Dacey v. Burgess
| Decision Date | 16 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | SJC-13286 |
| Citation | 491 Mass. 311,202 N.E.3d 1172 |
| Parties | Jason DACEY v. Sandy BURGESS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Paul R. Collier, III (Michael A. Weinhold, Lowell, also present) for the plaintiff.
Patrick F. Bull, for the defendant.
Andrew Hoffman, for MLPB, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Richard M.W. Bauer, Boston, Patricia Whiting, Louisa Gibbs, & Benjamin Golden, for City Life/Vida Urbana & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.
In March of 2020, following mediation, the plaintiff tenant, Jason Dacey, entered into a stipulation to dismiss voluntarily all claims against the defendant landlord, Sandy Burgess, and agreed to vacate his apartment. In exchange for the release of claims and to assist with relocation, Burgess agreed to waive rent for the month of March. Because of the COVID-19 emergency eviction moratorium, however, Burgess was unable to seek judgment on the parties’ voluntary stipulation, and execution on such judgment, until October of 2020. On motion of Burgess, a judge of the Housing Court entered judgment in her favor.1 Dacey then sought relief from the judgment, and filed a motion to revise, revoke, or vacate the judgment on jurisdictional and equitable grounds. This motion was denied.
Dacey now appeals from both the judge's entry of judgment in favor of Burgess and the denial of his motion to revise, revoke, or vacate the judgment. This appeal presents, among other issues, the question whether Burgess could seek to enforce the parties’ voluntary stipulation following mediation, and attempt to recover possession of the leased premises absent the commencement of a summary process action pursuant to G. L. c. 239. Where we conclude that the judge did have the authority to award possession of the premises to Burgess in the circumstances of this case, we affirm the entry of judgment in favor of Burgess and the denial of Dacey's motion to revise, revoke, or vacate such judgment.2
Background. The plaintiff, Dacey, leased a two-bedroom apartment from the defendant, Burgess. The original lease required Dacey to pay the sum of $1,250 per month. In November 2019, however, Burgess informed Dacey of a rental increase of sixty-five dollars, increasing the total rent to $1,315 per month. He refused to pay the rental increase, and as a result of his refusal, Burgess sent a formal notice to quit via certified mail, which remained unclaimed. Burgess subsequently had a notice to quit hand-delivered to Dacey.
Following the notice to quit, Dacey filed a verified complaint on February 26, 2020, and a motion seeking a temporary restraining order for treatment of an alleged bedbug issue within the apartment, as well as monetary compensation for damages. On March 12, 2020, the parties agreed to mediation, during which they reached a voluntary stipulation, which the judge also signed, dismissing all claims. According to the terms of the stipulation, Dacey agreed to vacate the apartment by no later than August 31, 2020. In exchange for his agreement to waive all remaining claims against Burgess, Dacey received one month free from rent for March 2020, to assist him with relocation.3
Following the voluntary stipulation, Dacey did not vacate the premises according to its terms, and remained in the apartment until the expiration of the COVID-19 emergency eviction moratorium in October 2020, at which time Burgess sought judgment and execution in an attempt to regain possession of the premises. After judgment entered in favor of Burgess, as explained supra, Dacey unsuccessfully attempted to revise, revoke, or vacate the judgment on both jurisdictional and equitable grounds.
Discussion. 1. Housing Court's authority. Dacey argues that, where Burgess failed to bring a summary process action pursuant to G. L. c. 239, the Housing Court lacked the authority to enforce the voluntary stipulation and award possession of the premises to Burgess. We disagree.
Before reaching the merits of Dacey's argument, we note that he argues that the Housing Court does not have "subject matter jurisdiction" to order him to forfeit possession of the premises without a summary process action brought pursuant to G. L. c. 239. "[A]s a jurisdictional matter, the Housing Court has broad authority to resolve civil claims and counterclaims that relate ‘directly or indirectly’ to ‘the health, safety, or welfare, of any occupant of any place used ... as a place of human habitation,’ as well as the authority to resolve all ‘housing problems, including all contract and tort actions which affect the health, safety and welfare of the occupants or owners’ of such housing." Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 338, 50 N.E.3d 419 (2016), quoting G. L. c. 185C, § 3. The entire dispute between Dacey and Burgess arose from a civil claim concerning an alleged bedbug issue within the apartment; thus, it was a claim that directly related to the health, safety, and welfare of Dacey as an occupant of the apartment leased to him by Burgess. Therefore, the Housing Court undoubtedly possessed the "subject matter jurisdiction" to enter a judgment in Burgess's favor in this case. Dacey's argument on appeal then more properly may be characterized as an argument that Burgess could not enforce the parties’ agreement because she did not instate an action pursuant to G. L. c. 239 when attempting to recover possession of the apartment. See G. L. c. 184, § 18.
