Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices

• Citation: 172 F.3d 104
• Decision Date: 09 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-1187,99-1187
• Parties: Beverly C. DAGGETT, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS AND ELECTION PRACTICES, et al., Defendants, Appellees. Betheda Edmonds, et al., Proposed Intervenors-Defendants, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 104

172 F.3d 104

Beverly C. DAGGETT, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS AND ELECTION PRACTICES, et

al., Defendants, Appellees.

Betheda Edmonds, et al., Proposed Intervenors-Defendants, Appellants.

No. 99-1187.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Argued March 4, 1999.

Decided April 9, 1999.

Gillian E. Metzger with whom Glenn J. Moramarco, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, John R. Brautigam and Arn H. Pearson, Maine Citizen Leadership Fund, were on brief, for appellants Betheda Edmonds, Kathleen McGee, Linda McKee, Peggy Pendleton and Elizabeth Watson.

Mark Lopez, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, with whom Nat Rosenblatt and Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell were on brief, for plaintiffs, appellees Beverly C. Daggett, Elaine Fuller, Christopher M. Harte, Mark T. Cenci, Jeffrey I. Weinstein, Shawn Levasseur and Libertarian Party of Maine.

James Bopp, Jr. with whom Robert J. Newmeyer, Heidi K. Meyer, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Daniel M. Snow and Pierce Atwood were on brief, for plaintiffs, appellees Rollin Stearns, Maine Right to Life Committee Political Action Committee State Candidate Fund, and National Right to Life Political Action Committee State Fund.

Andrew S. Hagler, Assistant Attorney General, Phyllis Gardiner, Assistant Attorney General, Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, and Paul Stern, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Litigation Division, on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before BOUDIN and LYNCH, Circuit Judges, and MAGILL, ^* Senior Circuit Judge.

BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal, by applicants whose motion to intervene was denied, stems from Maine's enactment in November 1996 of a set of campaign reform statutes. Adopted by Maine voters through a ballot initiative, the statute--denominated "An Act to Reform Campaign Finance" ("the Reform Act")--included both public funding of state campaigns and extensive regulation of contributions and expenditures. 1996 Me. Legis. Serv. Initiated Bill ch. 5 (I.B.5) (L.D.1823) (West).

The public financing provisions, called the Maine Clean Election Act, Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1121 et seq., offer participating candidates full public funding, eliminating the need for any fund-raising by candidates after they initially qualify. To qualify, a candidate must obtain $5 contributions from a number of registered voters, the number depending on the office sought (e.g., 50 contributions for a candidate for state representative). Id. §§ 1122(7), 1125(3). The contributions must be collected during the first half of the year in which the election occurs. Id. § 1122(8). (The period starts slightly earlier--November 1 of the preceding year--for gubernatorial candidates. Id.).

In addition to initial funding both for the primary and general elections, participating candidates get extra funds--up to a limit of 200 percent of the initial outlay--to the extent that nonparticipating opponents (or funds spent on their behalf) exceed the initial distribution. Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 1125(9). The participating candidates may describe themselves as Maine Clean Election Act candidates. Id. §§ 1122(1), 1125(5). In exchange for all of these benefits, the candidates agree not to spend more than the state's contributions. Id. § 1125.

For those candidates who decline to participate in the public funding program, the Reform Act imposes new limitations. Permissible contributions to such candidates are reduced--as to any contributing individual or group--to $250 for legislative races and $500 for gubernatorial races. Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, §§ 1015(1) (2), 1056(1). Nonparticipating candidates must also comply with expedited reporting requirements that are not applicable to publicly funded campaigns. Id. § 1017(3-B). Independent expenditures are not limited, but the matching fund provisions for participating candidates are triggered by independent expenditures as well as by direct expenditures. Id. § 1125(9).

