D.S. v. East Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp.
| Decision Date | 29 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:11-CV-431-PRC |
| Parties | D.S., b/n/f George M. Stahl and Debbie Lynn Stahl, GEORGE M. STAHL and DEBBIE LYNN STAHL, Plaintiffs, v. EAST PORTER COUNTY SCHOOL CORPORATION, PORTER TOWNSHIP SCHOOL CORPORATION, MORGAN TOWNSHIP MIDDLE/HIGH SCHOOL, and BOONE GROVE MIDDLE SCHOOL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 22], filed by Defendants East Porter County School Corporation and Morgan Township Middle/High School (jointly "Defendants") on January 31, 2013. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
On October 24, 2011, Plaintiffs D.S., Debby Lynn Stahl ("Debbie"), and George M. Stahl ("George") filed a Complaint against Defendants East Porter County School Corporation, Morgan Township Middle/High School, Boone Grove Middle School, and Porter Township School Corporation in the Porter County, Indiana Superior Court. The allegations of the Complaint relevant to the instant Motion for Summary Judgment are that, "[d]ue to the negligence of East Porter [County School Corporation] and Morgan Township [Middle/High School] in failing to protect her from known threats posed by staff and other students, [D.S.] has undergone pain, suffering,emotional distress and interference in her access to public education, all in denial of her Civil and Constitutional Rights." Compl. ¶ 11. Also, Debbie and George allege that, "[d]ue to their being banned willfully and without cause from the grounds of East Porter [County School Corporation] property, and the police being willfully and without cause notified against them, George and Debbie have undergone pain, suffering, emotional distress and loss of reputation in their community." Id. ¶ 12.
On November 22, 2011, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal, and the case was subsequently removed to this Court. Defendants Boone Grove Middle School and Porter Township School Corporation filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint on December 12, 2011, and Defendants East Porter County School Corporation and Morgan Township Middle/High School filed an Answer to the Complaint on December 13, 2011.
On January 31, 2013, East Porter County School Corporation and Morgan Township Middle/High School filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment accompanied by a brief in support and an appendix of exhibits. On February 11, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a response brief. Subsequently, on February 25, 2013, Defendants East Porter County School Corporation and Morgan Township Middle/High School filed a reply.
The parties orally consented to having this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movantis entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotations omitted).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party may discharge its initial responsibility by simply "'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the nonmoving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party, if it chooses, may support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials, and, if the moving party has "produced sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that there are no genuine issues for trial," then the burden shiftsto the nonmoving party to show that an issue of material fact exists. Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., 914 F.2d 107, 110-11 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). Rule 56(e) provides that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," but must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original).
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1995). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Minor Plaintiff D.S. was enrolled in East Porter County School Corporation from kindergarten until eighth grade. D.S. asserts that she experienced incidents of bullying in school from the third grade to her eighth grade year, which ultimately culminated in an incident before and during a basketball game on February 9, 2011, after which her parents, Debbie and George, were banned from East Porter County School Corporation property. D.S. specified an incident during her third grade year at the elementary school, in which her teacher referred to her as a "chocoholic" in front of her class. Def. Mot. S.J., Ex. 1, 14:6-7. Additionally, D.S. testified that her classmates tripped, shoved, and called her names during the third grade. D.S. complained to the elementary school principal about these incidents, but D.S. does not know if the principal took any action in response to the complaints. D.S. asserts that, during the fifth grade, "no one was allowed to talk to [her]" because a group of girls in her class began teasing students that talked to D.S. Id. at 17:5-11. As a result, when D.S. sat down to eat lunch, everyone would move to another table, isolating her. During the fifth grade, students also continued to trip D.S. as she walked down the hallway. D.S. again discussed the incidents with the elementary school principal and identified the girls that were picking on her.
D.S. testified that, in sixth grade, at Morgan Township Middle/High School, she was forced to participate in gym class despite the fact that she broke three of her toes playing basketball during lunch one day. The Stahls contacted a doctor about the injury, and he directed them to tape her toes and have D.S. refrain from participating in gym. D.S. did not obtain a doctor's note. Debbie Stahl wrote a note to the gym teacher indicating that D.S. could not participate in gym. In response, the gym teacher informed D.S. that "it was [her] choice whether or not to participate, but if [she] didn't,[she] would fail for the day." Id. at 27:1-3. D.S. did not want her grade affected, so she chose to participate. D.S. also gave a note to the assistant principal.
During the sixth grade, D.S. was involved with the basketball and volleyball teams at Morgan Township Middle/High School. She testified that, during basketball practices, the girls threw basketballs at her head, tripped her, and ignored her. D.S.'s sixth grade basketball coach put her into a game, took her out roughly one minute later, and subsequently accused D.S. of losing the game in front of the entire team. D.S. complained to the coach, who responded that D.S. was not good at basketball. In contrast, D.S. asserts that she was one of the best players on the team...
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