Our analysis begins with examining the actual words of G. L. c. 184, § 18. See GGNSC Admin. Servs., LLC v. Schrader, 484 Mass. 181, 187, 140 N.E.3d 397 (2020), quoting Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 604, 135 N.E.3d 702 (2019) (). "A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result." Marengi v. 6 Forest Rd. LLC, 491 Mass. 19, 24-25, 198 N.E.3d 1215 (2022), quoting Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110 (2001).
Section 18 states: "No person shall attempt to recover possession of land or tenements in any manner other than through an action brought pursuant to [G. L. c. 239] or such other proceedings authorized by law" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 184, § 18. Contrary to Dacey's argument, the plain language of the statute clearly demonstrates that a summary process action under G. L. c. 239, while likely the most common avenue for a landlord to recover possession of a leased premises, is not the exclusive avenue for Burgess to recover possession of the apartment. See id. See also Serra v. Quantum Servicing, Corp., 747 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2014), citing G. L. c. 184, § 18 (). The explicit language of the statute allows recovery of possession of a leased premises by any "other proceeding[ ] authorized by law," G. L. c. 184, § 18, demonstrating that the Legislature understood that there may be some limited circumstances in which a landlord's recovery of possession of a leased property may arise outside the context of summary process pursuant to G. L. c. 239.
With that in mind, we turn to the particular factual circumstances of this case. Here, following the filing of the complaint, Dacey filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. A hearing was scheduled in the Housing Court, and the parties were referred to a housing specialist for alternative dispute resolution prior to trial. At this point, the parties were "faced with a decision: proceed [on the current course toward] trial, or attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement through negotiation or mediation." Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 856, 120 N.E.3d 297 (2019) (Appendix).
"Mediation is an informal, confidential process during which the parties meet with a housing specialist to discuss a potential settlement." Adjartey, 481 Mass. at 856, 120 N.E.3d 297 (Appendix). "Housing specialists are Housing Court employees who work as impartial mediators in cases commenced in the court." Id. at 856 n.17, 120 N.E.3d 297. Where the parties reach a settlement by their own accord or by way of the mediator's help, and it is approved by a judge of the Housing Court, the settlement becomes a binding court order. Id. at 856, 120 N.E.3d 297. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Cassio, 428 Mass. 112, 113-114, 697 N.E.2d 128 (1998). A judge then lawfully may enter the approved settlement agreement as a judgment, also known as a consent judgment. See Thibbitts v. Crowley, 405 Mass. 222, 226, 539 N.E.2d 1035 (1989).
While the fair administration of justice does not require settlement, parties freely may choose to settle. See Wong v. Luu, 472 Mass. 208, 220, 34 N.E.3d 35 (2015). In settling, the parties make a "free, calculated and deliberate choice to submit to an agreed upon decree rather than seek a more favorable litigated judgment." Kelton Corp. v. County of Worcester, 426 Mass. 355, 360, 688 N.E.2d 941 (1997), quoting Thibbitts, 405 Mass. at 227, 539 N.E.2d 1035. Once judgment is entered based on the parties’ voluntary settlement, the judgment "conclusively determines the rights of the parties as to all matters within its scope." Kelton Corp., supra at 359, 688 N.E.2d 941, citing Fishman v. Alberts, 321 Mass. 280, 281, 72 N.E.2d 513 (1947).
Here, through the aid of mediation, Dacey voluntarily entered into the stipulation with Burgess. He agreed to vacate the apartment by no later than August 31, 2020, in exchange for one month free from rent during March of 2020. This...
To continue reading
Request your trial