D.R. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida
• Writing for the Court: M. CASEY RODGERS
• Decision Date: 18 July 2011
• Docket Number: Case No.: 4:10cv312/MCR/WCS
• Citation: D.R. v. Fla. State Bd. of Educ., Case No.: 4:10cv312/MCR/WCS (N.D. Fla. Jul 18, 2011)
• Parties: D.R., individually, and through next friend and father A.R.; Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, DR. ERIC J. SMITH, in his official capacity as Florida Commissioner of Education; and ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendants.

D.R., individually, and through next friend and father A.R.; Plaintiff,

v. FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, DR. ERIC J. SMITH, in his official capacity asFlorida Commissioner of Education; and ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,Defendants.

Case No.: 4:10cv312/MCR/WCS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

Date: July 18, 2011

ORDER

Plaintiff D.R., individually, and through next friend and father A.R. has filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., alleging in the amended complaint that the Florida State Board of Education and Dr. Eric J. Smith¹ (collectively the "Board of Education") failed to provide an adequate system of procedural rights as required by the IDEA, and that the Orange County School Board (the "School Board"), is responsible for the plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred during an IDEA administrative action. (Doc. 21.) Pending before the court are the defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint (docs. 23 & 24), which the plaintiff opposes (docs. 29, 30, 32). Having considered the motions and responses, the court finds that the motions to dismiss should be granted for the following reasons.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statementof the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;" detailed allegations are not required. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeks dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all factual allegations of the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). The motion is properly denied if the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This "plausibility standard" requires a showing of "more than a sheer possibility" that the defendant is liable on the claim. Id. The allegations of the complaint must set forth enough facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to permit a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. However, the court need not credit "[t]hreadbare recitals" of the legal elements of a claim unsupported by plausible factual allegations because "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. When deciding a motion to dismiss, "the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto" and incorporated into the complaint by reference. Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 n.7 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal marks omitted).

BACKGROUND

Some background information regarding the IDEA will be helpful to understanding the facts. The IDEA is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the manner in which states and public agencies provide special education and related services to children with disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Basically, the IDEA creates a federal grant program to assist states in educating disabled children. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); see also M.T.V. v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006). States are entitled to receive these funds if they implement policies and procedures to ensure that disabledchildren are provided a free, appropriate public education ("FAPE"), including offering each student special education and related services under an individualized education program ("IEP"). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). States must also provide certain procedural safeguards to the parents and children with the central purpose of facilitating a FAPE. Id. § 1412(a) (6); see Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 524 (2007). Among these procedural safeguards is the parents' right to an administrative "due process" hearing if they disagree with their local educational agency regarding the appropriateness of the child's current IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). See also Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 529 (noting the "IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents as well as to children"). Prior to any such hearing, the local educational agency is required to convene a meeting, or "resolution session," with the parents where the parents discuss the complaint and the local educational agency is provided an opportunity to resolve it; any written settlement agreement reached at a resolution meeting is executed as a legally binding agreement and the IDEA provides that it is enforceable in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B). If the parties proceed to a due process hearing, it is conducted by an administrative law judge ("ALJ") from the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Management Services on behalf of the Department of Education. See Fla. Stat. § 1003.57(1)(b); Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-6.03311(9)(u). The IDEA provides that parties to a hearing have the right to written findings of fact and decisions, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h), and that the ALJ's decision is final, except that any party involved in a due process hearing may appeal to the state agency, id. § 1415(g), and any party "aggrieved by" an ALJ's "findings and decision," or an administrative appeal, has the right to bring a civil action in state or federal court, id. § 1415(i). In any action or proceeding under the IDEA, a district court, in its discretion, "may award reasonable attorneys' fees" to a "prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(I).

The plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint that D.R. is an 18 year old girl who meets the IDEA's eligibility criteria of a "child with a disability." § 1401(3). In April 2009, after the School Board failed to provide D.R. with a FAPE for over a year and a half, her father initiated a due process hearing. Pursuant to § 1415(f)(1)(B), the parties met for aresolution session. Although progress was made, no settlement was reached at the resolution meeting because the parties needed to obtain further information and evaluations necessary to develop a new IEP. After eleven months, the parties reached an agreement. Both parties sought to have their settlement agreement incorporated into a Consent Order endorsed by the ALJ. They submitted a proposed final order, which set forth the terms of the agreement and listed certain actions agreed to by the School Board.² The ALJ did not sign the submitted proposed final consent decree. Instead, the ALJ noted in the final order of dismissal that the parties had resolved the dispute and stated that an ALJ has no authority to approve or disapprove a settlement executed by the parties, and that therefore, "submission of a consent final order for signature by an ALJ is unnecessary."³ (Doc. 21-2, at 1.) The pending petition for a due process hearing was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff subsequently initiated the present action, seeking attorney's fees as the prevailing party against the School Board, and alleging that the Board of Education failed to provide an adequate system of procedural rights, which allegedly deprived the plaintiff of a settlement agreement enforceable in federal court, and that the Board of Education deprived the plaintiff of the right to be determined a prevailing party under the IDEA for purposes of obtaining an award of attorney's fees. Defendants argue, among other things, that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim because the facts alleged provide no basis for finding the plaintiff to be a prevailing party and no basis for finding that the available state procedures deprived the plaintiff of any right afforded under the IDEA.

DISCUSSION

The Claim Against the School Board:

In the cause of action against the School Board (count three), the plaintiff seeks reasonable attorney's fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA. The plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in denying the parties' joint request to adopt the settlement agreement and that,"[b]ut for the ALJ's erroneous determination of lack of jurisdiction, [the plaintiff] would meet all the requirements of [prevailing party] status." (Doc. 21, at 19.) The School Board argues that the complaint does not state a plausible claim for an award of attorney's fees arising from the administrative proceedings.

Contrary to the ordinarily applicable "American Rule," that parties are typically responsible for their own attorney's fees, the IDEA contains a specific provision authorizing courts, in their discretion, to award "reasonable attorneys' fees . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(I). See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (discussing the "American Rule"). In Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001), the Supreme Court explained that under "prevailing party" statutes, which have been interpreted consistently with one another, courts may award fees only when there is a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties." See also id. at 602-03 & n.4. In other words, a "prevailing party" is one who obtains relief from the court, such as a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree. Id. at 604. The Court reasoned that a "defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the...