Daggs v. City of Seattle, s. 53037-8

• Citation: 110 Wn.2d 49,750 P.2d 626
• Decision Date: 18 February 1988
• Docket Number: Nos. 53037-8,53335-1 and 53681-3,s. 53037-8
• Parties: Victor DAGGS, Appellant, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent. Rosalie E. STEPHENS and David P. Stephens, Appellants, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent. Norma J. JOHNSON, Respondent, v. Jane MATTSON, et al., Defendants, and City of Seattle, Petitioner.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

Page 49

110 Wn.2d 49

750 P.2d 626

Victor DAGGS, Appellant, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent.

Rosalie E. STEPHENS and David P. Stephens, Appellants, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent.

Norma J. JOHNSON, Respondent, v. Jane MATTSON, et al., Defendants, and City of Seattle, Petitioner.

Nos. 53037-8, 53335-1 and 53681-3.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Feb. 18, 1988.

Lembhard G. Howell, Seattle, for appellant Daggs

Stritmatter, Kessler & McCauley, Keith L. Kessler, Hoquiam, for appellants Stephens.

Douglas Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Gordon F. Crandall, J. Roger Nowell, Victoria M. Seitz, Asst. City Attys., Seattle, for the City of Seattle.

Schroeter, Goldmark & Bender, Matthew G. Knopp, Seattle, for respondent Johnson.

Bryan P. Harnetiaux, Winston & Cashatt, Robert H. Whaley, Spokane, amicus curiae for Washington Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

DORE, Justice.

Three injured plaintiffs claim that the City's claims filing ordinance, Seattle Municipal Code 5.24.005, which requires a tort victim to file a claim with the City and then wait 60 days before bringing suit, is invalid. The victims point out that if they were required to wait 60 days after filing their claims, they would be subject to the new tort reform act (hereinafter Tort Reform Act), Laws of 1986, ch. 305, which applies to cases filed in superior court after August 1, 1986.

FACTS

Daggs. Victor Daggs was injured on January 12, 1986 when his car collided with a van which was being pursued On August 1, 1986, the City moved to dismiss Daggs' complaint because of his failure to comply with SMC 5.24.005. The trial court granted this motion, and later denied Daggs' motion for reconsideration. Daggs then moved for direct review by this court, which was granted on March 3, 1987.

                in a high speed chase by a Seattle Police Department patrol car.   Daggs alleged that the police negligently conducted the high speed chase and he filed a claim for damages with the City on June 3, 1986.   Pursuant to the Seattle claims filing ordinance, Daggs was required to wait 60 days before filing suit in superior court.   However, because the new Tort Reform Act would take effect on cases filed after August 1, 1986, Daggs did not wait the required 60 days and instead filed suit on June 25, 1986
                

Stephens. On January 18, 1985, William Stephens was driving a motorcycle on North 50th Street in Seattle when his motorcycle struck a curb which allegedly was protruding into the roadway. Stephens suffered severe brain damage because of this accident and his parents have been appointed as his guardians and co-conservators of his estate.

On July 6, 1986, his parents contacted counsel, and 2 days later a claim was filed with the City alleging damages from the poorly constructed curbing. On July 11, 1986, counsel filed suit in superior court, to try to prevent the application of the Tort Reform Act to the case. On July 29, 1986, the City moved to dismiss the suit for failure to comply with the 60-day waiting period, and this motion was granted on November 17, 1986. Stephens appeals this dismissal, and this case was consolidated with Daggs' suit to determine the validity of SMC 5.24.005(c).

Johnson. Christopher Johnson, a 6-year-old boy, was enrolled in a day care center in Seattle. The day care workers took Christopher to Gas Works Park in Seattle on September 1, 1983. At the park, Christopher allegedly played in a "play barn" area and fell from an apparatus. He suffered a fractured skull, as well as other injuries.

On July 18, 1986, Christopher's mother filed a claim with the City for damages on her own behalf and as guardian ad litem for Christopher. Three days later, Christopher's mother and Christopher filed suit in superior court against the City and other defendants. The City moved to have both causes of action dismissed for failure to comply with SMC 5.24.005(c). The trial court, however, denied this motion. The City petitioned the Court of Appeals for discretionary review, and subsequently this case was consolidated with the suits brought by Daggs and Stephens.

