D.H. v. Clayton Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 16 November 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:12–CV–00478–AT.
• Citation: 904 F.Supp.2d 1301
• Parties: D.H., a minor by his mother Angela DAWSON, Plaintiff, v. CLAYTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Chief Kemuel Kimbrough, of the Clayton County Sheriff's Office, individually, Former Eddit White Academy Assistant Principal Tyrus McDowell, individually, Former School Resource Officer Ricky Redding, individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

904 F.Supp.2d 1301

D.H., a minor by his mother Angela DAWSON, Plaintiff,

v.CLAYTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Chief Kemuel Kimbrough, of the Clayton County Sheriff's Office, individually, Former Eddit White Academy Assistant Principal Tyrus McDowell, individually, Former School Resource Officer Ricky Redding, individually, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:12–CV–00478–AT.

United States District Court,

N.D. Georgia,

Atlanta Division.

Nov. 16, 2012.

Adam B. Wolf, Wolf Legal, San Francisco, CA, Craig Lewis Goodmark, Goodmark Law Firm, LLC, Decatur, GA, Gerald R. Weber, Law Offices of Gerry Weber, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Brian R. Dempsey, Freeman Mathis & Gary, Atlanta, GA, Jack Reynolds Hancock, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Forest Park, GA, John C. Jones, Law Offices of John C. Jones, William F. Amideo, Law Office of William F. Amideo, Marietta, GA, Jacob Edward Daly, Freeman Mathis & Gary, Theodore Freeman, Freeman Mathis & Gary, Darren T. Horvath, Taylor English Duma LLP, for Defendants.

ORDER

AMY TOTENBERG, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Clayton County School District (“CCSD” or “the District”) and Kemuel Kimbrough's motions to dismiss [Doc. 23, 17]. Plaintiff files this suit seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff also files suit for violations of his constitutional rights under the Constitution of Georgia. SeeGa. Const. art I, § 1, paras. 13, 17; Id.art I, § 1, para. 1. Defendants move for dismissal, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to support his asserted claims against them.

I. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

This Court may dismiss a pleading for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A pleading fails to state a claim if it does not contain allegations that support recovery under any recognizable legal theory. 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2002); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court construes the pleading in the non-movant's favor and accepts the allegations of facts therein as true. See Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir.1993). The pleader need not have provided “detailed factual allegations” to survive dismissal, but the “obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In essence, the pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

II. BACKGROUND¹

This case involves the constitutionality of a strip search conducted by school officials on a seventh grade boy in the presence of other students as well as adults. On February 8, 2011, school officials at Eddie White Academy suspected three students (R.C., D.V., and T.D.) of possessing marijuana on campus and strip searched each one. (Compl. ¶ 7.) When they found no contraband, R.C. falsely told School Resource Officer Redding that the plaintiff, D.H., and another student had marijuana. ( Id. ¶ 8.)

After strip searching the other student, the school officials called D.H. into the vice principal's office, where School Resource Officer Redding, Vice Principal McDowell, and the three original suspected students were present. ( Id. ¶ 9.) The school officials searched D.H.'s pockets and book bag, but did not find any marijuana. ( Id. ¶ 10.) Mr. Collier then recanted his accusation that D.H. had marijuana, but Officer Redding continued the search anyway. ( Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.)

Vice Principal McDowell and Officer Redding proceeded with the strip search of D.H. ( Id. ¶ 15.) They refused D.H.'s request that they conduct the strip search privately in the bathroom away from the other students. The school also did not contact D.H.'s family before conducting the strip search. ( Id. ¶ ¶ 13, 14.) Plaintiff was required to take off all of his clothes—leaving him completely nude in front of Vice Principal McDowell, Officer Redding, and the other three students. ( Id. ¶ 15.) School officials found no contraband. ( Id.)

