Dade County v. Dade County League of Municipalities

• Decision Date: 23 July 1958
• Citation: 104 So.2d 512
• Parties: DADE COUNTY, Florida and Carl Holmer, Jr., as Supervisor of Registration, Appellants, and John E. Cicero and Charles Girtman, on behalf of themselves and all othersimilarly situated, Appellants, v. DADE COUNTY LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES and Dean Claussen, Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 512

104 So.2d 512

DADE COUNTY, Florida and Carl Holmer, Jr., as Supervisor of Registration, Appellants, and John E. Cicero and Charles Girtman, on behalf of themselves and all othersimilarly situated, Appellants, v. DADE COUNTY LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES and Dean Claussen, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 23, 1958.

Darrey A. Davis, Miami, for Dade County and Carl Holmer, Jr.

Olavi M. Hendrickson, Miami, for John E. Cicero and Charles Girtman.

George S. Okell, Sr., Miami, for appellees.

THORNAL, Justice.

Appellants Dade County, Holmer, Cicero and Gritman seek reversal of a decree of the Chancellor affirming the constitutionality of a proposed amendment to the Dade County Home Rule Charter but temporarily enjoining an election for the approval or disapproval thereof until the matter is finally determined by this court.

The point to be determined is the constitutionality of the proposed charter amendment.

Pursuant to authorization provided by Article VIII, Section 11, Florida Constitution, F.S.A. (the special Dade County Home Rule provision), the electors of Dade County adopted a Home Rule Charter on May 21, 1957. On October 15, 1957, representatives of the Dade County League of Municipalities presented to the Board of County Commissioners petitions signed by 38,002 persons requesting the calling of an election to pass upon a proposed 'municipal autonomy amendment' to the previously approval Home Rule Charter. Without undertaking to approve the validity of the proposed amendment, the Board of County Commissioners nevertheless called a special election to be held in Dade County on February 11, 1958, in order to submit the proposal to the electors.

On January 20, 1958, appellants Cicero and Girtman, as taxpayers repesentative of a class, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court against Dade County and appellant Holmer, as Supervisor of Registration. The complaint sought a declaratory decree on the matter of the constitutionality of the proposed municipal autonomy amendment and requested an injunction against the holding of the special election.

On January 27, 1958, appellees Dade County League of Municipalities and Claussen, as its president, were granted leave to intervene. The intervenors subsequently filed an answer alleging that they represented twenty-two of the twenty-six municipalities in Dade County. They alleged that the proposed amendment was constitutional and naturally opposed the prayer for injunctive relief. By their answer to the complaint, appellants Dade County and Holmer, as Supervisor of Registration, conceded that the petition seeking the election contained a sufficient number of electors to motivate the exercise of the power to call the election. No question has been raised as to compliance with any procedural requirements essential to the ultimate validity of the election itself. It is also conceded that the holding of the election would involve an expenditure of approximately $85,000 and that it would be to the interest of the taxpayers of the county to have a determination of the constitutionality of the proposed amendment prior to the expenditure of this substantial sum of public funds.

By his decree the Chancellor expressed the view 'that the amendment in question does not infringe, nor does it violate any section or phase' of Article VIII, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution. However, recognizing the public importance of the matter at hand and in order to obtain a determination of the basic question prior to the expenditure of substantial amounts of public funds, the Chancellor enjoined the holding of the special election until the constitutionality of the proposed amendment could be decided by this court. Reversal of that portion of the decree finding the proposed amendment to be constitutional is now sought.

It is the contention of the appellants that the proposed municipal autonomy amendment contravenes various parts of Article VIII, Section 11, Florida Constitution, and that if adopted it would for all practical purposes destroy Dade County metropolitan government as contemplated by the constitutional provision and the Home Rule Charter adopted pursuant thereto.

It is the contention of the appellees that the proposed amendment is consistent with the Constitution, that it is well within the spirit of Home Rule and that the injunction which precludes the holding of the special election should be dissolved.

