D.L. v. Waukee Community School Dist.

• Decision Date: 26 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. 4:07-cv-00458.,4:07-cv-00458.
• Parties: D.L., E.L., and I.L., a Minor, by her Father and Mother and Next Friends, D.L. and E.L., Plaintiffs, v. The WAUKEE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Heartland Area Education Agency 11, Dr. Barbara Rankin (in her individual and official capacity), Monica McKevitt (in her individual and official capacity), Deb Snider (in her individual and official capacity), Kindra Sweeney (in her individual and official capacity), Roxanne Cumings (in her individual and official capacity), Jason Sanders (in his individual and official capacity), and Mirranda Krohn (in her individual and official capacity), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

578 F.Supp.2d 1178

D.L., E.L., and I.L., a Minor, by her Father and Mother and Next Friends, D.L. and E.L., Plaintiffs, v. The WAUKEE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Heartland Area Education Agency 11, Dr. Barbara Rankin (in her individual and official capacity), Monica McKevitt (in her individual and official capacity), Deb Snider (in her individual and official capacity), Kindra Sweeney (in her individual and official capacity), Roxanne Cumings (in her individual and official capacity), Jason Sanders (in his individual and official capacity), and Mirranda Krohn (in her individual and official capacity), Defendants.

No. 4:07-cv-00458.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

September 26, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thad J. Collins, Matthew G. Novak, Pickens Barnes & Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, IA, Beth E. Hansen, Swisher & Cohrt, PLC, Waterloo, IA, for Defendants.

Jeffrey S. Carter, Jeff Carter Law Office, Bruce H. Stoltze, Stoltze & Updegraff PC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

ROBERT W. PRATT, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Clerk's No. 15), filed on February 29, 2008 by Defendants Heartland Area Education Agency 11 ("Heartland"), Dr. Barbara Rankin ("Rankin"), and Monica McKevitt ("McKevitt"). On the same date, the Waukee Community School District ("Waukee School"), Patti Brinkmeyer ("Brinkmeyer"), Deb Snider ("Snider"), Kindra Sweeney ("Sweeney"), Roxanne Cumings ("Cumings"), Jason Sanders ("Sanders"), and Mirranda Krohn ("Krohn") filed a Joinder in the Motion to Dismiss. Clerk's No. 16. After receiving two extensions of time, Plaintiffs, D.L., E.L., and I.L. (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed a resistance to the Motion to Dismiss on April 24, 2008. Clerk's No. 21. Heartland, Rankin, and McKevitt filed a Reply on May 6, 2008 (Clerk's No. 30), and amended the Reply on May 20, 2008 (Clerk's No. 35).¹ After receiving an extension of time, Waukee School, Brinkmeyer, Snider, Sweeney, Cumings, Sanders, and Krohn filed a Reply on May 20, 2008. Clerk's No. 36. The matter is fully submitted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the abovecaptioned action on October 4, 2007. Clerk's No. 1. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint and Jury Demand on January 25, 2008. Clerk's No. 2. The Amended Complaint alleges that I.L. is the minor child of D.L. and E.L. Am. Compl. ¶ 5. Prior to the summer of 2004, Plaintiffs resided in Castle Rock, Colorado. Id. ¶ 11. In December 2001, I.L. was referred to the Child Development Unit of Children's Hospital in Denver for a cognitive and emotional assessment. Id. ¶ 12. The psychologist performing the assessment recommended that I.L. be placed on a "clear behavior plan," as she had experienced difficulty with aggression continuing from age two through her kindergarten year. Id. Individual Education Plans ("IEPs") were developed for I.L. for the 2002-2004 school years at Buffalo Ridge Elementary in Castle Rock. Id. ¶ 13. An IEP developed for I.L. on May 5, 2004, prior to the family's move to Iowa, identified her as having significant social and emotional needs. Id. ¶ 14.

When I.L.'s family moved to Iowa in 2004, they met with representatives of Waukee School to discuss I.L.'s special education program. Id. ¶ 15. Teachers from the Waukee School explained to I.L.'s parents that a student in a functional skills classroom would ordinarily participate in the following: daily oral language; daily oral math; a science-discovery class; lunch; recess; and "specials," including art, music, physical education, and library. Id. ¶ 16. After five days, teachers decided that I.L. would need a more advanced program for children with higher academic skills, so I.L. was transferred to Krohn's functional skills classroom. Id. ¶ 17.

