D.E. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-01649-IM
| Decision Date | 21 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cv-01649-IM |
| Parties | D.E., Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Efrem Lawrence, EFREM LAWRENCE LAW FIRM, 5 Centerpointe Dr., Suite #400, Lake Oswego, OR 97035. Attorney for Plaintiff.
Caryn Geraghty Jorgensen, John Fetters, and Brett MacIntyre, STOKES LAWRENCE, P.S., 1420 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3000, Seattle, WA 98101. Attorneys for Defendant.
Plaintiff D.E. brings this action against Defendants American Airlines, Inc. ("American Airlines") and Does 1 through 25, alleging claims of negligence, negligence per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. ECF 16. Presently before this Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims. ECF 26. This Court held a hearing on Defendants' motion on February 19, 2020. At the hearing, Plaintiff conceded that her Second Claim for relief alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed. After considering all of the pleadings and arguments of counsel, this Court finds that there are no material facts in dispute and that Defendants have not breached the standard of care set forth in the Air Carrier Access Act ("ACAA") and its implementing regulations. Therefore, Plaintiff's negligence claims fail as a matter of law. In addition, Plaintiff has not opposed Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For these reasons and the reasons that follow, this Court grants Defendants' motion.
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). Although "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment," the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position [is] insufficient . . . ." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
For the purpose of this motion, the following facts are undisputed except where otherwise noted. Plaintiff D.E. sometimes travels with a psychiatric service animal when traveling forwork. See ECF 25 at ¶ 1. On October 21, 2016, a travel agent for Plaintiff's employer booked a ticket for Plaintiff to travel on a November 1, 2016 flight with Defendant American Airlines from Portland, Oregon to Dallas, Texas. Id. Plaintiff advised the travel agent booking the flight that she required extra leg room because she would be traveling with a psychiatric service animal. Id. When making the reservation, the travel agent selected seat 9B, a seat with extra leg room, for Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 2; Gould Decl., ECF 27 at ¶ 4. That seat ordinarily requires payment of additional fees, but the seat was provided to Plaintiff for no additional charge as an accommodation to Plaintiff. ECF 25 at ¶ 2; Gould Decl., ECF 27 at ¶ 4.
Four days before her flight, on October 27, 2016, Plaintiff called American Airlines' Reservation Department and requested changing her seat assignment to a bulkhead1 window seat. ECF 25 at ¶ 3. Plaintiff spoke with Laureen Waterman, a reservations agent, who documented the call in Plaintiff's reservation history. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. Ms. Waterman placed Plaintiff's reservation in the queue to be contacted by American Airlines' Special Assistance Coordinators ("SAC" or "SAC Desk"). Id. The SAC Desk is composed of specialized reservation agents who manage requests for passengers with disabilities. Id. at ¶ 5. The SAC Desk controls access to seats that have been "blocked" by the airline so that they are available to accommodate passengers with disabilities when timely requested. Id. On that same day, while awaiting further contact, Plaintiff sent the SAC Desk an email with a signed copy of American Airlines' "Emotional Support/Psychiatric Service Animal Authorization Form" and a handwritten note requesting a call to "further discuss accommodations needed." Id. at ¶ 6.
The parties had no additional contact until the day before Plaintiff's flight, October 31, 2016. The SAC Desk called Plaintiff and left a voicemail at 9:46 a.m., Pacific time. Id. at ¶ 7. After checking-in for her flight with seat assignment 9B, Plaintiff called back the SAC desk at approximately 11:00 a.m. and spoke with agent Georgeanne Rivera. Id. at ¶ 8; see ECF 37-3 at 3-4. Plaintiff discussed her request for a bulkhead window seat with Ms. Rivera but was informed that only local airport personnel can change a passenger's seat assignment once a passenger has checked-in for a flight. Rivera Decl., ECF 30 at ¶ 4; Gould Decl., ECF 27 at ¶ 7. Therefore, Plaintiff was unable to change her seat assignment during that call. Plaintiff then spoke with a supervisor who recorded notes stating that he advised Plaintiff that her concerns regarding her dog were documented and to "[check-in] at ATO for outbound to get bulkhead window seat she [requires]." ECF 37-3 at 3. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff was informed that she had been assigned to a bulkhead window seat—seat 7A—during this phone call. Compare ECF 26 at 5 with ECF 37 at 7 ().
Plaintiff arrived at the airport on the day of her flight, November 1, 2016, between 5:45 and 6:00 am. ECF 25 at ¶ 10. She proceeded to the ticket counter, where a customer service agent informed her that her seat assignment was 9B, and the agent was unable to reassign her seat to 7A because the seat was assigned to another passenger. Id.; ECF 37-2 at 11, l. 2-14, l. 14. The ticket agent was rude when she explained that she needed the accommodation for her disability. ECF 37-2 at 12, l. 1-12. The agent told Plaintiff, "I don't care about these disability laws." Id. at l. 11-12. While at the ticket counter, an American Airlines employee offered Plaintiff the opportunity to be reassigned to 7C, a bulkhead aisle seat, which Plaintiff declined. Sumpter Decl., ECF 36 at ¶ 4. Plaintiff was also offered seat 18F, a window seat, which she alsodeclined. Id.; see ECF 25 at ¶ 10. Plaintiff then continued through security and spoke with the agents at the gate. ECF 25 at ¶¶ 10-11. At the gate, Plaintiff was reassigned to seat 7C, a bulkhead aisle seat, and she boarded the plane. Id. at ¶ 11. After boarding the plane, Plaintiff asked the passenger assigned to seat 7A, the bulkhead window seat, if he would switch with her and he agreed. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff then moved to seat 7A. Id. An American Airlines employee asked the passenger assigned to seat 7B whether she would relocate to another row to allow additional space for Plaintiff and her service animal. Garland Decl., ECF 32 at ¶ 3. The passenger consented, leaving the seat next to Plaintiff empty for the duration of the flight. Id.; ECF 25 at ¶ 13. No one at American Airlines ever questioned Plaintiff's right to bring her service animal onto the aircraft. ECF 25 at ¶ 15.
To prove a negligence claim under Oregon law, Plaintiff must show that (1) Defendants owed her a duty, (2) they breached that duty, and (3) the breach was the cause in fact of some legally-cognizable damage to Plaintiff. Cain v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1279 (D. Or. 2011) (citing Brennan v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 405 (1979)). For a claim of negligence per se, Plaintiff must establish: (1) "defendants violated a statute or rule"; (2) "plaintiff was injured as a result of that violation"; (3) "plaintiff was a member of the class of persons meant to be protected by the statute or rule"; and (4) "the injury plaintiff suffered is of a type that the statute or rule was enacted to prevent." Buoy v. Soo Hee Kim, 232 Or.App. 189, 204 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). In the present case, Plaintiff must prove the same breach of duty—failing to comply with ACAA regulations—to establish a claim for negligence or negligence per se. As explained below, Defendants complied with the relevant ACAA regulations and provided thestandard of care that air carriers must afford disabled passengers who travel with service animals. For this reason, Plaintiff's claims for negligence and negligence per se fail as a matter of law.
The ACAA prohibits air carriers from "discriminating against an otherwise qualified individual" because that "individual has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a)(1). The Federal Aviation Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate regulations implementing the ACAA. Nat'l Fed. of the Blind v. United Airlines Inc., 813 F.3d 718, 730 (9th Cir. 2016); 49 U.S.C. § 40113(a). "Pursuant to that authorization, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") issued implementing regulations, codified at 14 C.F.R. Part 382, specifying the detailed requirements that airlines must meet to comply with the ACAA." Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2013). The ACAA does...
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