DaCruz v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, (SC 16847).

Decision Date04 May 2004
Docket Number(SC 16847).
Citation268 Conn. 675,846 A.2d 849
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesDAVID J. DaCRUZ v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.

Barbara A. Frederick, with whom were James N. Tallberg and, on the brief, Jeffrey A. Dempsey, for the appellant (defendant).

Ralph J. Monaco, with whom was Thomas J. Londregan, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Jon Berk and Claudia A. Baio filed a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Opinion

PALMER, J.

The dispositive issue raised by this certified appeal is whether a judgment declaring that the defendant, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm), had no duty to defend its insured against a claim brought by the plaintiff, David J. DaCruz, bars the plaintiff, under principles of collateral estoppel, from holding State Farm liable, pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-321,1 for damages awarded pursuant to a judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the insured. The trial court, Levin, J., rendered judgment for State Farm, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court concluded, contrary to the determination of the trial court, that State Farm is liable to the plaintiff under § 38a-321 for the judgment obtained by the plaintiff against State Farm's insured despite the earlier judgment declaring that State Farm had no duty to defend the insured. See DaCruz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 69 Conn. App. 507, 516, 794 A.2d 1117 (2002). We disagree with the Appellate Court and, accordingly, reverse its judgment.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On January 14, 1994, the plaintiff was assaulted by a classmate, Michael Bullock, while attending Amity Regional Junior High School in Orange. The plaintiff subsequently commenced an action2 (DaCruz action) against Amity Regional School District and Michael Bullock, among others,3 seeking damages for injuries that he had sustained as a result of that assault. In one count of the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Michael Bullock had committed an intentional assault by threatening him verbally, pushing him and then repeatedly striking him in the face and body. According to the plaintiff, he was knocked to the ground and rendered unconscious. In a second count, the plaintiff alleged the same facts but claimed that Michael Bullock's actions were negligent.4 In another count, the plaintiff alleged that Michael Bullock's parents, Curtis Bullock and Sheila Meadows, were negligent in failing to use reasonable care to control and to restrain their son, and that they were jointly and severally liable under General Statutes § 52-5725 for their son's conduct.

At the time of the assault, Michael Bullock was residing with his father, Curtis Bullock, and Susan Bullock. Susan Bullock was not married to Curtis Bullock at the time of the assault but married him approximately five months later. Susan Bullock owned a homeowner's insurance policy issued by State Farm that was in effect on the date of the assault. That policy provided coverage for any claim or action brought against an insured6 or "any . . . person under the age of twenty-one" in Susan Bullock's care7 for damages caused by an "occurrence." The policy defines an "occurrence" as an "accident" that results in bodily injury or property damage. Claims brought for bodily injury caused by an insured that the insured either expected or intended are expressly excluded from coverage under the policy.

State Farm initially retained an attorney to represent Michael Bullock and Curtis Bullock in the DaCruz action. Thereafter, however, State Farm brought a separate action (State Farm action) seeking a judgment declaring that it had no duty either to defend or to indemnify Michael Bullock and Curtis Bullock in the DaCruz action. The defendants in the State Farm action included Michael Bullock, Curtis Bullock, Susan Bullock, the plaintiff and the plaintiff's parents, Herminio DaCruz and Maria DaCruz. The court in the State Farm action rendered a default judgment as to Michael Bullock and Curtis Bullock on the basis of their failure to appear.8 The plaintiff and Herminio DaCruz, however, appeared by counsel and vigorously contested the State Farm action.

