Dacumos v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.

Decision Date15 December 2017
Docket NumberCase No. C17–0964RSM
Parties Caren Rose DACUMOS, Plaintiff, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

Saraellen M. Hutchison, Law Office of Saraellen Hutchison PLLC, Tacoma, WA, Robert W. Mitchell, Robert Mitchell, Attorney at Law, PLLC, Vancouver, WA, for Plaintiff.

John S. Devlin, III, Abraham K. Lorber, Lane Powell PC, Rachel L. Dunnington, Stoel Rives, Seattle, WA, Tuan V. Uong, Zachary C. Frampton, Reed Smith, Los Angeles, CA, Todd O. Maiden, Reed Smith LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jeffrey M. Edelson, Markowitz Herbold PC, Portland, OR, Katherine A. Neben, Lisa Poladian–Melzer, Jones Day, Irvine, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Toyota Motor Credit Corporation's ("TMCC") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Dkt. # 26. Defendant seeks dismissal of all claims against it with prejudice with respect to alleged violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). Plaintiff opposes the motion. Dkt. # 29. Having reviewed the record before it, and neither party having requested oral argument on the motion, the Court now GRANTS Defendant's motion, subject to amendment.

II. BACKGROUND

Defendants removed the instant action to this Court on June 26, 2017. Dkt. # 1. Plaintiff alleges violations of the FCRA and damages arising from the continued credit reporting of a charged off amount of a car loan that she co-signed. Id. Plaintiff names Defendant TMCC as the creditor/furnisher and Defendants Equifax Information Services LLC ("Equifax") and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian") as the credit reporting agencies. Dkt. # 1–1 at ¶¶ 2.2–2.9.

Plaintiff alleges the factual background to his claims as follows:

4.1 Plaintiff co-signed a vehicle loan with Defendant TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION ("Toyota") for Melanthon Ibanez.
4.2 Thereafter, Mr. Ibanez defaulted on the loan.
4.3 Toyota sued Mr. Ibanez and Plaintiff in Toyota Motor Credit Corporation v. Melanthon Ibanez and Carenrose Dacumos, King County Superior Court Case No. 15–2–13622–4 KNT.
4.4 Ultimately, Plaintiff successfully defended Toyota's action and on June 29, 2016, obtained an Order of Dismissal With Prejudice of all of Toyota's claims against her.
4.5 This dismissal order is a matter of public record.
4.6 Defendants did not update Plaintiffs credit report to reflect that Plaintiff owes nothing to Toyota.
4.7 Toyota account number 7040* * * * * * * * * * account status was reported by Defendants as a Charge Off and that $13,593 was past due, even though Plaintiff did not owe any money to Toyota.
4.8 Plaintiff submitted multiple online disputes of this information, and Equifax and Experian notified Toyota of these disputes.
4.9 Every time, Toyota verified the false information and Equifax and Experian continued to report it.
4.10 Plaintiff submitted online disputes to Equifax on July 8, 2016, August 10, 2016, October 3, 2016 and March 10, 2017.
4.11 In Equifax's October 17, 2016 response to Plaintiffs October 3, 2016 dispute, Equifax stated that Equifax researched the Toyota account, and "the results are: we verified that this item belongs to you. Additional information has been supplied from the original source regarding this item."
4.12 The October 17, 2016 Equifax updated credit report reported Toyota as a charge off with $13,593 owed.
4.13 Plaintiff also disputed the Toyota account to Trans Union (not a party to this action).
4.14 Trans Union notified Toyota of the disputes.
4.15 After at least two online disputes through Trans Union's "Credit Karma" website, Toyota continued to report to Trans Union that Plaintiff still owed Toyota money.
4.16 On March 18, 2017, and March 21, 2017, Plaintiff tried to apply for credit at Navy Federal Credit Union, and Navy Federal Credit Union turned her down both times because of delinquent credit obligations and a derogatory public record reported by Equifax.
4.17 On April 21, 2017, Plaintiff pulled her Equifax, Experian and Trans Union credit reports and saw that Defendants were still reporting that Plaintiff owed $13,593 to Toyota.
4.18 Plaintiff mailed dispute letters to all three Credit Reporting Agencies, attaching a copy of the Order of Dismissal With Prejudice of Toyota's claims against her.
4.19 Trans Union responded by correcting the balance to $0.
4.20 Experian, however, notified Toyota of the dispute, and the result was just the same as it had been every time previously—Toyota and Experian reported that Plaintiff owes Toyota $13,593 when this is false.
4.21 Equifax also notified Toyota of the dispute, with the same result—Toyota and Equifax reported that Plaintiff owes Toyota $13,593 when this is false.
4.22 Defendants were notified repeatedly of the inaccuracies, but repeatedly ignored the facts.
4.23 This ordeal has caused Plaintiff significant frustration, emotional distress, embarrassment, humiliation of credit denials, loss of reputation, monetary loss in the form of being denied credit, intrusion into her privacy, an unwelcome distraction in her personal life, the chilling effect on her obtaining credit, and other ongoing and harms and losses.

