Daffin v. State
Decision Date | 17 March 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 1D08-6367.,1D08-6367. |
Citation | 31 So.3d 867 |
Parties | Danurel DAFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Thomas D. Winokur, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
On direct appeal, Danurel Daffin contends the trial court erred by denying his request for credit, on each of three concurrent sentences, for all the time he spent in county jail before the concurrent sentences were pronounced. We reverse and remand for award of credit on each concurrent sentence for the time he spent in jail before sentencing.
Mr. Daffin was arrested on June 11, 2008, on charges of violating conditions of probation which had been imposed for resisting an officer without violence, a misdemeanor. An affidavit alleged that he had violated probation by committing new crimes: sale of cocaine in case number 08-20CF; and battery on a law enforcement officer (count I), resisting arrest with violence (count II), and petit theft (count III) in case number 08-29CF. Inasmuch as the new law violations were the basis alleged for revocation, he was arrested for the new law violations themselves at the same time.
At first appearance the following day, Mr. Daffin admitted violating probation. The trial court thereupon revoked probation, and sentenced him to 180 days in jail on the initial, underlying offense (resisting an officer without violence). Bond was set on the new law violation charges, but he never posted bond, remaining in jail instead, serving his sentence for resisting an officer without violence and awaiting disposition of the new law violation charges pending in cases numbers 08-20CF and 08-29CF.
On October 28, 2008, he pleaded no contest to all new law violations charged in exchange for concurrent sentences of four years and six months' imprisonment in case number 08-20CF; and, in case number 08-29CF, four years and six months' imprisonment on both Counts 1 and 2, and one month's imprisonment on count 3. On the sentencing forms, the box next to "original jail credit" was checked for each sentence, although the number of days' credit was not specified,1 except on the petit theft count, where a credit of 30 days (deemed the length of the whole sentence) was specified. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently with one another as well as concurrently with "any active sentence being served," which necessarily included the jail sentence imposed upon revocation of probation.
On November 3, 2008, Mr. Daffin filed a motion styled "Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence." The motion recited that it was being filed "pursuant to Rule 3.800 Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure," and alleged that the "fact that he was sentenced on the violation of probation before he was sentenced on the new charges does not affect his entitlement to jail credit on the sentence for the new charges." The trial court entered an order denying the motion; and amended the written sentencing papers to reflect one day's credit2 for the sentence imposed in case number 08-20CF and for each of the sentences imposed on counts 1 and 2 in case number 08-29CF.
Filed less than a week after entry of judgments of conviction for, and imposition of sentences on, the new law violations, Mr. Daffin's motion was a motion to correct sentencing errors pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1) (). Such a motion preserves alleged sentencing errors for review on direct appeal. See Amendments to Fla. Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g) & Fla. Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, 675 So.2d 1374, 1375 (Fla.1996) ( ); Whitehead v. State, 21 So.3d 157, 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) .
"Because a motion to correct a sentencing error involves a `purely legal issue,' an appellate court's standard of review for such a motion is de novo." Willard v. State, 22 So.3d 864, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing T.L.S. v. State, 949 So.2d 290, 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)). Here as below, Mr. Daffin asserts a right to credit for the time he spent in jail3 between June 12, 2008, and October 28, 2008, on each of his concurrent sentences, relying on this statutory language:
A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time she or he spent in the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a specified period of time and shall be provided for in the sentence.
§ 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). Our supreme court has made unmistakably clear that, pursuant to this provision, when "a defendant receives pre-sentence jail-time credit on a sentence that is to run concurrently with other sentences, those sentences must also reflect the credit for time served." Daniels v. State, 491 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla.1986) (emphasis in original).
The trial court did award pre-sentence jail-time credit on the sentence it imposed for petit theft, and the credit covered part of the time during which Mr. Daffin was serving the sentence that began when probation was revoked. A similar credit should have been awarded on each of the other concurrent sentences.4 Concurrent sentences have been defined as "two or more sentences of jail time to be served simultaneously." Black's Law Dictionary 1367 (7th ed. 1999). See generally State v. Rabedeau, 2 So.3d 191, 193 (Fla.2009). But "concurrent sentences do not necessarily begin at the same time, and unless they are ordered to be coterminous, they will expire on different dates." Llerena v. State, 953 So.2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Knight v. State, 832 So.2d 172, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)). In the present case, the concurrent sentences for the new law violations began later than the sentence pronounced upon revocation of probation to which they were all concurrent; and the petit theft sentence expired before any of the other sentences.
A defendant is not, of course, entitled to jail credit for concurrent sentences when the defendant was not actually in jail before sentencing in connection with the offenses for which the concurrent sentences are imposed. See, e.g., Gethers v. State, 838 So.2d 504, 505 (Fla.2003) ( ). If, for example, a defendant posts bond on one charge and is released, only to be reincarcerated later on other charges, he is then being held only on the charges occasioning the later arrest, until and unless the bond posted on the initial charge is revoked.5See Clifton v. State, 905 So.2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ( ); Blake v. State, 807 So.2d 772, 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (...
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