Daffin v. Scotch Lumber Co.

Decision Date12 January 1933
Docket Number1 Div. 740.
PartiesDAFFIN, TAX ASSESSOR, v. SCOTCH LUMBER CO.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Clarke County; T. J. Bedsole, Judge.

Petition of the Scotch Lumber Company for mandamus to W. W. Daffin Jr., as Tax Assessor of Clarke County, and as ex officio Secretary of the Board of Review of said County. From a judgment granting the writ, respondent appeals.

Reversed and rendered.

Thos E. Knight, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Thos. Seay Lawson, Asst Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Adams & Gillmore, of Grove Hill, for appellee.

BROWN J.

This appeal is from the judgment of the circuit court awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus, commanding the appellant as tax assessor of Clarke county to enter on the record of the tax assessment against the appellee, the valuation of the property as fixed by the board of review on July 11, 1932.

The question presented by this appeal is whether or not the board of review, on the facts alleged in the petition, if sustained by the proof, had jurisdiction to reopen the assessment and revalue the property.

The property involved is real estate, consisting of timbered and cut-over lands, the improvements thereon, and mineral rights.

The petition avers, in substance, that the petitioning taxpayer duly listed the lands, consisting of 123,414 acres, described according to the government survey, with estimated valuation of 60 per cent. of the market value of $14.40 per acre on 30,309 acres, and 93,105 acres at $1.80 per acre, or total estimated value of $604,038; separately listing the improvements, dwelling houses, and log camps, as personal property, at an estimated valuation on like basis of $18,812; oil and mineral rights, 1,013 acres estimated at 10 cents per acre, $101.30; that the respondent, as tax assessor, or the board of review, at some time unknown to the petitioner, and without notice to him, reclassified the property and assessed the 123,414 acres, "land only" at $222,145, "timber only" at $757,770 transferred the "dwelling houses and log camps" to the real estate column, at an assessed valuation of $18,812, and transferred the "oil and mineral rights" to the personal property column at an assessed valuation of $101.30; that no valuation was entered by the assessor or board of review upon any of the individual "items of real property" as listed by the petitioner; nor was any such valuation entered on the recapitulation sheet as related to the items listed-assessing the timber and lands, as lands; that for the preceding tax year, 1931, the total value of petitioner's real estate as finally fixed was $982,292; that for the preceding tax year the items "described as dwelling houses and as log camps had both been entered as personal property, and the value thereon fixed as such," and remained classified as personal property for said year; that as finally entered up for the current year 1932, "as hereinabove more specifically set forth, the aggregate value of its real estate was fixed by said Board of Review at $998,727"; that petitioner was not notified "that there had been added to its tax return list, either by the tax assessor or by the Board of Review, the item which was entered thereon," as "timber only," or that its property had been "reclassified and redistributed," nor that there had been a transfer from its list of personal property to its list of real estate, the items designated as "dwelling houses and log camps," and "was not notified in any manner that the aggregate value of its real estate had been fixed for taxation by the Board of Review at an amount exceeding the value of said real estate for the preceding year"; that there had been no severance in the ownership of said timber from the land, and the assessment as made was unauthorized; that on July 5, 1932, petitioner filed with the tax assessor a protest in writing, a copy of which is made exhibit to the petition, and thereafter "the Board of Review held a meeting for the purpose of hearing the protest," at which time the petitioner appeared and offered evidence in support of its protest, and the Board of Review, by affirmative action of all of its members, except the tax assessor, "agreed to fix and did fix the value of the real estate of your petitioner, not including the dwelling houses and log camps, at the following amounts, to-wit: 30,309 acres of land at $14.40, $436,449.00; 93,105 acres of land at $1.80, $167,589.00, *** in lieu of the entries theretofore made by the tax assessor and/or the Board of Review, as hereinabove indicated, as 'land only' and 'timber only,' so that said items last mentioned should be eliminated from the said tax return list."

In the protest filed with the tax assessor, attached to and made a part of the petition for mandamus, it is alleged "that the total amount of the items thus listed and valued by the tax assessor and by the Board of Review, as real estate upon the list of property of this taxpayer, exceeded in the aggregate the value fixed for the preceding tax year upon the real estate of this taxpayer; but, nevertheless, this taxpayer was never notified in any manner that there had been such increase in the valuation of its real estate."

Section 56 of the act creating the board of review (Acts 1923, p. 181, Revenue Code 1929, § 186) provides: "Immediately upon the completion of the work of reviewing and adjusting assessed valuations by the Board of Review, required in this act, the tax assessor shall give notice by publication once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper published in the county, and if no newspaper is published in the county, by posting notices in three public places in each precinct of the county, that the assessed valuations of all property listed for taxation have been fixed as provided by law and that the tax return list showing thereon such assessed valuations are in his office and open for public inspection, and that the Board of Review will sit at the courthouse of the county, on the first Monday in June to consider such protests as may be filed by any taxpayer as herein provided, and that any taxpayer who is not satisfied with the valuations of his property as fixed and entered on the return list as required herein, may file objections in writing to such assessed valuations with the secretary of said board, on or before the last Monday in May, and the taxpayer shall set out in such objections filed, the description of each item of property and his reason for making objections to the assessed valuation as placed thereon." (Italics supplied.)

And section 57 provides: " For the purpose of hearing objections filed in writing to any assessments or valuations fixed as provided for herein, the Board of Review shall sit at the courthouse in their respective counties on the first Monday in June in each year, from 9 A. M. to 5 P. M. and shall continue as long as may be necessary, provided such sitting shall not be extended beyond the second Monday in July, unless otherwise ordered by the State Tax Commission, to dispose of all cases where objection to valuations or assessments has been filed in writing by any taxpayer, as provided in this act. At such sitting the property owner may appear in person, or by agent or attorney and produce evidence in support of objections if any, to any assessment or valuation theretofore made, and it shall be the duty of the Board of Review to examine under oath any complaining property owner, and...

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8 cases
  • State v. Alabama Power Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • October 19, 1950
    ...for assessment and taxation all his property and not omitting or overlooking any. In this connection this court in Daffin v. Scotch Lumber Co., 226 Ala. 33, 145 So. 452, 455, said: 'There can be no doubt that it was within the power of the tax assessor to classify the property listed, in ma......
  • Schwab v. Carter
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • January 12, 1933
    ......Woodall v. Southern Mfg. Co., 223 Ala. 262, 135 So. 446; Grimsley v. First Ave. Coal & Lumber. Co., 217 Ala. 159, 115 So. 90; Federal Automobile. Ins. Ass'n v. Abrams, 217 Ala. 539, 540, 117 ......
  • Broadway v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • October 19, 1944
    ...... the amount, that is administrative. Daffin v. Scotch. Lumber Co., 226 Ala. 33, 145 So. 452. See, section 62,. Title 51, Code. That status ......
  • State ex rel. Denson v. Howze
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • November 8, 1945
    ......Lewis. v. Jenkins, 215 Ala. 680, 112 So. 205; Daffin v. Scotch Lumber Co., 226 Ala. 33, 145 So. 452; State. v. Hogan, 204 Ala. 325, 85 So. 557. . . ......
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