In 1997, after adoption of the statute, it was promptly challenged in lawsuits in the district court. They were dismissed as premature, since the statute only became effective on January 1, 1999, and will apply for the first time in the November 2000 elections. However, it will now affect fund-raising that may begin as early as the summer of 1999. Accordingly, on November 4, 1998, a group of plaintiffs brought the Daggett lawsuit against the Maine commission that administers the new statute, the commission's members, the Maine Secretary of State and the Maine Attorney General (collectively, "the state defendants"). See Daggett v. Webster, No. 98-223-B--H (D. Me. compl. filed Nov. 4, 1998).

The Daggett plaintiffs are six individuals, including candidates who previously ran for the state legislature, a citizen who contributes, and the Libertarian Party of Maine. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief barring enforcement both of the public funding provisions and various of the regulatory limitations. Less than a month later, another set of plaintiffs brought the Stearns suit against the commission members, challenging the contribution limits and the provision for matching distributions based on independent expenditures. See Stearns v. Webster, No. 98-239-B-H (D. Me. compl. filed Dec. 4, 1998). The two cases were subsequently consolidated. See Daggett v. Webster, No. 98-223 (D. Me. order filed Jan. 4, 1999).

Within two weeks after the Daggett suit was filed, the present five appellants moved to intervene. Appellants are current officeholders or prospective candidates, all of whom intend to run for election in 2000, using public funding provided for by the Maine Clean Election Act. They sought intervention as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) or, in the alternative, permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). The plaintiffs in both cases opposed the motion, while the state defendants welcomed intervention.

On December 23, 1998, the district court set an expedited schedule for designation of experts, discovery, a trial (or stipulated record), and briefing of issues with final oral argument scheduled for June 3, 1999. Thereafter, on January 19, 1999, the district court entered the order now under review denying intervention by the applicants. Daggett v. Webster, 34 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.Me.1999). After applicants appealed, the district court suspended the scheduling order. This court expedited the appeal in light of the parties' representations as to the need for an urgent resolution.

The district court's decision to deny intervention as of right rested on the ground that, in the words of the rule, "[t]he applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). The district court said that the Maine Attorney General's goals were "identical to those of the would-be intervenors" and the Attorney General was fully able to mount "a strong defense in support of the statute." Daggett, 34 F.Supp.2d at 75. The court relied directly upon this court's decision in Moosehead Sanitary District v. S.G. Phillips Corp., 610 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir.1979). See Daggett, 34 F.Supp.2d at 75.

The district court also denied permissive intervention, available in the court's discretion where the applicant's claim or defense and the main action have "a question of law or fact in common." Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b). The court said that the intervenors' interest in supporting the new campaign legislation could be adequately satisfied by permitting them to participate as amicus curiae (which permission the court gave), and that additional defendants would only "complicate the proceedings without adding any advantage." Daggett, 34 F.Supp.2d at 76.

The order denying intervention is appealable now. See Public Serv. Co. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir.1998). The standard of review on appeal is "abuse of discretion" circumscribed by the specific standards set forth in the applicable rule, id.; but, as always, abstract issues of law (such as the proper standards for evaluating intervention motions) are reviewed de novo. This appeal turns primarily on the applicants' claim that the district court misconstrued and then misapplied the rule governing intervention as of right which reads:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject matter of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) (brackets added by us).

In this instance, the first requirement of timeliness was easily met. The second requirement--that the applicant possess a protectable "interest"--was not directly addressed by the district court. However, on appeal, the Daggett plaintiffs assert that the applicants lack a protectable interest. The Stearns plaintiffs make a related argument that the applicants lack Article III standing; on the latter argument the applicants say that they do have such standing but that it is in any event unnecessary for intervenors as of right.

Where required, standing is fundamental, see United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 113-15 (1st Cir.1992), and we begin with this issue. Interestingly, the circuits are divided as to whether an intervenor as of right must possess standing under Article III, and the Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the point. ¹ This circuit has not taken a position on the issue nor need we decide it here, as we believe that the applicants have a sufficient stake in the outcome to meet the rather modest requirements of Article III.

The case law interpreting standing requirements under Article III is, to put it mildly, "one of the most confused areas of the law." Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction §...