D.B. v. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 12-1559 (FLW)
• Parties: D.B., a minor by his Guardians KRISTEN STEINNABEL AND RONALD BERGEN, Plaintiff, v. DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

D.B., a minor by his Guardians KRISTEN STEINNABEL AND RONALD BERGEN, Plaintiff, v. DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 12-1559 (FLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: November 5, 2012

***NOT FOR PUBLICATION***

OPINION

WOLFSON, United States District Judge:

Through this suit, Plaintiff D.B. ("Plaintiff" or "D.B.") seeks to hold Defendant Division of Youth and Family Services ("DYFS")¹, the Department of Human Services ("DHS"), and the State of New Jersey (collectively, "the State Defendants"), along with several unnamed state officials (collectively, "State Official Defendants"), accountable for alleged systematic acts of verbal and physical abuse perpetrated upon him while he was placed in the state foster care system. The State Defendants move to dismiss his suit under sovereign immunity grounds and for failure to file a tort claim notice. For the following reasons, their motion is denied.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I take the following facts from the Plaintiff's Complaint as true, as I must, on a motion to dismiss. Philips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).

A. Abuse Allegations

Near the end of 2002, DYFS removed D.B. and his brother from their mother's, Kristen Steinnagel's, care and placed them into foster care at the home of Matthew M. and Anne Marie Muzslay ("the Muzslays"). Compl., ¶¶ 3-4. At that time, D.B. was around three years old. See id. at ¶ 13 (noting D.B.'s birthdate of August 7, 1999). While D.B. was placed in foster care, Steinnagel was allowed to visit him, along with his brother, at the DYFS office in Asbury Park, New Jersey on a bi-weekly basis for a period of two years. Id. at ¶ 4. During those visits, Steinnagel noticed that D.B. was often wearing "old and filthy clothes" and had "visible bruises on his legs and body." Id. at ¶ 5. At one such visit, she discovered that D.B. had a broken collar bone "which he claimed occurred from 'falling out of a van'." Id. He blamed other injuries on the Muzslays's dog or on his own clumsiness. Id. Steinnagel reported directly to DYFS caseworkers that D.B. was bruised and wearing dirty clothes, and she made separate reports of abuse via the DYFS Abuse Hotline. Id. at ¶ 7. Despite these reports, no action was taken to investigate her claims or to remove D.B. from the Muzslays's home. Id. at ¶ 8.

D.B. alleges that, while living with the Muzslays, he was subjected to verbal and physical abuse. According to him, the Muzslays's threw objects at him, including shoes and boots, and slammed his leg in a door. Id. at ¶ 6. They also struck him. D.B.asserts that he did not report any of these acts of violence when they occurred because Mrs. Muzslay directed him not to speak about the abuse, and threatened him. Id.

D.B. remained at the Muzslays until 2006, when his mother won custody of him through a court proceeding. Id. at ¶ 9. Now that D.B. has returned to living with his mother, he exhibits difficulty in dealing with his emotions and expresses extreme anger. He has been unable to attend school, and, as of May 28, 2009, has been referred to a special education institution for the emotionally disturbed. Id. at ¶¶ 10-12. He has been hospitalized, attends therapy twice per week, and is currently taking a series of psychiatric medications. Id.

According to the complaint, DYFS is an agency within DHS. DYFS was established by the State of New Jersey to investigate reports of abuse and neglect, to ensure the well-being of children placed in foster care, and protect those children from maltreatment at the hand of their foster parents. See id. at ¶ 24. Once a child is placed in foster care, his case is assigned to a district office caseworker. Id. at ¶ 25. Thereafter, a regional DYFS Foster Home Unit places the child in an appropriate home. The district office is responsible for making face-to-face contact and monitoring the child's progress in the home. Id. Each foster care home is licensed through DYFS. Prior to 2003, licenses were granted by DYFS's District and Regional Foster Home Units and DYFS's Bureau of Licensing. Id. at 26. Post-2003, licenses are granted by DHS's Office of Licensing. Id. The regional Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit is responsible for investigating accusations of abuse and/or neglect in a foster care setting. Id.

Based on DYFS's and DHS's alleged failure to protect D.B. from abuse at the hands of the Muzslays, D.B. brings the instant suit against Defendants DYFS, DHS, the State of New Jersey, the Muzslays, Managerial Does 1-10, Supervisory Does 1-10, and Casework Does 1-10. The Managerial and Supervisory Doe Defendants encompass both DYFS and DHS staff, whereas the Casework Does refer to solely DYFS staff.

D.B. asserts the following claims against these defendants: (i) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 substantive due process claim against the DHS and DYFS supervisory and managerial staff in their individual capacities (Counts 1 and 2)²; (ii) a section 1983 claim against those same defendants based on procedural due process (Count 3); (iii) a substantive due process claim under the New Jersey Constitutional against all defendants (Counts 4 and 5); (iv) a violation of the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6B-1, et seq., against all defendants (Count 6); (v) several claims based upon the defendants' failure to comply with applicable New Jersey statutes and regulations relating to their visitation obligations, licensing of foster care homes, and abuse investigation obligations (Counts 7, 8, and 9); (vi) a negligence claim against all defendants, citing the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. (Count Ten); and (vii) a vicarious liability claim against the State Defendants for the Muzslays's alleged abusive actions (Count Eleven).

B. Tort Claim Notice

D.B. filed an initial notice of claim with the State of New Jersey's Division of Risk Management at the Department of Treasury, on September 1, 2011. See Pl. Opp., Exh. 1.³ In that notice, D.B. lists the Division of Youth and Family Services and the DHS as the agencies who caused him harm. Several months after the initial notice was filed, on November 1, 2011, the Division of Risk Management acknowledged receipt of the notice and indicated that it was forwarding the notice to the Chief of Investigations at the Division of Law. Id., Exh. 2.

The State Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds, and for failure to timely file a tort claims notice.⁴

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiffmay be entitled to relief." Philips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted). In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court clarified the 12(b)(6) standard. There, the Court stated that the factual allegations set forth in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id., at 545. As the Third Circuit has stated, "the Supreme Court's Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus: 'stating...a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element. This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, at 547). In affirming that Twombly standards apply to all motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court explained some of the important principles. First, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). Second, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. Moreover, in deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of Plaintiff's claim. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004).

III. DISCUSSION

The State Defendants present two grounds for dismissal. First, they argue that Plaintiff's section 1983 claims⁵ against DYFS and DHS must be dismissed with prejudice because these state entities are entitled to sovereign immunity. Second, the State Defendants argue that all claims against them must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim within 90 days of its accrual, as is required by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. I address each argument in turn.

A. Sovereign Immunity

Section 1983 serves a mechanism through which plaintiffs may bring suit in federal court for civil rights violations committed by state actors. It provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

While section 1983 grants plaintiffs a means...