D.L. v. S.B.
| Decision Date | 25 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 76,No. 76 |
| Citation | 39 N.Y.3d 81,201 N.E.3d 771,181 N.Y.S.3d 154 |
| Parties | In the Matter of D.L., Appellant, v. S.B. et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NYU Family Defense Clinic, Washington Square Legal Services, New York City (Christine Gottlieb of counsel), and Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer US LLP, New York City (Scott A. Eisman and Elena Hadjimichael of counsel), for appellant.
Dennis M. Cohen, County Attorney, Central Islip (James G. Bernet of counsel), for Suffolk County Department of Social Services, respondent.
Law Office of Domenik Veraldi, Jr., Islandia (Domenik Veraldi, Jr. of counsel), Attorney for the Child.
Karen Freedman, Lawyers for Children, Inc., New York City (Betsy Kramer of counsel), Lawyers for Children, Inc. and others, amici curiae.
Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Rebecca L. Visgaitis, Richard Dearing and MacKenzie Fillow of counsel), for New York City Administration for Children's Services, amicus curiae.
Acting Chief Judge CANNATARO.
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC or Compact) is an agreement among the states to follow certain procedures in connection with sending children across state borders "for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption" ( Social Services Law § 374–a [1] [art III] [a]). The issue raised on this appeal is whether the ICPC applies to out-of-state, noncustodial parents seeking custody of their children who are in the custody of New York social services agencies. We hold that it does not.
Petitioner father, a North Carolina resident, and respondent mother, a New York resident, are the parents of the subject child. In 2012, respondent Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) removed the child from the custody of mother, who admitted neglecting the child, and placed the child in foster care. Father exercised his right to appear in the neglect proceeding and, in 2013, an application was made under the ICPC to North Carolina for the approval of father's home in that state as a suitable placement for the child. The relevant North Carolina authority denied the ICPC request. The child remained in foster care with the goal of reunification with mother and, according to father, he maintained contact with and continued to visit with the child. Thereafter, in 2017, father commenced these custody proceedings, arguing that it was in the child's best interests to award him sole custody. DSS argued that the child could not be placed with father in light of the North Carolina authority's 2013 refusal to consent to the placement.
Family Court dismissed father's petitions without conducting a hearing. The court held in pertinent part that the requirements of the ICPC applied to placement of the child with father, even though he is an out-of-state noncustodial parent, because the child was in the custody and care of DSS in New York. The court also rejected father's claim that the ICPC is unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to apply to a noncustodial parent's petition for custody of that parent's child. Father appealed.
The Appellate Division affirmed (183 A.D.3d 565, 121 N.Y.S.3d 644 [2nd Dept. 2020] ), holding that Family Court properly determined that the ICPC applied because "the child was in the custody of DSS and ... father resided in North Carolina" ( id. at 566, 121 N.Y.S.3d 644 ). The Court concluded that the petitions for custody were correctly dismissed without a hearing inasmuch as the relevant North Carolina authority denied approval of father's 2013 ICPC request ( id. ).
We granted father leave to appeal ( 37 N.Y.3d 901, 2021 WL 2151985 [2021] ) and now reverse.1
The ICPC is an agreement among the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. It is a non-federal agreement and is "construed as state law" in each adopting state ( McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 [3d Cir 1991] ). Governor Rockefeller approved New York's entry into the ICPC, which has since been codified in Social Services Law § 374–a (see Governor's Approval Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1960, ch 708).
