Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 13467,13467
• Citation: 550 A.2d 1061,209 Conn. 243
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Lois DADDONA, Administratrix (ESTATE of Isabel KEIPER) v. LIBERTY MOBILE HOME SALES, INC.

Page 1061

550 A.2d 1061

209 Conn. 243

Lois DADDONA, Administratrix (ESTATE of Isabel KEIPER) v. LIBERTY MOBILE HOME SALES, INC.

No. 13467.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 6, 1988.

Decided Nov. 29, 1988.

Robert L. Hirtle, Jr., with whom was Richard M. Porter, West Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Edward G. Fitzpatrick, with whom, on the brief, was Peter E. Mariano, Naugatuck, for appellee (plaintiff).

Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Stephen R. Park, William M. Rubenstein and Robert M. Langer, Asst. Attys. Gen., filed a brief for the State as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN and COVELLO, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, Lois Daddona, administratrix of the estate of her mother, Isabel Keiper, owner of a mobile home, brought an action seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages against the defendant, Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., which owns the lot where the home is located. The plaintiff alleged in her amended complaint that the defendant's continuing refusal to permit an on-site sale of the decedent's mobile home violates General Statutes § 21-79; ¹ that the defendant's enforcement of the resale standards set by the 1982 supplemental judgment in an action the defendant had brought against the town of Prospect constitutes a violation of General Statutes § 21-79 and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; and that the dismantling of the mobile home by the defendant for off-site storage constitutes a violation of CUTPA.

The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff to recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The trial court also permanently enjoined the defendant from interfering with the on-site sale of the mobile home and from evicting the plaintiff, provided that the plaintiff paid the defendant a reasonable sum for use and occupancy each month after the effective date of its decision. In addition, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the defendant's counterclaim for unpaid rent, on the ground that, by dismantling the mobile home, the defendant had caused the mobile home to become untenantable, thereby excusing the plaintiff from paying rent pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-4a.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in holding that: (1) General Statutes § 21-79 does not take private property without just compensation; (2) an estate is a "resident" as defined by General Statutes § 21-64(5); ² (3) General Statutes § 21-79 takes priority over the lease provision incorporating the 1982 supplemental judgment in an action the defendant had brought against the town of Prospect; (4) the plaintiff did not abandon the mobile home; (5) the defendant's actions constituted violations of CUTPA in three respects; and (6) the defendant was not entitled to recover on its counterclaim for unpaid rent.

At oral argument, the defendant conceded that the first claim is controlled by our holding in Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 208 Conn. 620, 546 A.2d 805 (1988), that the right of on-site sale given to a mobile home owner by § 21-79 does not constitute an unconstitutional taking of property. The defendant has also acknowledged that the second claim is controlled by our holding in Thompson v. Merlino Enterprises, Inc., 208 Conn. 656, 545 A.2d 1094 (1988), that an administrator is a "resident" as defined by § 21-64(5) and thus may exercise the rights of a deceased owner of a mobile home. We find no error on the third and fourth claims. On the fifth claim we conclude that two of the three grounds relied upon in awarding damages for violations of CUTPA are unsound. On the sixth claim, we conclude that the trial court's finding of fact on which its conclusion was based was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court with direction to redetermine the issue of damages based upon the remaining ground for finding a CUTPA violation, and to retry the defendant's counterclaim.

The trial court found the following facts. On December 13, 1972, the decedent, Isabel Keiper, purchased a 1973 Burlington mobile home for $10,800. The mobile home was purchased "on-site" upon a lot in Harmony Acres Mobile Home Park, which the defendant owned, in the town of Prospect. The parties entered into a rental agreement, which was renewed annually until September, 1984, when it expired.

An addendum to the plaintiff's lease was executed on September 23, 1983, incorporating the provisions of a 1982 supplemental judgment from a prior action, Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Prospect, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 106145 (September 23, 1982). That judgment provided that, pursuant to the redesign of the park, twenty-six mobile home lots were to be eliminated from the Harmony Acres Mobile Home Park by September 22, 1988. The lot occupied by the plaintiff's mobile home was among those to be eliminated. The judgment required, however, that a new site within the park be offered to each resident whose lot was being eliminated by the plan of development.

No new lease was executed after September, 1984, because the plaintiff's decedent, Keiper, was hospitalized and unable to sign. Keiper died on November 11, 1984. The plaintiff, administratrix of the estate, paid rent to the defendant from December 1, 1984, to July 1, 1985. In November, 1984, after Keiper's death, the defendant advised the plaintiff that the home would have to be removed from the park and sold off-site.

The plaintiff's expert at trial testified that the appraised value of the mobile home in December, 1984, if sold on-site was $28,000. On June 21, 1985, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant, giving notice of her intention to sell the mobile home and requesting an inspection. The defendant did not respond to this request within twenty days after its receipt as required by General Statutes § 21-79(e). On December 16, 1985, the plaintiff was notified that the defendant's employees were dismantling the mobile home. Shortly thereafter the defendant offered to buy the mobile home for the original purchase price of $10,800. On January 2, 1986, the defendant's employees continued to dismantle the mobile home, removing the vinyl skirting, television antenna, awnings, porch gutters, central air conditioning unit, and lines. The defendant did not notify the plaintiff that the mobile home had been dismantled in preparation for off-site storage, did not serve a notice to quit possession of the lot, and never obtained court authority for its action.

The plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order on January 3, 1986, to prevent the defendant from further dismantling the mobile home. On February 28, 1986, the commissioner of consumer protection issued a declaratory ruling concerning the on-site resale of the mobile home owned by Keiper's estate. This ruling declared that the new owner, whether the estate or the heirs, had the right to sell the home pursuant to General Statutes § 21-79, but that the mobile home was not safe, sanitary, nor in conformance with the park's aesthetic standards for resale in its dismantled condition.

The plaintiff brought this action, seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages. The defendant raised a number of special defenses, including a claim that the plaintiff had abandoned the mobile home. The defendant also filed a counterclaim to collect the rent allegedly due since August 1, 1985.

In rejecting the defendant's special defense of abandonment, the trial court found that the plaintiff had continued to visit the home every two weeks to maintain the exterior grounds and the interior until July, 1985, when the defendant refused an on-site sale, and that thereafter, the plaintiff had visited monthly.

The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, rejected the defendant's special defenses, and found for the plaintiff on the defendant's counterclaim. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court erred in holding that General Statutes § 21-79 supersedes the 1982 supplemental judgment in an action the defendant had brought against the town of Prospect; Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Prospect, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 106145 (September 23, 1982); and in concluding that, because the plaintiff was not required to abide by the permit requirements of that judgment, she had resale rights in respect to the mobile home.

In that action, the defendant in this case sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of certain Prospect zoning regulations. In a supplemental judgment, the court ordered "[t]hat all owners of mobile homes within the park will be required to obtain a building permit and certificate of occupancy from the Town prior to resale of their mobile homes...."

This court's holding in Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., supra, defeats the defendant's claim. In Eamiello, we noted that, because the plaintiffs were not parties to the defendant's suit against the town of Prospect and were not notified of the supplemental judgment until after it had been rendered, they were not bound by the judgment under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel. We held, nevertheless, that "the terms of the judgment bind the plaintiffs to the same extent as the other lease provisions but have no independent force." Id.

We stated that " § 21-79(a) prohibits the operator of a mobile home park from requiring for approval of the on-site resale of a mobile home anything more than that the home be 'safe, sanitary and in conformance with aesthetic standards.' Thus, the requirement of the 1982 supplemental judgment referred to in the lease that the plaintiffs 'obtain a building permit and certificate of occupancy from the town prior to resale,' like other resale...