At oral argument, the City conceded that Christopher's mother's suit should not have been dismissed pursuant to SMC 5.24.005(c), as the ordinance cannot be invoked when to do so would cause the applicable statute of limitations to run. Christopher's mother had until September 1, 1986 to file suit, and application of the 60-day waiting period would prevent Christopher's mother from filing suit until after that date. SMC 5.24.005(c) does still apply to Christopher, however, as the applicable statute of limitations is tolled until he reaches eighteen. RCW 4.16.190.

POWER TO ENACT CLAIMS ORDINANCES

In 1967, the Legislature enacted RCW 4.96.010, which abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity for the political subdivisions of the state. This statute and RCW 35.31.030, however, require that as a condition precedent to maintaining an action in court, an injured party must comply with the applicable claims filing laws. These laws, including SMC 5.24.005, typically require that an injured party file a claim with the political subdivision, describing the accident, the party's current address, and the amount of the claim.

Certain claims statutes and ordinances have been subject to attack in recent cases. RCW 35.31.020, which required that claims be filed with certain cities within 120 days of the date of the accident, was held to be unconstitutional by this court because it arbitrarily shortened the amount of time in which an injured party could bring an action Not all claims filing laws, however, were invalidated. Claims filing laws serve the important function of fostering inexpensive settlement of tort claims. So long as the procedural burdens of filing claims with the government are reasonable, the claims laws are valid. Hall v. Niemer, 97 Wash.2d 574, 581, 649 P.2d 98 (1982). At issue in this case therefore, is whether Seattle's claims ordinance was validly enacted and does not impose an unreasonable procedural burden.

                against the State or its political subdivisions.   Equal protection requires that a party have the same amount of time to bring a tort action against the government as he or she would have to bring the action against a private tortfeasor.   Hunter v. North Mason High Sch., 85 Wash.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975);   Jenkins v. State, 85 Wash.2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975)
                

RCW 35.31.010 mandates that claims filed with charter cities such as Seattle must contain certain information, such as the current residence of the claimant. RCW 35.31.010 provides, in part:

Whenever a claim for damages sounding in tort against any city permitted by law to have a charter is presented to and filed with the city clerk ... in compliance with valid charter provisions thereof ... such claim must contain in addition to the valid requirements of the city charter ... a statement of the actual residence of the claimant ...

The plaintiffs argue that this statute not only requires that certain information be included in the claim, but also mandates that any claims filing requirement be contained in the city charter. Seattle has a charter, but the charter does not contain a claims filing provision. Instead, that provision is contained in an ordinance, and the plaintiffs assert that this is impermissible.

The plaintiffs rely on the holding in Amende v. Bremerton, 36 Wash.2d 333, 217 P.2d 1049 (1950) for this proposition. In Amende, the plaintiff sued the City of Bremerton (a charter city) to collect on some municipal bonds. Despite The City contends that neither RCW 35.31.010 nor the holding in Amende mandates that the only method of enacting a valid claims filing provision would be by amending the city charter. We agree. The purpose of RCW 35.31.010 is to ensure a claimant provides the City with his or her current address. While the wording of the statute indicates that the claim must be "in compliance with valid charter provisions ...", it does not explicitly require that the claims filing provision be found in the charter itself. Moreover, as mentioned above, the Amende case did not decide whether Bremerton could have validly enacted a claims filing ordinance.

                the fact [750 P.2d 629] that this suit was not brought in tort, the court held that the plaintiff was making a "claim for damages" and must comply with the applicable claims section.   The court then held that since no state statute required a claim to be filed, and since Bremerton did not have any charter provision regarding claims, the claim for damages could proceed.  Amende, at 338, 217 P.2d 1049.   The case did not decide, however, whether a Bremerton claims filing ordinance would have been valid
                

Article 4, section 15 of the current Seattle charter imparts on the city council broad legislative powers.

The City shall, in addition to the powers enumerated in this Charter, have all other powers now or hereafter granted to or exercised by municipal corporations of like character and degree ... and may exercise the same by ordinance and not otherwise.

This court has repeatedly held that first class cities such as Seattle may enact any ordinance which does not contravene the constitution, state statutes or the city charter. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wash.2d 772, 792, 666 P.2d 329 (1983); Winkenwerder v. Yakima, 52 Wash.2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873 (1958). Since none of these provisions preclude Seattle from enacting a claims filing law by ordinance, the ordinance was validly enacted.

EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTIES

The plaintiffs also assert that the claims filing ordinance violates the equal protection guaranties found in Washington Const. art. 1, § 12 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs argue that no valid reason exists to make tort victims of the government wait 60 days before filing suit when other victims of torts committed by private persons may file suit immediately. The detrimental effect to the plaintiffs of the 60-day period is particularly strong in ...