A.D. v. Marriott Int'l

• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-645-JES-NPM
• Decision Date: 25 August 2023
• Parties: A.D., an individual, Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHM NAPLES II HOTEL PARTNERS, LLC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

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A.D., an individual, Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHM NAPLES II HOTEL PARTNERS, LLC, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-645-JES-NPM

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division

August 25, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN E. STEELE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant Marriott International, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #41) filed on May 23, 2023 and defendant CHM Naples II Hotel Partners, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc #42) filed on the same day. Plaintiff filed a Consolidated Response in Opposition (Doc. #46) on June 20, 2023. Both defendants filed Replies. (Docs. ## 47, 48.) Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. #49) on August 8 2023.

I.

On April 19, 2023, the Court granted defendants' motions to dismiss with leave to file an Amended Complaint. A.D. v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-645-JES-NPM, 2023 WL 2991042, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2023). On May 9, 2023, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #39) and defendants have now essentially renewed their motions to dismiss.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,” Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff's (second) amended complaint is brought pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). As previously stated,

The TVPRA is a criminal statute that also provides a civil remedy to victims of sex trafficking. Section 1591(a) of the Act imposes criminal liability for certain sex trafficking:

(a) Whoever knowingly--

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person;

or

(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1),

knowing, or, except where the act constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

18 U.S.C.A. § 1591(a). In addition to a criminal punishment, the TVPRA provides the following civil remedy:

(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.

18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

Thus, the TVRPA authorizes a victim of sex trafficking to bring a direct civil claim against the perpetrator of the trafficking and a “beneficiary” civil claim against “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPRA].” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). To state a claim for beneficiary liability under the TVPRA, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant “(1) knowingly benefited (2) from participating in a venture; (3) that venture violated the TVPRA as to [A.D.]; and (4) [Defendants] knew or should have known that the venture violated the TVPRA as to [A.D.].” Doe v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 726 (11th Cir. 2021).

A.D. v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., at *2. The Court will consider each of the elements as applied to the amended pleading.

II.

The operative amended complaint alleges the following: Defendant Marriott International, Inc. (Marriott) knows and has known for years that sex trafficking and prostitution occur at their branded hotel locations. Defendant CHM Naples II Hotel Partners LLC's (CHM Naples) also knows and has known for years of both occurring specifically at the SpringHill Suites (SpringHill) by Marriott in Naples, Florida. (Doc. #39, ¶¶ 2-3.) This action for damages is brought by the Plaintiff, identified by her initials A.D., a survivor of sex trafficking under the TVPRA. (Id. at ¶ 12.) A.D. was trafficked for commercial sex at SpringHill by Trafficker 2 through force, fraud, and coercion. (Id. at ¶ 16.)

“With knowledge of the problem, and as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' multiple failures and refusals to act, mandate, establish, execute, and/or modify their anti-trafficking efforts at the SpringHill hotel, A.D. was continuously sex trafficked, sexually exploited, and victimized repeatedly at the SpringHill hotel.” (Id. at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants “participated in a hotel operating venture and knowingly benefited from this venture through room rentals, profits, third party fees, and the value of the “good will” of the Marriott® brand. The venture knew or should have known that they were profiting from sex trafficking, including the sex trafficking of A.D., in violation of the TVPRA.” (Id. at ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Marriott participated in a hotel operating venture that included staff at the SpringHill. CHM Naples owns the SpringHill pursuant to a franchise agreement entered into with Marriott. Plaintiff alleges an agency relationship through Marriott's “exercise of ongoing and systemic right of control over SpringHill hotel.” (Id. at ¶¶ 29-32.) Marriott makes decisions that directly impact the operations and maintenance of their branded hotels, including the SpringHill. (Id. at ¶ 39.) CHM Naples directly offered public lodging services at the SpringHill where A.D. was trafficked for sex. (Id. at ¶ 49.) Defendants “participated in a hotel operating venture in connection with the management and operating of the SpringHill hotel involving risk and potential profit.” (Id. at ¶ 52.)

During at least 2008 to 2012, emails were exchanged by employees of Marriott that related to sex trafficking in hotels, including CHM Naples' hotel. (Id. at ¶ 57.) Marriott had actual and/or constructive knowledge of sex trafficking, including A.D.'s sex trafficking and victimization, occurring on its branded property. (Id. at ¶ 60.) Despite having access to sex trafficking indicators, Marriott continues to permit and profit from male clientele who rented hotel rooms to buy sex, including those who bought Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 72.)

CHM Naples employees and staff openly observed signs of trafficking and did not aid plaintiff. CHM Naples received revenue and a percentage was provided to Marriott. (Id. at ¶ 104.) Through Marriott's relationship with the staff at the SpringHill, it benefited or received royalty payments, licensing fees, franchise fees and dues, reservation fees, and percentages of the gross room revenue. (Id. at ¶ 105.) Through their “continuous business venture of renting hotel rooms”, CHM Naples knowingly benefited. (Id. at ¶ 107.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants benefit from the steady stream of income that sex traffickers bring to their hotel brands and from their reputation for privacy, discretion, and the facilitation of commercial sex. (Id., ¶¶ 116-117.)

III.

As previously stated, plaintiff must sufficiently plead that a defendant knowingly benefited from participating in a venture, that the venture violated the TVPRA, and that defendants knew or should have known that the venture violated the TVPRA.

A. Knowingly Benefited

To satisfy the first element of a TVPRA beneficiary claim, plaintiff must allege that defendant “knew it was receiving some value from participating in the alleged venture.” Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 724. As the Eleventh Circuit stated,

“Knowingly benefits” means “an awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact.” Knowledge, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). And Section 1595(a) explains that a defendant may benefit “financially or by receiving anything of value.” Accordingly, a plaintiff like the Does must allege that the defendant knew it was receiving some value from participating in the alleged venture.

Id. at 723-24. In the absence of a more stringent statutory pleading requirement, knowledge “may be alleged generally.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Alleging a “continuous business relationship” is sufficient to show a knowing benefit. G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No. 22-2621, 2023 WL 4944015, at *16 (7th Cir. Aug. 3, 2023). The Court previously found this element could be satisfied at this stage of the proceedings. A.D. v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., at *3.

B. Participation in Venture - Franchisor

Plaintiff must allege that the benefits received by Marriott were from “participation in a...