At the outset we dispose of the matter of the propriety of considering the constitutionality of the proposal in advance of an election called to enable the electorate to express its approval or disapproval of the subject proposal. There is adequate precedent for doing so. We are not here confronted with an election in which the people are to have the privilege of expressing their choice as between candidates for public office. If the latter were the situation, the matter for determination would be purely political rather than judicial and the courts would not interfere. State ex rel. Landis v. Tedder, 106 Fla. 140, 143 So. 148. We are here dealing with an election involving a matter with reference to which the public interest and public rights may be determined in advance of the ballot, in order to preclude or forestall possible expenditure of substantial sums of public monies in the doing of what could be a vain and useless thing. Duval County v. Jennings, 121 Fla. 584, 164 So. 356; Dubose v. Kelly, 132 Fla. 548, 181 So. 11; Gray v. Moss, 115 Fla. 701, 156 So. 262; Gray v. Winthrop, 115 Fla. 721, 156 So. 270, 94 A.L.R. 804.

Having determined the propriety of considering the constitutionality of the proposed autonomy amendment in advance of the special election, we now proceed to the main question. We do not have to concern ourselves with alleged conflicts between the existing Home Rule Charter and the provisions of the proposed amendment. This is so because the controlling law is a constitutional provision authorizing Home Rule in Dade County. The provisions of the Charter and amendments thereto are to be tested by the prescriptions of the Constitution itself. In the same vien we do not undertake to evaluate the ultimate effect of the adoption of the proposed amendment upon the continued existence or efficiency of metropolitan government in Dade County. This is so because Home Rule government means exactly what the term suggests. If the people in the affected area desire Home Rule in its broadest and most completely unrestricted sense, it is theirs to adopt so long as they comply with the provisions of the organic law. On the other hand, and subject only to the same limitation, they can have limited Home Rule. Finally, by the same token if they desire no Home Rule at all, it is for them to decide. Consequently, it would be inappropriate for this court to undertake to discuss in any measure either the wisdom or the lack of wisdom reflected by the proposed amendment.

We emphatically herewith make it clear that nothing in this opinion is to be construed as an expression of the views of this court on the subject of the wisdom or advisability of the proposal. We limit our consideration of the problem entirely to a determination of whether the proposal in its entirety contravenes the provisions of Article VIII, Section 11, Florida Constitution. We have used the word 'entirety' advisedly. When a proposal of the nature here involved is assaulted on the ground that it violates the Constitution, the courts will not interfere if upon ultimate approval by the electorate such proposal can have a valid field of operation even though segments of the proposal or its subsequent applicability to particular situations might result in contravening the organic law. In other words, if an examination of the proposed amendment reveals that if adopted it would be legally operative in part, even though it might ultimately become necessary to determine that particular aspects violate the Constitution, then the submission of such a proposal to the electorate for approval or disapproval will not be restrained. Gray v. Moss, supra; Gray v. Winthrop, supra.

The so-called municipal autonomy amendment to the Dade County Home Rule Charter which is here involved reads as follows:

'Section 10.01: Reservation of Certain Powers in Municipalities.

'A. Anything to the contrary herein notwithstanding, neither the political autonomy nor the right of self-government or self-determination of any of the municipalities in Dade County shall be infringed upon, disturbed, or interfered with, and they shall maintain their continuous right to exercise all powers whether granted by their several charters, or by Special Act, or by General Law. This, however, shall not and does not apply to Section 4.04 dealing with Assessment and Collection of Taxes, nor with Sub-paragraph (18) of Paragraph A of Section 1.01 which permits the Dade County Commissioners to set reasonable minimum standards for all governmental units in the County for the performance of any service or function.

'B. All existing ordinances inconsistent herewith shall no longer remain in force and effect.'

Consistent with the rules which we have previously announced in order to justify an injunction against the submission of the proposal to the electorate of Dade County it would be necessary for this Court to find that the proposed amendment was unconstitutional in its entirety.

With regard to Home Rule in Dade County we have heretofore several times announced that the provisions of the Home Rule...