D'Entremont v. Atlas Health Care Linen Servs., Co.
| Decision Date | 13 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | 1:12-CV-0060 (LEK/RFT) |
| Parties | CORBET D'ENTREMONT Plaintiff, v. ATLAS HEALTH CARE LINEN SERVICES, CO., LLC; SCOTT WAKEMAN, sued individually and as as an employee of Atlas; and JANE DOE, Quality Control Manager for Atlas, sued individually and as agent for Atlas, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
On January 12, 2012, pro se Plaintiff Corbet D'Entremont ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint against Defendants Atlas Health Care Linen Services, Co., LLC ("Atlas"), Scott Wakeman, and a single Jane Doe Defendant ("Doe" or "the Doe Defendant") identified as a "Quality Control Manager for Atlas" (collectively, "Defendants"). Dkt. No. 1 ("Complaint"). Plaintiff asserts federal claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and § 510 of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Id. On January 12, 2012, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which was subsequently granted by the Honorable Randolph F. Treece, United States Magistrate Judge. Dkt. Nos. 2, 7.
Following a number of extension requests by Defendants, which were granted by Judge Treece,1 Defendants filed a Motion to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on April 30, 2012.2 Dkt. No. 25 ("Defendants' Motion"). On May 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to Defendants' Motion. Dkt. No. 31 ("Plaintiff's Response"). Defendants, in turn, filed a Reply on June 4, 2012. Dkt. No. 32 ("Defendants' Reply").
On June 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion to amend his Complaint to name the Doe Defendant and "fix any deficiencies the court may find." Dkt. No. 37 ("Plaintiff's Motion"). On June 28, 2012, Defendants filed a Response in opposition. Dkt. No. 38 ("Defendants' Response"). Plaintiff, in turn, filed a Reply on July 13, 2012. Dkt. No. 39 ("Plaintiff's Reply"). Presently before the Court are Defendants' Motion to dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to amend
The Court presumes the parties' familiarity with the factual allegations underlying this action and recites them here only to the extent necessary to resolve the instant Motions. For a more complete statement of the facts, reference is made to the Complaint.
On January 14, 2011, Plaintiff began work for Atlas as a laundry sorter. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. Plaintiff was given papers to sign by Doe, who also informed Plaintiff that he was on a 90-day probation period with Atlas, after which he would be able to join the union, as well as Atlas's medical, dental, and life insurance plans. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. On his first day of work, Plaintiff worked from approximately 7:00 AM until 7:30 PM. Id. ¶ 12. He was assigned to the "clean side" of the factory, where his job duties included folding clean linen and placing it into designated carts. Id. Following his first day of work, Plaintiff experienced no back pain. Id.
The following day, after starting work on the clean side of the factory, Plaintiff was transferred to the "dirty side," where his job responsibilities involved unloading dirty laundry from trucks, carrying crates, and sorting and lifting bags of dirty laundry. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. By the end of the day, Plaintiff was experiencing slight pain in his lower back.
On January 16, 2011, Plaintiff reported for work wearing a back brace that had been provided to him by a physician. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff once again worked on the dirty side of the factory. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. After lunch, Plaintiff spoke with his supervisor and told his supervisor - when asked - that he preferred working on the clean side of the factory because of his back problems.3 Id. ¶ 23. The supervisor said that he would try to have Plaintiff reassigned to the clean side. Id. That night, Plaintiff experienced significant lower back pain. Id. ¶ 26.
The following day, January 17, 2011, Plaintiff was experiencing excruciating back pain and went to St. Mary's Hospital instead of reporting for work. Id. ¶¶ 27-29. There, he was given a doctor's note "keeping him out of work for three days." Id. ¶ 30. While he had not informed Atlas of his absence in advance or on the day of his trip to the hospital, Plaintiff called Atlas's "absentee hotline" at 12:00 A.M. on January 18, 2011, and left a message explaining the situation (including the existence of the doctor's note). Id. ¶¶ 30-35. Plaintiff did not attend work the next day, and left another message on the absentee hotline explaining that he would be missing work on January 20 for a doctor's appointment. Id. ¶¶ 37-38.
After meeting with his back specialist, Dr. Whalen, on January 20, 2011, Plaintiff left yet another message with Atlas, this time stating that Dr. Whalen was keeping him out of work for thenext seven days and asking that someone from Atlas call him to discuss the situation.4 Id. ¶ 42. On January 21, 2011, Plaintiff brought his doctor's note to the Atlas building and rang the door bell, but no one responded.5 Id. ¶ 43. Plaintiff left another voice message explaining that he had tried to drop off the doctor's note and stating that he would be out of work until January 26, 2011. Id. ¶ 45.
On January 26, 2011, Plaintiff finally returned to Atlas. Id. ¶ 47. He gave both of his doctor's notes to Doe and told her about his back injury and explained that he had called in to report his absences after the first day. Id. ¶¶ 47-49. Plaintiff told her that he had discussed the possibility of filing a worker's compensation claim against Atlas with Dr. Whalen, but that they had determined that Plaintiff should not because his back pain was an aggravation of a previous injury. Id. ¶ 51. At this point, Doe asked how long Plaintiff had worked for Atlas. Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff replied "three days," Doe looked over Plaintiff's doctors' notes one more time, and told him, "[U]nfortunately, we let you go." Id. ¶¶ 53-54.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants knew he was serving a court-ordered sentence of probation at the time of his employment because he had stated it on his job application form. Id. ¶¶ 57-59. Following his firing, Plaintiff was charged with violating the terms of his probation in part due to his not having gainful employment. Id. Plaintiff was sentenced to three years' incarceration and post release probation due to his violation. Id. ¶ 60.
Plaintiff pursued state administrative remedies against Atlas for discrimination and, on October 17, 2011, received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment OpportunityCommission ("EEOC"). Id. ¶¶ 50-63. The instant suit followed.
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Such a determination "requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). A court must accept as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that there are not "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct]." Id. at 556. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Where a court is unable to infer more than the mere possibility of the alleged misconduct based on the pleaded facts, the pleader has not demonstrated that he or she is entitled to relief and the action is subject to dismissal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Additionally, the allegations of a pro se litigant are to be construed under a "less stringentstandard[] than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave[,] . . . he court should freely give leave when justice so requires." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). "In the absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely given.'" Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). As noted, the allegations of a pro se litigant are to be construed under a "less stringent standard[] than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; see also Harris, 572 F.3d at 72. "A pro se plaintiff, particularly one bringing a civil rights action, should be afforded an opportunity fairly freely to amend his complaint." Holmes v. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) ( ...
To continue reading
Request your trial