D.M. v. Forrest Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't
| Decision Date | 19 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-48-KS-JCG |
| Parties | D.M., individually and as next friend of two minor children, N.M. and A.M. PLAINTIFFS v. FORREST COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
For the reasons provided below, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to Strike [32]; grants the Motion to Dismiss [12] filed by the District Attorney's Office for the Twelfth Circuit Court District and Assistant District Attorney Becky Denham; grants Defendant Alyssa Chandlee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [18]; and grants in part and denies in part the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants Forrest County Sheriff's Department, Forrest County Board of Supervisors, and Alyssa Chandlee.
Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their pleading to correct the numerous deficiencies outlined in this opinion. Any motion seeking such leave must be filed within fourteen days of the entry of this opinion and comply with Local Rule 15.
This case arises from an investigation into allegations of child molestation. Plaintiff D. M. filed this suit on behalf of herself and her minor children, N. M. and A. M. She contends that Defendants mishandled a criminal investigation and grand jury proceedings. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Alyssa Chandlee, a Deputy of the Forrest County Sheriff's Department, negligently conducted an interview of the minor Plaintiffs and provided false and/or misleading testimony during a grand jury proceeding. Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant Becky Denham, an Assistant District Attorney, conspired with Chandlee to protect the man accused of molestation. Plaintiffs referred to a wide variety of statutes and constitutional provisions in their Complaint, but the pleading is less than clear as to the factual predicate underlying each cause of action. Defendants filed numerous motions, which are fully briefed and ripe for review.
Defendants filed a Motion to Strike [32] numerous exhibits to Plaintiffs' responses to the motions for judgment on the pleadings. Defendants contend that the exhibits are beyond the proper scope of review for a motion under Rule 12(c). In response, Plaintiffs argue that the motion to strike is improper because the Court stayed the case pending resolution of Defendants' dispositive motions. Plaintiffs also argue that the Court must convert Defendants' motions to motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 and consider the evidence. Plaintiffs are mistaken on both counts.
Local Rule 16 provides, in relevant part: "Filing a . . . motion asserting an immunity defense . . . stays the attorney conference and disclosure requirements and all discovery, pending the court's ruling on the motion, including any appeal."L.U.Civ.R. 16(b)(3)(A). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "[o]ne of the most salient benefits of qualified immunity is protection from pretrial discovery, which is costly, time-consuming, and intrusive." Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012). Indeed, "that is precisely the point of qualified immunity," as it confers "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Id. (see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed. 411 (1985)). Therefore, "[i]t is common for a district court to order a stay in discovery when a court is considering an immunity defense." Grumbles v. Livingston, 706 F. App'x 818, 820 (5th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the Court only stayed the normal discovery, attorney conference, and disclosure requirements, but Defendants were still free to file the subject Motion to Strike [32].
As for the scope of review, motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) are subject to the same standard of review as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC v. La. State, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010). "To be plausible, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (punctuation omitted). The Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. But the Court will not accept as true "conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions." Id. Likewise, "a formulaic recitation of the elementsof a cause of action will not do." PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2010) (punctuation omitted). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
"The court's review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint." Ironshore Europe DAC v. Schiff Hardin, LLP, 912 F.3d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 2019). The Court may also consider matters of public record, Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, n. 3 (5th Cir. 1995), and any other matters of which it may take judicial notice. Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011). "If, on a motion under . . . Rule 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). However, the "district court has complete discretion to either accept or exclude the evidence." Gen. Retail Servs., Inc. v. Wireless Toyz Franchise, LLC, 255 F. App'x 775, 783 (5th Cir. 2008).
First, the Court declines to consider any evidence outside the pleadings when addressing the pending dispositive motions. Accordingly, the Court need not convert them to motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. The Court must determine which, if any, of the disputed exhibits are within the boundaries of the applicablestandard of review. Defendants argue that six of Plaintiffs' exhibits must be stricken. The Court will address each one.
First, the purported Notice of Claim, attached as Exhibit A1 to each Response, was not attached to the Complaint or the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. It is also not a matter of public record, and Plaintiffs have not argued that the Court may otherwise take judicial notice of it. Therefore, the Court may not consider Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Responses to the pending Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Next, D. M.'s affidavit, attached as Exhibit B2 to each Response, was not attached to the Complaint or the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. It is also not a matter of public record, and Plaintiffs have not argued that the Court may otherwise take judicial notice of it. Therefore, the Court may not consider Exhibit B to Plaintiffs' Responses to the pending Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Finally, the investigation file from the Forrest County Sheriff's Department, attached as Exhibit D3 to each Response, was not attached to the Complaint or Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. Moreover, it is not a matter of public record. Law enforcement agencies' "investigative reports" are exempt from the provisions of the Mississippi Public Records Act ("MPRA"). MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-12(2). TheMPRA generally defines "investigative reports" as "records of a law enforcement agency containing information beyond the scope of matters contained in an incident report . . . ." MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-61-3(f). The investigation file in question clearly falls within this definition. Accordingly, the Court may not consider Exhibit D to Plaintiffs' Responses to the pending Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings.
For these reasons, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to Strike [32]. The Court hereby orders that Exhibits A, B, and D to Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings - Docket Nos. [25-1], [25-2], [25-4], [27-1], [27-2], and [27-4] - shall be stricken.
The District Attorney's Office for the Twelfth Circuit Court District and Assistant District Attorney Becky Denham (the "D.A. Defendants") filed a Motion to Dismiss [12]. Among other things, they argue that the D.A.'s Office and Denham in her official capacity enjoy sovereign immunity from liability against Plaintiffs' claims. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This amendment protects states from being sued in federal court for damages. Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 2005). It applies to suits under both state and federal law. See, e.g. Guajardo v. State Bar of Texas, 803 F.App'x 750, 755 (5th Cir. 2020). The protection extends to "any state agency or other political entity that is deemed the 'alter ego' or an 'arm' of the State." Vogt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 294 F.3d 684, 689 (5th Cir. 2002). But the protection is not absolute. Pace, 403 F.3d at 276. First, states can waive their sovereign immunity. Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2005). Second, "Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the enforcement power conferred by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity from suit under §§ 1981, 19...
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