Dkt. # 1–1 at ¶¶ 4.1–4.23.

Plaintiff now brings claims against Defendants for violations of the FCRA. Dkt. # 1–1 at ¶¶ 5.1–7.7. The instant motions followed.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The same legal standard applies to a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc. , 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, the Court must accept as true all material facts alleged in the pleadings and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Fleming v. Pickard , 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co. , 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). Though the Court limits its review to allegations of material fact set forth in the complaint, the Court may consider materials attached to or incorporated by reference in the pleadings. See Knievel v. ESPN , 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the Court has taken judicial notice of and considers herein the documents attached to Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice. Dkt. # 27, Exs. A–U. The Court agrees that judicial notice is appropriate because the documents presented are matters of public record, having been filed in the King County Superior Court, and because several of those exhibits have been incorporated by reference in the Complaint. Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001) ; Parrino v. FHP, Inc. , 146 F.3d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1998).

As further discussed below, the Court does not consider the Settlement Agreement provided by Plaintiff, as that document is not one of public record, Plaintiff makes no reference to the document in her Complaint, and the Court declines to treat this motion as one for summary judgment.

B. Plaintiff's Complaint
1. Request to Convert to Summary Judgment

As an initial matter, the Court addresses Plaintiff's request that this Court convert the instant motion into one for summary judgment and then continue the motion while Plaintiff completes discovery. Dkt. # 29 at 7–8. The Court denies that request for two reasons. First, the premise of Plaintiff's request is misguided. Plaintiff argues that the instant motion should be converted to one for summary judgment because Defendants ask the Court to consider matters extrinsic to the pleadings, specifically "a curated selection of records" that have been mischaracterized. Id. at 7. Regardless of the characterization of the records, the Court has already noted that it may take judicial notice of such records without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See Section III.A., supra. Moreover, Plaintiff could have, but chose not to, submit additional records from the same proceedings to fill in whatever gaps she believed were necessary to present to the Court. The Court could have taken judicial notice of those documents for the same reasons. Finally, the Court is aware of the standards applicable to the consideration of the records, and does not rely on the documents for the truth of the matters set forth therein. Accordingly, the Court declines to convert the instant motion to one for summary judgment.

2. Request to Deny as Untimely

The Court next addresses Plaintiff's passing argument that the instant motion is untimely. Dkt. # 29 at 6. Without citing any authority, Plaintiff asserts the motion is untimely because Defendant waited to file it until after the deadline for amended pleadings have expired. Id. That argument is without basis. First, this Court controls its own docket and deadlines, and has the authority to allow amended pleadings when it finds such action to be just. Further, this case is in its infancy. The trial date is not set until July of 2018. Dkt. # 14. The discovery deadline is not until March of 2018. Id. Should Plaintiff choose to file an Amended Complaint, as discussed, below, there is no reason that either discovery or a trial in this matter should be delayed. Thus, allowing this motion is not unduly prejudicial to Plaintiff.

3. Effect of Dismissal in State Court

The Court now turns to the claims made by Plaintiff. In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the dismissal with prejudice of the collections...

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    ...to a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Dacumos v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (citing Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Court accepts "......
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    ...to a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Dacumos v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (citing Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Court accepts "......
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