of being [1] open to use, or [2] substantially complete and taken for occupancy by the owner); or whether the statute was triggered multiple times, as each individual building (or other relevant component) of the project met those statutory requirements. Ultimately, we conclude that the latter approach adheres most closely to the statutory language and the underlying legislative intent.

We view as significant that the applicable language defining the triggering events for the statute of repose in § 2B was added by amendment in 1984, displacing prior language that described the triggering event as "the performance or furnishing of such design, planning, construction or general administration." See St. 1984, c. 484, § 53. By amending the statute in this manner, the Legislature evinced an intent to shift the focus away from such factors as when, and by whom, the particular work was performed, and instead to predicate the analysis on two independent factors: (1) whether the improvement is open to use; or (2) whether the improvement is substantially complete and the owner has taken possession for occupancy.

The defendants contend that the statute of repose was triggered as each building in the development was opened to use, relying principally on the certificates of occupancy issued by the town. Cf. Aldrich, 437 Mass. at 221-222, 770 N.E.2d 447 ( § 2B's statute of repose did not bar suit by condominium trust where action was commenced within six years of date of certificate of acceptance and occupancy, designated date of substantial completion, and date individual units had begun to be occupied).13 Although the plaintiffs do not dispute that the issuance of a certificate of occupancy can signify that a building is open to use for purposes of § 2B, they argue that, in the context of a multi-phase, multi-building condominium such as this, the relevant event is the issuance of the certificate of occupancy for the...

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