Daggs v. Ochsner L. S. U. Health Sys. of N. La.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:20-CV-00440 |
| Parties | RENATA MARIE DAGGS v. OCHSNER L. S. U. HEALTH SYSTEM OF NORTH LOUISIANA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Before the undersigned magistrate judge, on reference from the District Court, is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or in the alternative, for more definite statement [doc. # 5] filed by defendant Ochsner LSU Health System of North Louisiana. The motion is opposed. For reasons assigned below, it is recommended that the motion be GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.
On April 7, 2020, plaintiff pro se Renata Daggs filed the instant complaint against her former employer, Ochsner LSU Health Systems of North Louisiana ("OLHS-NL"). In her omnibus 50-page long complaint, plaintiff catalogued a series of wrongs that apparently began in 2015 when she made anonymous complaints regarding inadequate medical care that her employer was providing to psychiatric patients, which eventually culminated with an on-the-job eye injury following a patient assault in November 2018, her termination from employment in February 2019, and the suspension of her nursing license in March 2019, which was upheld in November 2019 following a July 2019 hearing.1
Given the breadth and scope of plaintiff's 50-page complaint, it is somewhat challenging to distill the precise nature of all her claims. However, from what the court may discern, plaintiff has endeavored to assert claims against OLHS-NL via the following statutory provisions or theories of recovery: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (); Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq.; Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; violations of various federal and state criminal laws; the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law ("LEDL") La. R.S. § 23:301, et seq.; the Louisiana whistleblower statute, La. R.S. § 23:967; penalties for retaliatory discharge and/or discrimination following the filing of a workers' compensation claim, La. R.S. § 23:1361; possible state law tort claims for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and/or medical malpractice; plus, allegations of conspiracy. Plaintiff seeks "punitive damages, general damages, and compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000 to settle out of court."
On July 29, 2020, defendant OLHS-NL filed the instant motion to dismiss for failure tostate a claim upon which relief can be granted, or in the alternative, for more definite statement. In its motion, OLHS-NL asserted that plaintiff's complaint failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it was vague, ambiguous, and did not include a short and plain statement of her claim showing that plaintiff was entitled to relief. OLHS-NL decried the complaint as long-winded and incoherent, and emphasized that it was unable to discern what claims plaintiff was asserting, or against whom.
Despite these misgivings, OLHS-NL proceeded to address the viability and sufficiency of some of plaintiff's claims. For instance, OLHS-NL argued that plaintiff's citation to criminal statutes was ineffectual because criminal statutes do not support imposition of civil liability. Similarly, defendant asserted that the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") did not provide a private right of action. OLHS-NL further observed that it was not obliged to provide plaintiff with any benefits under a federally assisted program, and thus, it could not have denied any benefits to plaintiff or otherwise discriminated against her on that basis. OLHS-NL also suggested that it was not a person acting under color of state law, and consequently, it could not be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, defendant observed that plaintiff could not pursue a claim for legal malpractice against OLHS-NL because it never provided any legal services to plaintiff.
With regard to plaintiff's employment-related claims, OLHS-NL argued that it did not violate the FMLA because plaintiff exhausted all twelve weeks of leave that she was entitled to receive under the law. As to her claims under Title VII and § 1983, OLHS-NL asserted that plaintiff never alleged that OLHS-NL took an adverse employment action against her because of her race. In addition, OLHS-NL argued that there were no allegations that plaintiff sufferedfrom a disability or that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability as required to support an ADA claim.
In the event that the court declined to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, OLHS-NL urged the court to order plaintiff to amend her complaint to provide a more definite statement. OLHS-NL reasoned that plaintiff's complaint was so vague and ambiguous that it could not possibly be expected to prepare and file a responsive pleading.
On August 20, 2020, plaintiff transmitted a Microsoft Word copy of her opposition brief to the undersigned's email address for courtesy copies, but neglected to file the actual opposition brief with the Clerk of Court. The court brought this issue to plaintiff's attention and gave her until September 4, 2020, in which to file her opposition brief with the Clerk of Court. (Aug. 25, 2020, Order [doc. # 8]).
On September 22, 2020, plaintiff filed her opposition brief with the Clerk, in belated compliance with the court's order. . In her brief, she explained that she asserted claims against OLHS-NL for violations of the ADA, the FMLA, Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She further argued that she did not need to satisfy a prima facie case for employment discrimination at the pleading stage. She also took issue with defendant's characterization of her complaint as fatally flawed because it purportedly lacked requisite facts and clarity. While acknowledging that the format of her complaint was a bit confusing, plaintiff noted that defendant managed to isolate and address multiple causes of action set forth in her complaint. She also added that defendant conspired with others, and that she had asserted a claim for fraud. Plaintiff then proceeded to discuss the viability of her variousclaims. However, she did not oppose providing defendant with a more definite statement. Plaintiff concluded by observing that she should not be required to provide evidence of her claims at the pleading stage. Rather, she intended to provide additional details after discovery and after defendant filed its formal answer to the complaint.
On September 29, 2020, OLHS-NL filed its reply brief, and argued that the court should not consider plaintiff's opposition memorandum because it was untimely.2 (Def. Reply [doc. # 10]). Defendant argued that, even if the court considered the memorandum, plaintiff's complaint, as clarified by her brief, still remained deficient. OLHS-NL emphasized that, given the continued lack of clarity regarding plaintiff's claims, it would suffer extreme prejudice if the court were to permit plaintiff to proceed with this litigation. OLHS-NL reargued that plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded that OLHS-NL was a state actor or that its employees were acting under color state law. Furthermore, even if she had so alleged, plaintiff's § 1983 claim was untimely. Defendant also asserted that the FLMA did not insulate plaintiff from termination simply because she requested medical leave or was placed on medical leave. Defendant concluded by urging the court to require plaintiff to amend her complaint - in the event the court declined to dismiss it outright.
On December 23, 2020, plaintiff again transmitted to the undersigned's courtesy copies email address several documents, including: a motion for leave to file first amended complaint, an apparent proposed amended complaint that was divided into at least two documents, a table ofauthorities for fraud on the court, a letter from the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and certain deposition excerpts. The court again advised plaintiff that she needed to file these documents by delivering them to the Clerk of Court. (Dec. 30, 2020, Order [doc. # 11]). The court accorded plaintiff until January 11, 2021, in which to file the documents and cautioned that it would not consider the "submissions," if she failed to timely do so. Id.
Plaintiff did not file her submissions with the Clerk of Court. Thus, the matter is ripe.3
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim for relief when, inter alia, it contains a "short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere inbetween. See Iqbal, supra. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127...
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