D'AMARIO v. Ford Motor Co.
Decision Date | 21 November 2001 |
Docket Number | No. SC95881, No. SC96139. |
Citation | 806 So.2d 424 |
Parties | Karen D'AMARIO, individually and on behalf of Clifford Harris, a minor, and Clifford Harris, individually, Petitioners, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Respondent, General Motors Corporation, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Brian Nash, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Maria Nash, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A., Miami, FL; Florin, Roebig & Walker, P.A., Clearwater, FL; and Wagner, Vaughan & McLaughlin, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Karen D'Amario, etc., et al., Petitioners.
Wendy F. Lumish and Jeffrey A. Cohen of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Miami, FL; and Ronald E. Cabaniss and Francis M. McDonald of Cabaniss, Conroy & McDonald, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Ford Motor Company, Respondent.
Benjamin H. Hill, III, and Marie A. Borland of Hill, Ward & Henderson, Tampa, FL; William Powers, Jr., and Steven Goode, Austin, Texas; and Hugh F. Young, Jr., Reston, VA, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Amicus Curiae.
Daniel S. Pearson of Holland & Knight, Miami, FL; and Chilton Davis Varner, Halli D. Cohn, and Michelle Jerusalem Cole of King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, for General Motors Corporation, etc., et al., Petitioners.
Mark Poses of Poses & Poses, P.A.; and Marc Cooper and Nancy C. Ciampa of Colson, Hicks & Eidson, Miami, FL, for Brian W. Nash, etc., et al., Respondents.
Benjamin H. Hill, III, and Marie A. Borland of Hill, Ward & Henderson, Tampa, FL; William Powers, Jr., and Steven Goode, Austin, Texas; and Hugh F. Young, Jr., Reston, VA, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Amicus Curiae.
We have for review the decision in Ford Motor Co. v. D'Amario, 732 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which we have concluded conflicts with the decision in Nash v. General Motors Corp., 734 So.2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), on the issue of whether principles of comparative fault apply in a crashworthiness case.1 We hold that principles of comparative fault concerning apportionment of fault as to the cause of the underlying crash will not ordinarily apply in crashworthiness or enhanced injury cases.2 Because the manufacturer alleged to be responsible for a defective product that results in a second accident and injury ordinarily may not be held liable for the injuries caused by the initial accident, the fault of the manufacturer may not be compared or apportioned with the fault of the driver of the vehicle who allegedly caused the initial crash.
Both cases before us involve lawsuits premised on the crashworthiness doctrine. Such cases, which are also often referred to as "secondary collision" or "enhanced injury" cases, involve both an initial accident and a subsequent or secondary collision caused by an alleged defective condition created by a manufacturer, which is unrelated to the cause of the initial accident but which causes additional and distinct injuries beyond those suffered in the primary collision. One court has explained that the damages sought in such cases "are not for injuries sustained in the original collision but for those sustained in the second impact where some design defect caused an exacerbated injury which would not have otherwise occurred as a result of the original collision." Meekins v. Ford Motor Co., 699 A.2d 339, 341 (Del.Super.Ct.1997).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals first recognized a cause of action against an automobile manufacturer for enhanced injuries caused by a defective product in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968). The Larsen court reasoned that "[n]o rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where the defect in design or manufacture was the causative factor of the accident, as the accident and the resulting injury, usually caused by the so-called `second collision' of the passenger with the interior part of the automobile, all are foreseeable." Id. at 502. While the court acknowledged that an "automobile manufacturer is under no duty to design an accident-proof or foolproof vehicle," it nevertheless concluded the following:
[s]uch manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision. Collisions with or without fault of the user are clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable.
Id. Accordingly, the court held:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design.
Id. at 502-03. The ruling in Larsen recognizing a distinct cause of action against manufacturers for secondary collisions caused by defective products has subsequently received widespread approval throughout the country.
Florida adopted the principle of Larsen in Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So.2d 201, 202 (Fla.1976), wherein we declared: "We hold that a manufacturer of automobiles may be held liable under certain conditions for a design or manufacturing defect which causes injury but is not the cause of the primary collision." See also Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So.2d 1049, 1052 (Fla.1981) ( ). However, while the crashworthiness doctrine is now well established in this state, it is not entirely clear whether or how the principles of comparative fault should apply in such cases.3 That is the issue presented in the two cases before us today.
In D'Amario, Clifford Harris, a minor, was injured when the car in which he was riding as a passenger collided with a tree and then burst into flames. The car was driven by a friend of Harris who was allegedly intoxicated and speeding at the time of the accident.4 As described in the opinion below:
A witness to the crash circled the car twice and noticed a fire in the engine area. Some minutes later, the fire spread and an explosion occurred, engulfing the car in flames. Harris was severely injured, losing three limbs and suffering burns to much of his body.
D'Amario, 732 So.2d at 1145. Harris, and his mother, Karen D'Amario, sued Ford alleging that a defective relay switch in the automobile caused Harris's injuries. The plaintiffs did not seek damages against Ford for the injuries to Harris caused by the initial collision with the tree. Rather, they sought damages for the injuries caused by the alleged defective relay switch only. Ford asserted as an affirmative defense that the injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of a third party, although in its answer to the complaint, Ford did not specifically identify the vehicle's driver as a non-party tortfeasor.
At trial, the two sides advanced conflicting theories as to the cause of the fire and Harris's injuries. The plaintiffs' "theory of liability was that a relay switch failed, thus preventing it from disrupting the flow of power to the fuel pump." Id. Plaintiffs' experts "testified that gasoline continued to be pumped after the impact and caused the fire." Id. On the other hand, Ford's Id. Hence, clear lines and choices for the jury were drawn between the positions of the parties, the plaintiffs asserting the failure of the manufacturer's product, and the manufacturer countering that its products worked properly and no failure occurred.
Prior to jury selection, the plaintiffs moved to exclude evidence about the driver's alcohol consumption on the day of the accident and the trial court ruled that evidence of the driver's alcohol consumption would be excluded.5 The court reasoned that the acts leading up to the collision were not at issue, rather, the issue as to Ford's liability concerned events occurring after the initial collision with the tree. However, at trial, Ford moved to amend its affirmative defenses to include an allegation that Harris's injuries were caused by the fault of a third party, and proffered evidence of the driver's intoxication and excessive speed. The trial court granted Ford's request and held that an apportionment defense was available and evidence of the driver's actions in causing the initial accident could be admitted in support of such defense. In the face of such ruling, the parties stipulated to the jury that the negligent and excessive speed of the driver caused the initial accident and that at the time the driver had a blood alcohol level of.14 percent.
Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for the defense, finding that Ford was not a legal cause of the injuries to Harris. Because the jury found for the defense, it did not reach the question on the interrogatory verdict form as to the driver's comparative negligence. D'Amario subsequently moved for a new trial, alleging that the court erred in permitting evidence of the driver's intoxication to go to the jury. D'Amario also contended that the court erred in permitting Ford to amend its affirmative defense to include the driver as a "Fabre party"6 and to include him on the jury verdict form, where the defense had failed to comply with the advance pleading requirements of Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc., 678 So.2d 1262 (Fla.1996). In a supplemental memorandum to the court, D'Amario asserted that the driver's conduct was not a legal cause of Harris's injuries, and that the court's ruling during trial further prejudiced the...
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