State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment in the State Farm action. Upon concluding that there were no material facts in dispute, the trial court, Blue, J., granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment with respect to State Farm's claim that it had no duty to defend Michael Bullock and Curtis Bullock in the DaCruz action. In his memorandum of decision, Judge Blue explained that the facts alleged in the DaCruz action permitted only one possible inference with respect to Michael Bullock's state of mind when he had attacked the plaintiff, namely, that he had done so intentionally. Judge Blue concluded that "it was impossible to imagine any conceivable scenario under which an assault like the one described in the DaCruz complaint could be done negligently." Judge Blue further concluded that, because the plaintiff in the DaCruz action alleged no facts other than those pointing ineluctably to the conclusion that the assault was intentional, "the general allegations of negligence in the . . . complaint were a transparent attempt to trigger insurance coverage." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Judge Blue also concluded that State Farm had no duty to defend Curtis Bullock because he was not married to Susan Bullock, the policyholder, at the time of the assault and, therefore, was not an "insured" within the meaning of the policy. See footnote 6 of this opinion and accompanying text.

Judge Blue declined, however, to render judgment declaring that State Farm did not have a duty to indemnify Michael Bullock and Curtis Bullock for any damages for which they might become liable in the DaCruz action. Judge Blue concluded that it would be inappropriate to decide the indemnification issue in light of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Williamson, 153 Conn. 345, 216 A.2d 635 (1966), in which we held that the trial court in that case properly had concluded, in the circumstances presented, that the claim of the plaintiff insurer that it owed no duty of indemnification to its insured properly was raised "in a defense to an action under what is now § 38a-321 should the occasion for that action arise"; id., 350; rather than in a declaratory judgment action that is commenced prior to a judicial determination of the insured's liability. Id.

No party appealed from the judgment rendered in the State Farm action. In accordance with Judge Blue's decision in the State Farm action, the attorney retained by State Farm to represent Michael Bullock and Curtis Bullock in the DaCruz action withdrew his appearance.

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed motions for default as to Michael Bullock, Curtis Bullock and Sheila Meadows in the DaCruz action.9 The trial court, Curran, J., granted the plaintiff's motions. Judge Curran then held a hearing in damages. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Curran found that Michael Bullock's conduct was intentional and that Michael Bullock and his parents were jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for $31,398 in economic damages, $93,602 in noneconomic damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. At the urging of the plaintiff's counsel, Judge Curran thereafter indicated that Michael Bullock's conduct also was negligent.10 Although Judge Curran neither filed a memorandum randum of decision nor signed the transcript of his oral finding, he did sign and issue a judgment setting forth his findings in regard to damages. The judgment, which had been prepared by the plaintiff's counsel, provided in relevant part: "It is further adjudged that this court has found that the conduct of . . . Michael Bullock. . . was an intentional assault ... as alleged in count one of the amended complaint ... and, further, that the conduct of . . . Michael Bullock . . . was negligent and careless as alleged in count two of the amended complaint in that he used an excessive and unreasonable amount of force upon the plaintiff." The judgment further provided that "the court finds that. . . Curtis Bullock and Sheila Meadows . . . are liable as parents and guardians of . . . Michael Bullock. . . pursuant to count three of the amended complaint." Finally, the judgment provided that it "is joint and several as to all three defendants."

The plaintiff then commenced the present action against State Farm under § 38a-321 seeking satisfaction of the judgment in the DaCruz action. State Farm claimed, by way of special defense, that the incident was not covered under Susan Bullock's homeowner's insurance policy because (1) it was not an "occurrence" as defined by the policy, and (2) the policy expressly excludes coverage for injury or damage that is expected or intended. State Farm also raised a second special defense, contending that the plaintiff's claim was precluded by (1) the judgment rendered by Judge Blue declaring that State Farm had no duty to defend Michael Bullock and Curtis Bullock in the DaCruz action, and (2) Judge Blue's determination that the conduct attributed to Michael Bullock in the complaint filed in the DaCruz action necessarily was intentional rather than negligent. The plaintiff and State Farm each filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court, Levin, J., denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment, essentially concluding that the incident was an intentional assault not covered by the policy.11 Having decided the issue before him on that ground, Judge Levin declined to address State Farm's alternate special defense that the plaintiff's claim was barred, under principles of collateral estoppel, by virtue of Judge Blue's decision to...

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