A.D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 02 March 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14–1880 JBS/KMW.
• Citation: 90 F.Supp.3d 326
• Parties: A.D. and R.D., individually and on behalf of their son, S.D., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. HADDON HEIGHTS BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

90 F.Supp.3d 326

A.D. and R.D., individually and on behalf of their son, S.D., a minor, Plaintiffs

v.HADDON HEIGHTS BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14–1880 JBS/KMW.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed March 2, 2015.

Sarah E. Zuba, Esq., Judith A. Gran, Esq., Freeman Carolla Reisman & Gran LLC, Haddonfield, N.J., for Plaintiff S.D.

William S. Donio, Esq., Cooper Levenson, P.A., Atlantic City, N.J., and Joseph F. Betley, Esq., Capehart & Scatchard, P.A., Mount Laurel, N.J., for Defendant.

OPINION

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiffs A.D. and R.D., individually and on behalf of their son, S.D. (hereinafter, “S.D.” and collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that Defendant the Haddon Heights Board of Education (hereinafter, “Defendant”) failed to comply with its statutory obligations to provide S.D., a student with a disability, with a free and appropriate education (hereinafter, “FAPE”), and enacted an attendance policy that deprived S.D. of an education equivalent to that provide to his nondisabled peers. Plaintiffs therefore allege that Defendant violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. (hereinafter, “RA”), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq. (hereinafter, the “ADA”), the First and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. §§ 10:5–12 et seq. (hereinafter, “NJLAD”).

Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on an array of jurisdictional and substantive grounds. (Def.'s Br. [Docket Item 32–2].) First, Defendant asserts that the parties' July 2014 Settlement Agreement and Defendant's subsequent accommodations have rendered Plaintiffs' claims moot and/or premature for adjudication, thereby depriving the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 9–13.) Second, because Plaintiffs seek relief available under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (hereinafter, the “IDEA”), Defendant insists that Plaintiffs must comply with the IDEA'S administrative process, despite the fact that Plaintiffs only assert non-IDEA claims. Because Plaintiffs indisputably failed to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies, Defendant therefore argues that Plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust. (Id. at 16–22.) Lastly, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims on the merits because Plaintiffs purportedly have not and cannot show that Defendant discriminated against, or acted deliberately indifferent towards, S.D. on account of his disability. (Id. at 23–34.)

Plaintiffs, however, dispute the Settlement Agreement's effect on the justiciability of their claims, and argue that the terms of the Agreement served to “inflict further discrimination,” rather than to redress the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. (Pls.' Opp'n [Docket Item 37], 5–9.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA have no application to this litigation, because Plaintiffs do not—and cannot—claim entitlement to relief under the IDEA. (Id. at 10–14.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's motion should be rejected with respect to its substantive challenges to Plaintiffs' claims, primarily because such challenges rely upon a “conjure[d]” version of facts entirely different to those averred in the Amended Complaint. (Id. at 15–30.)

The principal issues before the Court are whether the parties' July 2014 Settlement Agreement impacted Plaintiffs' standing to pursue their claims; and whether, in this non-IDEA action, the nature of Plaintiffs' claims nevertheless require compliance with the IDEA'S administrative exhaustion process.

For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion will be granted on exhaustion grounds. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint will, accordingly, be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Because resolution of the pending motion relates inextricably to the procedural posture of this litigation, the Court will discuss the factual predicate¹ and procedural circumstances of this litigation in unison.

1. S.D.'s Disabilities

S.D., an eleventh-grade student at Haddon Heights Junior/Senior High School, suffers from “multiple medical problems including chronic sinusitis with frequent acute exacerbations, allergic rhinitis, and intermittent asthma,” all of which “make it likely that he will have frequent” school absences and tardiness “due to [his] acute [ ] underlying chronic illness.” (Am. Compl., Ex. C.) On October 24, 2012, Plaintiff's physician, Dr. Wendy S. Cook, D.O., therefore advised that S.D. “should qualify for 504 plan modifications for school” and “should be excused for absences/lateness due to his illness.” (Id. at Ex. A.)

2. Section 504 Accommodation Plans for the 2012–2013 and 2013–2014 Academic Years

For the remainder of the 2012–2013 school year, Defendant, accordingly, developed a 504 Accommodation Plan, in consultation with Plaintiffs, on October 25, 2012 (hereinafter, the “initial 504 Plan”). (See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 24–25, 29–30.) The initial Section 504 Plan provided S.D. with “extra time for assignments, tests, and quizzes when absent,” and directed Plaintiffs “to communicate” with S.D.'s teachers concerning “any missed work” and absences. (Am. Compl., Ex. A at 2.) Despite these accommodations, however, Plaintiffs allege that the initial 504 Plan failed to “impose any enforceable obligations” upon Defendant and its teachers, and provided no mechanism for S.D. “to be instructed in and learn the material” missed during his absences. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 31.) Rather, the initial 504 Plan purportedly required that S.D. instead learn the materials on his own. Plaintiffs, accordingly, requested a follow-up 504 meeting, in light of their concerns that the initial 504 plan proved ineffective and too poorly implemented to enable him to meaningfully participate in and benefit from the educational opportunities offered by Defendant to other students. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 9, 31.)

Defendant thereafter convened a 504 meeting on April 19, 2013, and developed an amended 504 Accommodation Plan (hereinafter, the “amended 504 Plan”). (Id. at ¶ 33–34.) The amended 504 Plan continued to provide S.D. “extra time to complete assignments,” but required all assignments to “be completed within two weeks from [S.D.'s] return from absence,” allowing teachers to reduce S.D.'s assignments at their discretion. (Am. Compl., Ex. B.) In addition, the amended 504 Plan directed S.D.'s teachers to “send weekly updates” concerning missing assignments and to provide class notes and, if possible, background information and/or discussion materials concerning information covered in class. (Id. ) The amended 504 Plan further imposed various, purportedly onerous “responsibilities,” by requiring S.D. to create lists in order to track assignments and to maintain folders to segregate complete and incomplete work, and directed him to meet, regularly, with his teachers and guidance counselor. (Id.; Am. Compl. at ¶ 39.)

Plaintiffs, however, allege that the amended 504 Plan similarly failed to provide any “mechanism” or “firm or enforceable directive” to ensure that S.D.'s teachers provided class notes and/or exercised their discretion to reduce assignments. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs further allege that the amended 504 Plan failed to ensure that S.D. received supplemental or alternative instruction (namely, home instruction), “to enable him to keep up with the curriculum, [to] complete his assignments in a timely manner,” and to otherwise enjoy the benefits of, and access to, the educational opportunities offered by Defendant to S.D.'s “typical peers.” (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 35, 41, 46.) Rather, Plaintiffs allege that the amended 504 Plan continued to require S.D., in effect, “to teach himself the curriculum and to [ ] identify and understand assignments” explained by teachers in his absence-only causing S.D. to fall “further and further behind” in his academic assignments. (Id. at ¶ 46.)

3. Defendant Enacts a New Attendance Policy

The attendance policy in effect for the 2012–2013 academic year prohibited a student from earning credit for a course in which the student accrued more than 15 absences, unless the student provided a “medical note from a physician” to substantiate and excuse the excess absences.² (Am. Compl., Ex. D.) The policy provided that “[w]arnings will be issued” to the students “in danger of exceeding the 15–day limit,” but cautioned that accruing absences in excess of the maximum would result in the student being placed in non-credit status. (Id. at Ex. E.) Moreover, the policy required any student over the 15–day absence maximum to attend “Saturday Credit Completion” for each day over the prescribed limited, or risk the loss of credits for the missed course. (Id. )

“Due to his chronic medical issues, S.D. had over 33 absences during the 2012–2013 school year.” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 48.) Despite such absences, however, S.D. purportedly earned the credits necessary “for yearly promotion to the Grade 10 Sophomore Class.” (Id. at ¶ 48–53.)

In the summer of 2013, Defendant enacted a new attendance policy, as follows:

STUDENTS ARE LIMITED TO A TOTAL OF 33 ABSENCES IN A SCHOOL YEAR (THIS LIMIT INCLUDES ANY ABSENCE, INCLUDING APPROVED, EXCUSED AND UNEXCUSED ABSENCES) EXCEPT W HEN HOME BOUND INSTRUCTION IS APPROVED BY THE DISTRICT'S SCHOOL PHYSICIAN. STUDENTS WITH MORE THAN 33 ABSENCES WILL BE RETAINED.

(Id. at ¶ 53; see also Am. Compl., Ex. E.) The new policy, however, left undisturbed Defendant's existing Saturday Credit Completion program. Plaintiff therefore alleges that Defendant “made a deliberate choice to enact the Policy,” in order to “target” students, like S.D., “with frequent excused absences,” and “never” offered the only exception to the new policy, home instruction, as an accommodation,...