Dahl v. Dahl
Decision Date | 30 January 2015 |
Docket Number | Nos. 20100683,20111077.,s. 20100683 |
Citation | 2015 UT 23,345 P.3d 566 |
Parties | Charles DAHL, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Kim DAHL, Respondent and Appellant. |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Steve S. Christensen, Craig L. Pankratz, Samuel J. Sorensen, Salt Lake City, Sara Pfrommer, Park City, for petitioner and appellant.
Rosemond G. Blakelock, Ryan D. Petersen, Provo, for respondent and appellee.
Having recused themselves, Chief Justice DURRANT and Justice LEE did not participate herein; District Judges TODD M. SHAUGHNESSY and W. BRENT WEST sat.
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 These interrelated cases arise from the marriage dissolution of Dr. Charles Dahl and Ms. Kim Dahl. On appeal of the divorce case, Ms. Dahl challenges the district court's substantive rulings on alimony, child custody, and distribution of the marital estate. She additionally challenges the district court's rulings on judicial bias, evidentiary issues, and attorney fees. Ms. Dahl also appeals the outcome of a separate, but related, lawsuit involving marital assets contained in the Dahl Family Irrevocable Trust (Trust). Although these cases came before this court separately, we consolidate them, sua sponte for the purposes of appeal and remand, based on our conclusion that the Trust should have been joined as a party to the divorce action.
¶ 2 Due to the complex factual and procedural history of these cases, we provide only a brief overview of the underlying facts here. We will discuss the relevant facts in more detail below as they relate to our resolution of the various issues.
¶ 3 Dr. Charles Dahl and Ms. Kim Dahl were married for nearly eighteen years. Dr. Dahl is a practicing cardiologist. Ms. Dahl earned a master's degree in education and worked as an interior designer and school counselor prior to her marriage to Dr. Dahl. During the couple's marriage, Ms. Dahl was the primary caregiver to the couple's two children, D.D. and C.D.,1 and did not work outside the home.
¶ 4 Dr. Dahl filed for divorce on October 24, 2006. Following years of pretrial proceedings, the divorce court conducted a bench trial over fourteen nonconsecutive days, beginning in September 2009. The divorce court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 5, 2010, and the Decree of Divorce was entered July 20, 2010.
¶ 5 The divorce proceedings were extremely contentious. The parties fiercely disputed custody of their children, Ms. Dahl's right to temporary and permanent alimony, and the proper distribution of the marital estate. The discovery process was rife with abuses on both sides, which delayed trial. The pretrial disclosure process was similarly fraught and ultimately resulted in the exclusion of most of Ms. Dahl's trial exhibits and expert witnesses. The district court aptly described the pretrial proceedings as a “train wreck.”
¶ 6 On appeal of the divorce action, Ms. Dahl asserts several claims of error: (1) that the district court judge, Judge Taylor, was biased against her; (2) that the district court abused its discretion in various evidentiary rulings; (3) that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to award Ms. Dahl temporary and permanent alimony; (4) that the district court unfairly divided the marital assets in favor of Dr. Dahl; (5) that the district court erred in not considering joint custody of the couple's children; and (6) that the district court erred in not ordering Dr. Dahl to pay Ms. Dahl's attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 7 Ms. Dahl brought a separate action against the Trust, Marlette Enterprises, L.L.C., Dr. Dahl's real estate investment company, and C. Robert Dahl, Dr. Dahl's brother who served as the Trust's investment trustee (collectively Trust Defendants). In essence, Ms. Dahl sought a share of the Trust assets, which she claimed were marital property. Specifically, she sought declaratory judgment as to the parties' rights and obligations under the Trust, arguing that the Trust was null and void, that the Trust was revocable as a matter of law, that Ms. Dahl was a settlor of the Trust, and that she was entitled to an accounting from the Trust. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted the Trust Defendants' motion, dismissing Ms. Dahl's claims. She asserts that the district court erred when it declared that she had no enforceable interest in Trust assets. We agree and therefore reverse.
¶ 8 Ms. Dahl's appeals of both the divorce action and the trust action came before the court of appeals. The court of appeals certified both appeals to us. We have jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A–3–102(3)(b) of the Utah Code.
¶ 9 As an initial matter, we address Ms. Dahl's failure to join the Trust in the divorce action. Despite years of pretrial proceedings in the divorce action, counsel for Ms. Dahl failed to join the Trust as a defendant. Then, just weeks before the start of the divorce trial, Ms. Dahl's attorneys initiated the separate lawsuit against the Trust. The divorce court refused to consider the Trust assets in distributing the marital estate, ruling that the eve of trial was too late to join a new party and that it could not consider Trust assets that were the subject of other pending litigation. Given Ms. Dahl's failure to join the Trust as a defendant in the divorce action, we do not fault the divorce court for refusing to consider the Trust assets.
¶ 10 Courts may “make a legally binding adjudication only between the parties actually joined in the action.” Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah 1987) ; see also R.M.S. Corp. v. Baldwin, 576 P.2d 881, 883 (Utah 1978) ( ). Because of Ms. Dahl's failure to add the Trust as a party, the district court was correct that it had no power to adjudicate the parties' rights in the Trust assets.
¶ 11 The Trust assets included marital property. Without the power to consider and distribute the Trust assets, the district court lacked the authority to fully and fairly distribute the marital estate. Accordingly, the Trust should have been joined as a party to the divorce action.2 Counsel's failure to join the Trust prevented the district court from considering the Trust and its assets and therefore prevented a complete distribution of the marital estate. But we are now in a position to consider the Trust and its assets because both the Trust and divorce cases are before us. And “appellate courts may raise the issue [of joinder] sua sponte. ” Hiltsley, 738 P.2d at 1025. Accordingly, we hereby consolidate the Trust and divorce cases for purposes of appeal.3 And we remand both cases to the district court that handled the divorce case and direct it to join the Trust as a party to the divorce action.
¶ 12 On July 31, 2009, Ms. Dahl brought an action seeking a declaration of her rights in the Trust assets and requesting an accounting of the Trust's activities and a copy of the Trust agreement. Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court held a hearing on the parties' cross-motions on August 31, 2011. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court instructed counsel for both parties to prepare orders consistent with their respective positions. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trust Defendants and signed the order prepared by their counsel.
¶ 13 In adopting the order, the district court held that the Trust was irrevocable and that Ms. Dahl had no enforceable interest in the Trust assets. Though the Trust agreement contained a choice-of-law provision, the order did not specify whether the court was construing the Trust according to Utah or Nevada law. But it appears to have construed the Trust according to both Utah and Nevada law.
¶ 14 On appeal, Ms. Dahl argues (1) that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis, (2) that the court erred when it held that the Trust was irrevocable and that Ms. Dahl had no enforceable interest in Trust assets, and (3) that the district court exceeded its authority when it opined that the statute of limitations had lapsed on several claims not actually before it.4
¶ 15 Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Accordingly, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness and take “the facts and [any] inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Peterson v. Coca–Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ¶ 7, 48 P.3d 941.
¶ 16 Because Utah has a strong public policy interest in the equitable division of marital assets, we will not enforce the choice-of-law provision contained in the Trust. Instead, we construe the Trust according to Utah law. We hold that the Trust is revocable under Utah law and that Ms. Dahl has an interest in the Trust property as a settlor of the Trust. We further hold that the district court erred when it purported to adjudicate claims not properly before it. Before we address Ms. Dahl's specific claims of error, we first turn our attention to an inconsistency in the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Trust Defendants.
¶ 17 The district court adopted the order drafted by counsel for the Trust Defendants. That order was internally inconsistent. The order first addressed Ms. Dahl's request for...
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