On September 15, 2004, an interim IEP was developed, pending the results of an eligibility evaluation. The interim IEP provided that no behavior support plan was necessary; however, during the fall of 2004, I.L. experienced significant behavioral difficulties. Id. ¶ 18. In late October and early November 2004, a functional behavior assessment was conducted, comprised of observations from I.L.'s special education classroom. Id. ¶ 20. Heartland conducted a full evaluation of eligibility for educational services and issued a report on November 8, 2004. Id. ¶ 21. A formal IEP for the 2004-05 school year was developed on November 22, 2004. Id.

On December 14, 2004, I.L. was transferred to a new program, though no parental input was solicited before the change. Id. ¶ 22. According to the Amended Complaint, the educational program and services specified in I.L.'s IEP were not implemented in the new classroom. Id. Data regarding I.L.'s behavior showed increasing difficulties from December 2004 through February 2005, which resulted in five "applications of the hand-over-hand interventions."² Id. ¶ 23. During one of these interventions, E.L. observed that "some of Defendants were restraining I.L. and that her eyes were glazed, she was screaming and yelling and had urinated during the restraint." Id. ¶ 24. Behavioral problems continued into the fall of 2005, and Defendants "used more hand-overhand restraints, physical body restraints and a `calming room.'" Id. ¶ 27.

On November 18, 2005 a reevaluation IEP was developed. Id. ¶ 31. D.L. and E.L. wrote a letter to Principal Snider and Special Educator Brinkmeyer expressing concern over various proposed provisions of the November 18 IEP. A meeting was held on December 2, 2005, and a finalized IEP was developed. Id. ¶ 33. On December 7, 2005, I.L. was uncooperative in completing some work and was put into "timeout."³ The timer was set and reset, eventually resulting in the timeout lasting for 3 hours 12 minutes. Id. ¶ 36. The timeout was continued the next morning for another 25 minutes. Id. Additional extensive timeouts occurred over the next several days, including a 2 hour 10 minute timeout on December 12, 2005, a 5 hour 10 minute timeout on December 13, 2005, and a 1 hour 16 minute timeout on December 14, 2005. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. On December 15, 2005, I.L. was given several timeouts for varying lengths of time and had her lunch taken away. Id. ¶ 39. This pattern is alleged to have continued on a day-to-day basis. Id. ¶ 40. On January 13, 2006, revisions to the IEP were noted and it was suggested that isolation with immediate timeouts would be appropriate. Id. ¶ 41. D.L. expressed his objection to the revisions and stated that he intended to remove I.L. from school with outside support at the Waukee School's expense. Id.

E.L. and D.L. filed a complaint and had an administrative hearing conducted in accordance with the procedures provided by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). Pls.' Br. at 17. At this hearing, the administrative law judge provided educational remedies. Id. Plaintiffs concede that they received a favorable ruling from the administrative judge. Id. at 18. Defendants have appealed the administrative ruling to this Court.⁴ Since the filing of the present motion, Defendants' appeal has been decided, and the administrative ruling affirmed.⁵ See Case No. 4:07-cv-00278.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' conduct toward and treatment of I.L. caused various damages. The Amended Complaint asserts eleven causes of actions: (1) violation of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414-15,⁶ the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"); (2) denial of substantive and procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) denial of equal protection, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) violation of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 794; (5) disability discrimination in violation of Iowa Code § 216.9; (6) assault and battery; (7) false imprisonment; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (10) negligence—bystander; and (11) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress—bystander. In the present Motion to Dismiss, Defendants assert that none of Plaintiffs' causes of actions are viable and that each and every count must be dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

In order for the Court to dismiss a claim Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the opposing party must successfully challenge the claim "on its face or the factual truthfulness of its averments." Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). Facial challenges are limited to analyzing the face of the complaint. Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir.2005). Under a facial challenge, each factual allegation concerning jurisdiction is presumed to be true. Titus, 4 F.3d at 593. Thus, the moving party's motion can be "successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction." Id. Factual challenges invoke facts other than those pled in the complaint. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990). If a party mounts a factual challenge, "the Court may look outside the pleadings to determine whether jurisdiction exists, and the nonmoving party loses the benefit of favorable inferences from its factual statements." Dolls, Inc. v. City of Coralville, 425 F.Supp.2d 958, 970 (S.D.Iowa 2006). Here, Defendants motion to dismiss, to the extent it arises under Rule 12(b)(1), makes a facial challenge, asserting only that the allegations in the Amended Complaint, even if presumed to be true, are insufficient to support jurisdiction.⁷

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

In addressing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must follow the standard of review articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Supreme Court determined that the standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2...