D.F. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re R.A.M.O.)
| Decision Date | 10 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-JC-1873 |
| Citation | 190 N.E.3d 385 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF R.A.M.O., Child in Need of Services, D.F., Mother, Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Jennifer D. Wilson Reagan, Wilson & Wilson, Greenwood, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert J. Henke, Natalie F. Weiss, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] D.F. ("Mother") appeals the juvenile court's determination that her minor child, R.A.M.O., is a child in need of services. Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in continuing her factfinding hearing beyond the 120-day timeframe set forth in Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(b). She also asserts that the trial court's decision to continue the matter violated her due process rights. Because we disagree, we affirm.
[2] C.O. ("Father") and Mother are the parents of R.A.M.O. ("Child"), who was born on September 4, 2020. Soon after Child was born, DCS opened an informal adjustment, which is a lesser intervention than a child in need of services ("CHINS") case, due to Mother's untreated mental health issues and inability to care for Child. A couple of months later, while the informal adjustment was ongoing, DCS received a report alleging neglect of Child. Child was an inpatient at Riley Hospital for Children, and hospital staff reported that Mother did not engage with Child and refused to feed Child. The staff also reported that they were concerned by Child's weight and that Child could become malnourished or ultimately die due to her feeding issues.
[3] When Family Case Manager ("FCM") Demi Eckles visited the hospital to investigate the report, she noticed that Child had been left in her hospital room unattended. She also observed that Child, who was roughly six months old, needed assistance to sit upright and that she had a recognizable flat spot on her head. At the time, Mother reported to FCM Eckles that there was domestic violence within their household.
[4] DCS removed Child from Mother's care and filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS. It also closed the informal adjustment because it had failed. The juvenile court then set a factfinding date of April 22, 2021, but the factfinding date was later reset to June 21, 2021, upon the parties’ request. Specifically, the parties asked that this matter be continued and reset for additional facilitation because they were unable to resolve their issues. Further, the parties agreed to waive the sixty-day statutory timeframe set forth in Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(a) that requires a factfinding hearing to be completed no later than sixty days after the CHINS petition is filed.
[5] On the date of the factfinding, DCS requested a continuance, which the trial court granted, because Mother's psychological examination revealed that she was mentally incompetent and needed the appointment of a guardian. Mother's counsel then requested that the juvenile court set the factfinding hearing within 120 days of the filing of the CHINS petition,1 and the factfinding date was reset to June 25, 2021. Then, the day before this new factfinding date, DCS filed a motion for continuance. The DCS attorney for this matter was admitted to the hospital for labor induction and was unable to find a substitute because all DCS attorneys in the region were at a mandatory training out of town. The juvenile court held a hearing on DCS's motion on June 25, 2021. It ultimately granted DCS's motion over Mother's objection, and the factfinding date was reset to a day within the 120-day statutory deadline—June 28, 2021.
[6] After the hearing on June 25, 2021, DCS filed another motion for continuance, asserting that two of its "essential witnesses" were unable to testify on June 28, 2021. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 84. Both witnesses performed neuropsychological evaluations on Mother, which were relevant to Mother's ability to understand the underlying proceedings and to parent Child. Also, both witnesses were out of their offices until after the 120-day statutory deadline expired. After holding a hearing on DCS's second motion for continuance, the juvenile court granted the motion over Mother's objection, found that there was good cause to set the hearing past the 120-day statutory deadline, and reset the factfinding date to July 14, 2021.
[7] The juvenile court held the factfinding hearing on July 14, 2021.2 Rachel Boes, who was assigned to offer supervised visitation and home-based casework to Mother through DCS, testified that Mother's home was an unsafe environment for Child. Particularly, the home contained clutter, overflowing trash, trash on the floor, tools, lighters, loose tobacco, and rotting food. There were also firearms scattered throughout the home. Thus, because Child was a mobile infant, she would have been physically endangered living in the home.
[8] Also, Mother continued to disclose to DCS instances of domestic violence between her and Father. She stated that she was afraid to clean her home because she would have to move Father's possessions and feared doing so. Relatedly, Boes observed bruises on Mother's neck, which were consistent with strangulation marks. Further, Boes testified that Mother would "zone out" during visits and would not pay adequate attention to Child. Tr. at 87.
[9] During the factfinding hearing, Dr. Barbara Gelder testified that Mother had severe functioning limitations that negatively impacted her ability to care for herself and Child. Some of these limitations included a limited ability to understand abstract concepts and common situations. Dr. Gelder also concluded that Mother's social and emotional functioning was rated at roughly a three-year-old level, while her adaptive functioning was consistent with that of a three- to four-year-old child.
[10] In August 2021, the juvenile court entered its order determining that Child was a CHINS, and, among other facts, found that:
[Child's] physical condition is seriously impaired as a result of [Mother's] inability to provide [Child] with adequate care. [Mother's] current home conditions constitute a clear danger to [Child], a mobile infant. Mother has shown that she is unable to protect [Child] from Domestic Violence, which is ongoing within the home. [Mother's] inattentive parenting has already impacted [Child] with a flat spot on [her] head. Due to [Mother's] inability to properly supervise [Child], [Child] would be in grave danger in [Mother's] care.
[11] Shortly after, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing and issued its dispositional order, which stated that it was in Child's best interests to be removed from the home. The order also directed Mother to participate in various services. Mother now appeals.
[12] Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's findings of fact and conclusions, or the evidence supporting the court's findings. Instead, she argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in continuing the factfinding hearing beyond the 120-day timeframe set forth in Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(b), which she argues also violated her right to due process. Lastly, because counsel failed to preserve Mother's timeliness objection by filing a motion to dismiss, Mother contends she received ineffective assistance from counsel.
[13] "Indiana law provides that a [juvenile] court must dismiss a [CHINS petition] ... if the court does not conclude a factfinding hearing within 120 days of the filing of the petition by the State." In re M.S. , 140 N.E.3d 279, 280 (Ind. 2020) (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-11-1(d) ). However, the "Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure ... allow a party to move for a continuance if that party can show ‘good cause’ for why a continuance is necessary in a particular case." Id. at 280–81 (citing Ind. Trial Rule 53.5.). "Because our trial rules trump statutes on matters of procedure, Rule 53.5 allows extension of the 120-day deadline in Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(b) provided a party can show ‘good cause.’ " Id. at 284.
[14] "[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents." Id. Thus, juvenile Id. at 285. "We will reverse the [juvenile] court only for an abuse of that discretion." In re K.W. , 178 N.E.3d 1199, 1206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). A juvenile court abuses its discretion when it reaches a conclusion that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable and probable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. "There are no ‘mechanical tests’ for determining whether a request for a continuance was made for good cause." M.S. , 140 N.E.3d at 285. Instead, "the decision to grant or deny a continuance turns on the circumstances present in a particular case." K.W. , 178 N.E.3d at 1206.
[15] Here, DCS filed its CHINS petition on March 1, 2021. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 26. The matter was set for factfinding on April 22, 2021, and the sixty-day deadline was set to expire on April 30, 2021. Upon the parties’ request, the April factfinding date was later reset to June 21, 2021. The parties agreed to waive the sixty-day statutory timeframe set forth in Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(a) and expand the factfinding date to 120 days pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1(b). The record reflects that the 120th day was June 29, 2021. Tr. at 7–8. The juvenile court ultimately held the factfinding hearing outside the 120-day timeframe on July 14, 2021.
[16] We initially note that if a hearing is not held within the 120-day timeframe, Indiana Code section 31-34-11-1...
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