The ICPC governs the "interstate placement of children" ( Social Services Law § 374–a [1] [art I]) and "was designed to promote cooperation among [s]tates in providing each child with the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment with persons or institutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care" ( Matter of Shaida W., 85 N.Y.2d 453, 458, 626 N.Y.S.2d 35, 649 N.E.2d 1179 [1995] []). The Compact was further intended to provide a state receiving a child with a "full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable requirements for the protection of the child" ( Social Services Law § 374–a [1] [art I] [b]) and to enable a sending state to "obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to evaluate a projected placement before it is made" ( id. § 374–a [1] [art I] [c]). The ICPC also promotes " ‘appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of the children involved’ " ( Matter of Shaida W., 85 N.Y.2d at 459, 626 N.Y.S.2d 35, 649 N.E.2d 1179, quoting Mem of Jud Conf of State of NY, Bill Jacket, L 1960, ch 708) and "was designed to prevent States from unilaterally ‘dumping’ their foster care responsibilities on other jurisdictions" ( id. ).
The ICPC provides at the outset that it applies when a state agency seeks to send children to a receiving state to be placed in foster care or for possible adoption. Specifically, article III of the ICPC provides:
‘‘Placement," in turn, is defined as "the arrangement for the care of a child in a family free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution" ( id. § 374–a [art II] [d]).
The Appellate Division Departments have disagreed regarding the applicability of the ICPC to noncustodial parents who reside outside New York. The Second Department has repeatedly applied the ICPC to out-of-state noncustodial parents, holding that "[w]here the custody of a child who is under the supervision of the Commissioner [of Social Services] is transferred to the custody of a parent or relative in another state, the provisions of the ICPC apply" ( Matter of Alexus M. v. Jenelle F., 91 A.D.3d 648, 650–651, 937 N.Y.S.2d 257 [2d Dept. 2012] ; see Matter of Faison v. Capozello, 50 A.D.3d 797, 797, 856 N.Y.S.2d 179 [2d Dept. 2008] ; Matter of Tumari W. v. Lynell W., 65 A.D.3d 1357, 1358–1359, 885 N.Y.S.2d 753 [2d Dept. 2009] ; Matter of Keanu Blue R., 292 A.D.2d 614, 614–615, 740 N.Y.S.2d 98 [2d Dept. 2002] ). By contrast, the First Department has expressly declined to follow the Second Department's interpretation of the ICPC and, instead, has held that the ICPC "does not apply" to out-of-state noncustodial parents, reasoning that the plain language of the ICPC limits its application to placements in foster care or adoptive settings ( Matter of Emmanuel B. [Lynette J.], 175 A.D.3d 49, 52, 106 N.Y.S.3d 58 [2019], lv dismissed 34 N.Y.3d 1036, 115 N.Y.S.3d 222, 138 N.E.3d 1104 [2019] ). The Third Department has recently endorsed the First Department's approach, albeit in dicta (see Matter of David Q. v. Schoharie County Dept. of Social Servs., 199 A.D.3d 1179, 1181 n., 159 N.Y.S.3d 155 [3d Dept. 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 901, 164 N.Y.S.3d 549, 185 N.E.3d 29 [2022] ). We are now called on to resolve the disagreement regarding ICPC applicability to noncustodial parents.
"It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the [l]egislature" and, because "the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [1998] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Moreover, "where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used" ( Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544, 359 N.E.2d 1338 [1976] ). " ‘Absent ambiguity the courts may not resort to rules of construction to [alter] the scope and application of a statute’ because no such rule ‘gives the court discretion to declare the intent of the law when the words are unequivocal’ " ( Kuzmich v. 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC, 34 N.Y.3d 84, 91, 108 N.Y.S.3d 431, 132 N.E.3d 624 [2019], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 904, 205 L.Ed.2d 462 [2020], quoting Bender v. Jamaica Hosp., 40 N.Y.2d 560, 562, 388 N.Y.S.2d 269, 356 N.E.2d 1228 [1976] ).
By its terms, the ICPC governs the out-of-state "placement" of children "in foster care or as a preliminary to possible adoption" ( Social Services Law § 374–a [1] [art III] [a] & [b]). The language of the statute thus unambiguously limits its applicability to cases of placement for foster care or adoption—which are substitutes for parental care that are not implicated when custody of the child is granted to a noncustodial parent. Indeed, applying the ICPC to noncustodial parents would be inconsistent with the...
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