D.C. v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 17 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-20339,20-20339 |
| Parties | D.C., an individual with a disability; J.C., as parent/guardian/next friends of D.C., an individual with a disability; K.C., as parent/guardian/next friends of D.C., an individual with a disability, Plaintiffs—Appellees, v. KLEIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant—Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Before HAYNES, GRAVES, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.
*
This case was brought on behalf of D.C., a minor with a specific learning disability in reading comprehension. Soon after D.C. started first grade in the Klein Independent School District (the "District"), his teachersrealized that he struggled with reading comprehension and fluency. By the end of second grade, school officials recognized that D.C. was "in need of intensive intervention" due to his reading deficiencies. Although the District provided D.C. with increasing accommodations, his grades and test scores continued to decline in some respects. Finally, in fifth grade, the District evaluated D.C. and determined that he was eligible to receive special education. Yet, when District officials met with D.C.'s parents to draft a special education program, they failed to provide D.C. with any specialized instruction in reading comprehension. Once the program was implemented, D.C. showed only marginal improvements in his reading ability and remained well below grade-level.
Dissatisfied with the District's program, D.C.'s parents sued the District on D.C.'s behalf under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the "IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82. There are two key questions remaining in this lawsuit: (1) did the District unreasonably delay evaluating D.C. for special education eligibility; and (2) did the District fail to provide D.C. with an adequate special education program? So far, a state hearing officer, a magistrate judge, and a district court have unanimously answered each question, "Yes." We agree, and therefore AFFIRM.
The IDEA provides that in exchange for "federal funds to assist in educating children with disabilities," "a State pledges to comply with a number of statutory conditions." Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017). Chief among these conditions is the requirement to provide a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") "to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). Under the IDEA, a FAPE "consists ofeducational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the . . . child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the instruction." Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982).
The IDEA provides a comprehensive scheme to ensure that every eligible child is provided a FAPE. This scheme begins with the "child find" mandate, which requires each state to "identif[y], locate[], and evaluate[]" each resident child with disabilities "who [is] in need of special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A). Once an eligible child is identified, the IDEA requires preparation of an Individual Education Plan ("IEP") "tailored to the unique needs of" the child. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181. The "IEP must be drafted in compliance with a detailed set of procedures," which "emphasize collaboration among parents and educators." Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414). Further, "[e]ach IEP must include an assessment of the child's current educational performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature of the special services that the school will provide." Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)). Ultimately, "a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances." Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
If the collaborative IEP-drafting process breaks down, the IDEA offers a detailed dispute-resolution process. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415. As relevant here, "the parents or the local educational agency involved" may request an "impartial due process hearing," the exact procedures of which are determined by state law. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A). At the conclusion of the state administrative process, any aggrieved party may seek relief in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Additionally, a federal court may award attorneys'fees to the parents if they are the "prevailing party" in the litigation. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
During first through fourth grade, D.C. struggled with reading comprehension and fluency. The District recognized that D.C. was struggling, and attempted to address his issues through means other than special education.1 When he was in third grade, his mother requested a special education evaluation from the school. After reviewing D.C.'s file, the District's Referral Committee concluded that D.C. did not appear to be in need of special education. However, on March 22, 2016, the District's Section 504 Student Review Committee convened and determined that D.C. had a disability under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, warranting a number of instructional accommodations. These accommodations included: not requiring D.C. to read aloud, providing extra time for assignments, permitting frequent breaks, and allowing oral administration of assignments and tests.
On September 3, 2017, just before the start of D.C.'s fifth grade year, D.C.'s parents again requested a special education evaluation. On October 19, 2017, the District's Referral Committee met with D.C.'s mother and, with her consent, referred him for evaluation. The evaluation was completed on January 14, 2018, concluding that D.C. had a specific learning disability in reading comprehension.
The District's Admission, Review, and Dismissal ("ARD") Committee met with D.C.'s parents on February 7, 2018 to review the resultsof the evaluation and to formulate an IEP. After three days of meetings (February 7, March 1, and March 9), the ARD Committee prepared an IEP for D.C.; D.C.'s parents signed the IEP and agreed to its immediate implementation. D.C.'s IEP recognized that he had a "Specific Learning Disability in the area of Reading Comprehension, Reading Fluency, Basic Reading Skill," and, at the insistence of D.C.'s family, identified him as a "student with Dyslexia." The IEP placed D.C. in general education for all of his classes, but offered two major special services: (1) 3.75 hours per week of co-teach reading instruction, and (2) dyslexia services.
D.C.'s parents filed a due process complaint with the Texas Education Agency on April 27, 2018. A hearing was held in August 2018, and the hearing officer issued his decision in November 2018. Based on his review of the evidence, the hearing officer determined that D.C. had a specific learning disability in reading comprehension and that his "reading comprehension deficit [was] the root of his issues with reading fluency and his primary area of need."
The hearing officer then concluded that the District had denied D.C. a FAPE by violating its child find duty and by failing to prepare an adequate IEP. With respect to child find, the hearing officer found that the District had reason to suspect D.C. was eligible for special education by April 27, 2017, and had unreasonably delayed evaluating him until January 2018.2
With respect to the adequacy of the IEP, the hearing officer found that: (1) the IEP was not individualized because it did not provide D.C. with a specialized program to address his reading comprehension disability, instead providing D.C. with dyslexia services, even though there was insufficient evidence that D.C. was dyslexic; (2) the IEP did provide services in the least-restrictive environment; (3) the IEP did not provide services in a collaborative manner; and (4) the IEP did not provide D.C. with sufficient academic benefit as he made only minimal progress in reading. Accordingly, the hearing officer ruled that the District had not provided D.C. with a FAPE.
Based on these findings, the hearing officer ordered the District to modify the IEP so as to provide D.C. with forty-five minutes per day of reading instruction using either Read 180, a research-based reading comprehension program, or a similar peer-reviewed program. The hearing officer also awarded D.C. 108 hours of compensatory education.
In January 2019, D.C.'s parents filed suit in federal district court, seeking attorneys' fees and costs as the prevailing party in the state administrative proceedings. The District counterclaimed, asserting that D.C. was not a prevailing party because the hearing officer's decision was erroneous. The District also sought reversal of the hearing officer's award of compensatory education.
D.C. and the District filed cross-motions for summary judgment.3 The magistrate judge reviewed these motions and recommended that thedistrict court grant D.C.'s motion and deny the District's. The District timely objected to the magistrate judge's recommendations.
Although the district court agreed with the District that the magistrate judge had applied an incorrect standard of review, it concluded that this error was not dispositive. Accordingly, the district court modified the magistrate judge's report and recommendation to apply the correct standard of review, but otherwise adopted it in full. In its memorandum order, the district court agreed with the hearing officer's conclusions regarding child find, found that D.C.'s IEP was inadequate because it was not appropriately individualized and did not provide a demonstrated...
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