Before this incident, CCSD had conducted strip searches later found to be unconstitutional. ( Id. ¶ 20.) Specifically, in Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir.2001), vacated536 U.S. 953, 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 829 (2002), reinstated323 F.3d 950, 952 (11th Cir.2003), a group of schoolchildren sued CCSD, alleging they were subjected to unconstitutional strip searches. Id. at 1162. The Eleventh Circuit in Thomas affirmed the district court's holding that the searches were indeed unconstitutional. Id. at 1163. Since that time, CCSD officials and Police Chief Kimbrough allegedly failed to develop any new policies or procedures that instruct school officials on the kinds of searches they may conduct, ( id. ¶¶ 22, 24–26), and failed to implement any training of staff on constitutional requirements for conducting searches. ( Id.)

III. ANALYSISA. Defendant Clayton County School District's Motion to Dismiss

CCSD argues that Plaintiff's claims against it should be dismissed for failure to allege facts sufficient to support a constitutionalcause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. CCSD argues that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to establish the school district's liability for failure to train its officials to conduct searches in conformity with students' constitutional rights.² (Def. CCSD's Mot. Dismiss at 7.) Similarly, they argue that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to establish liability against the District based on a final decision-maker analysis. ( Id. at 11.) Consequently, CCSD urges the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state claims. ( Id. at 15.)

Plaintiff argues that he has pled sufficient facts to establish CCSD's liability. Plaintiff contends that the District and Chief Kimbrough failed to provide training to employees with responsibilities for conducting searches within the school, and strip searches in particular, consistent with constitutional requirements, although they were aware that these employees would regularly face situations requiring student searches and that strip searches would violate students' constitutional rights absent extraordinary circumstances. (Compl., ¶¶ 12, 24–26; Reply Br. at 5–11.) Further, Plaintiff argues that CCSD is liable because of the acts of Chief Kimbrough as a final decision-maker (Compl. ¶ 25). It also argues that Vice Principal McDowell acted as the final decision-maker on behalf of the District in determining to conduct the strip search as he maintained total discretion in executing the search and did not contravene any district policies in allowing the search to go forward. (Reply Br. at 12.)

1. Theory of Liability for Failure to Train

In order to give rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a governmental entity's “failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to deliberate indifference to the [constitutional] rights of persons with whom the untrained employees come into contact.” Connick v. Thompson, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). However, the government's “culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on failure to train.” Id. Under the Eleventh Circuit's framework, a plaintiff must prove three elements in order to prevail on a § 1983 action for failure to train: “(1) the government inadequately trained or supervised its employees; (2) the failure to train is an official policy; and (3) the policy caused the employees to violate the plaintiff's rights.” Thomas, 261 F.3d at 1173. Defendant argues that the Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second prong. (Def. CCSD's Mot. Dismiss at 8.)

A plaintiff satisfies the second prong by proving “that a policy existed by showing that the government knew that a need to train or supervise its employees existed but made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Thomas, 261 F.3d at 1173 (citation omitted). A Plaintiff must also demonstrate that the Defendant was on notice of the need to train its employees by showing either of the following: “(1) the government's employees face clear constitutional duties in recurrent situations; or (2) a pattern of constitutional violations exists such that the government knows or should know that corrective measures are needed.” Id. at 1173 (quotation marks omitted). As discussed further below, the Complaint alleges facts sufficient to support a record that CCSD was on notice that it should have trained its employees with respect to conducting strip searches and deliberately chose not to take any action.

a. The Complaint alleges facts that CCSD employees face clear constitutional duties in recurrent situations.

Plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to support a claim that the search of students for contraband is a recurring event faced by school officials. In light of the need to search students in these kinds of situations, CCSD has issued a policy to guide school officials on when to search students. (Def. CCSD's Ex. A., Doc. 34–1.) However, this policy appears virtually the same in its material elements as the policy that was in place before the Thomas suit.³ (Compl. ¶ 20); see also Thomas v. Clayton County Board of Education, 94 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1313–1314 (N.D.Ga.1999) (describing specific elements of CCSD's previous search policy). CCSD's search policy as well as the policies adopted by other school districts...