D.C. ex rel. T.C. v. Mount Olive Twp. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No.: 12-5592 (KSH) |
| Parties | D.C. on behalf of T.C. and D.C. Plaintiffs, v. MOUNT OLIVE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C., on behalf of herself and her son, T.C., seeks review of a decision by the Honorable Mumtaz Bari-Brown, an Administrative Law Judge in the Office of Administrative Law (the "ALJ"), that found in favor of the defendant, the Mount Olive Township Board of Education ("the Township"). The plaintiffs argue that the Township committed numerous procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA," 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) over a period spanning several years, thereby denying T.C. the free, appropriate public education ("FAPE") he is entitled to under the law. The plaintiffs also separately move for injunctive relief. For the following reasons, the Court will grant judgment in favor of the Township and deny the request for an injunction.
The IDEA is a "comprehensive scheme of federal legislation designed to meet the special educational needs of children with disabilities." M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist.,344 F.3d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 2003). Originally enacted in 1970 as part of the Education of the Handicapped Act, it provides federal funds to assist states "in providing educational services to children with disabilities," subject to the condition "that states meet a number of substantive and procedural criteria." Id. at 338 & n.4.
IDEA cases are often "replete with acronyms," M.H. ex rel. P.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 223 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012), and this one is no exception. The first is FAPE. The IDEA requires those states that "provide special education funds [and that] are eligible for federal funds to implement state-wide special education programs that guarantee a FAPE to eligible disabled children." CG v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)). The United States Supreme Court has summarized the statutory definition of FAPE, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), as consisting of "educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the instruction." Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982). The programs provided under the IDEA reflect a preference for "mainstreaming," meaning that a child should be placed in the least restrictive environment that will provide him with a meaningful educational benefit. L. E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2006).
The second essential IDEA concept is the "individualized education program" ("IEP"), the "centerpiece" of the IDEA. See D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2010). The statute identifies numerous procedural and substantive criteria that must be met foran IEP to be deemed satisfactory. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). "The IDEA does not set forth definitive guidelines for the formulation of an IEP, but at a minimum, [t]he IEP must be 'reasonably calculated' to enable the child to receive 'meaningful educational benefits' in light of the student's 'intellectual potential.'" Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). "The right to a FAPE ensures that students with special education needs receive the type of education that will 'prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.'" Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). However, school districts are not required to "maximize the potential" of each student. Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., 723 F.3d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Under the IDEA, providing a FAPE is a "collaborative process . . . between parents and schools," with the IEP as the "central vehicle" for the collaboration. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2012). School districts work with parents to design the IEP, which "must include an assessment of the child's current educational performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature of the special services that the school will provide." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
"In addition to the general requirements set out in the IDEA, state and federal regulations detail the implementation of the statute." S.H., 336 F.3d at 264 (3d Cir. 2003). The relevant federal regulations can be found at 34 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.; New Jersey's codification of the IDEA requirements is contained in Title 6A, Chapter 14 of the New Jersey Administrative Code. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.320-23 (); N.J.A.C. § 6A:14-3.7 (same). New Jersey's IEP requirements follow the federal requirements. See D.S., 602 F.3d at 557 n.1. And under the state's regulations, "a child study team, which includes a school psychologist, a learning disabilities teacher-consultant, and a school social worker, along with specialists in the area of disabilities, school personnel, and parents[, is] 'responsible for identification, evaluation, determination of eligibility, development and review of the individualized education program, and placement.'" J.T. ex rel. A.T. v. Dumont Pub. Sch., 533 F. App'x 44, 46 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential).
"When a party objects to the adequacy of the education provided, the construction of the IEP, or some related matter, IDEA provides procedural recourse: [i]t requires that a State provide '[a]n opportunity for any party to present a complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of [a FAPE] to such child.'" Winkelman ex rel Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525 (2007) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)). This takes the form of an administrative proceeding centered around an "impartial due process" hearing, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1); see also R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 2012) (). After state proceedings are finished, "the IDEA permits an aggrieved party to bring a civil action in any court." S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).
The following is drawn from the exhibits submitted by the plaintiffs as attachments to their motion for summary judgment and the reply brief in support of that motion, as well as the parties' statements of material fact. The exhibits in question, which are set out in the two relevant declarations by attorney Jenna Statfeld Harris [D.E. 22, 27], include: T.C.'s IEPs from 2007 through 2011, evaluations and other assessments, parent/school correspondence, and documents created during the impartial due process administrative action. As discussed further below, the exhibits track, but do not match exactly, the record compiled before the agency.
Since the exhibits are, with one exception, all attached to the first Harris declaration, the Court will refer to them by the exhibit numbers assigned by the plaintiffs. Because they are inconsistently paginated and often contain inserts and enclosures, the Court will cite to specific page ranges when possible but will otherwise describe the documents in detail sufficient to identify their place in the record.
T.C., now 20 years old, is a young man with high-functioning autism,1 a disability covered by the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A). He was diagnosed at an early age. At threeand a half, he attended a half-day preschool program for disabled children in Morris County, transitioning to the private Park Lake School in Morris Plains around age five. T.C. returned to public school for third grade, enrolling in the Nixon Elementary School in Roxbury Township, then moved to the Lincoln Roosevelt Elementary School (also in Roxbury) for fourth grade. In April 2003, T.C. withdrew from Lincoln Elementary. His mother, D.C., home schooled him for the remainder of fourth grade through the third marking period of seventh grade. (See Mount Olive Social Assessment 1-2, Ex. 8.)
In 2004, at the age of eleven and while he was being home schooled, T.C. was given a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation by pediatric neuropsychologist Daniel DaSilva. The evaluation was requested by the Lincoln Elementary Child Study Team to assess T.C.'s neurocognitive status "and to assist in educational planning." Dr. DaSilva's report summarized T.C. as exhibiting "wide variability throughout the neurocognitive profile with normal and impaired functioning within virtually all domains." (See 2004 Neuropsychological Evaluation 1, 12, Ex. 42.)
The period of home schooling came to a close in 2007, when T.C. was 13. Reflecting his parents' desire for a "more inclusive educational program" (2007 IEP 2), T.C. was enrolled in Mount Olive Middle School, with the aim of gradually transitioning him into a general-education curriculum. To assist with this transition, the Mount Olive Middle School created an IEP reflecting its initial evaluation of his abilities. Both T.C. and D.C. attended the IEP implementation meeting.
The IEP describes him as a "pleasant, hard[-]working student who has made a good adjustment to a shortened program at the middle school," and lists T.C.'s "moderate to severelanguage disorder," "weaknesses in receptive and expressive language," and "borderline range" functioning....
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