Dahl v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2 of Lawrence Cnty.

• Decision Date: 10 April 1922
• Docket Number: No. 4989.,4989.
• Citation: 45 S.D. 366,187 N.W. 638
• Parties: DAHL et al. v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 OF LAWRENCE COUNTY.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

45 S.D. 366

187 N.W. 638

DAHL et al.

v.INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 2 OF LAWRENCE COUNTY.

No. 4989.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

April 10, 1922.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lawrence County; James McNenny, Judge.

Action by James E. Dahl and others against Independent School District No. 2 of Lawrence County, a school corporation. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.Francis J. Parker and Hayes & Heffron, all of Deadwood, for appellants.

Rice & Wishart, of Deadwood, for respondent.

ANDERSON, J.

This action is instituted by certain taxpayers, citizens, and parents of children who have been attending the First ward school of Deadwood for the purpose of procuring a permanent injunction, restraining defendant, its officers and agents, from closing said school or entering into any contract for the conveyance of the pupils of said school from their homes to what is known as the Third ward or Central school.

Prior to the commencement of this action and on July 29, 1921, there was held a regular monthly meeting by the board of education of independent school district No. 2 of Lawrence county. At this meeting it was moved and seconded:

“That the First ward school be closed and pupils of first, second and third grades conveyed to the Central school.”

Thereupon a petition was presented to the board by Hon. R. C. Hayes, who asked that the board listen to assembled representatives of the First ward in objection to the motion before the board, which was done. After extended arguments for and against the proposed action, the motion was put to a vote, with the result that three of the board members voted for the motion and two voted against it. The motion was declared carried. Thereafter the First ward school building was closed, and the pupils of the first, second, and third grades were conveyed to the Central school. This action on the part of the board of education is attacked in the complaint on the ground that the board in its action was guilty of abuse of discretion. The complaint is voluminous, covering, as it does, more than 22 pages of appellants' brief; but we believe foregoing statement in substance sets forth the material facts.

To this complaint defendants interposed a demurrer on the following grounds:

(1) That complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

(2) That it appears upon the face of the complaint that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the relief sought is against the board of education and not against the defendant.

(3) That the court is without jurisdiction for the reason that plaintiffs' remedy, if any, was by appeal from the action of the board. This demurrer was by the trial court sustained, and this appeal is taken from the order sustaining such demurrer.

Appellants' first contention is that the resolution passed, “that the school be closed and pupils of the first, second, and third grades conveyed to the Central school,” is illegal for want of authority vested in the independent district to provide such conveyance.

It is further contended that the whole action, being taken on the theory that respondents had the power to transport the pupils, and the resolution being indivisible in character, the whole action must fail.

[1] It is true that there is no statute specifically authorizing independent school districts to furnish conveyance for pupils, yet by reference to section 7537, R. C., under the head of “General Powers of Independent Districts,” we find this provision: “It (the independent district) shall possess the usual powers of corporations for school purposes.” This provision, it seems to us, is broad and comprehensive and may well be deemed as covering the matter of transportation of pupils. This, we think, is especially so in the light of the provisions of section 7456, R. C., as amended by chapter 176, Laws 1919. To us there seems no natural reason why it should not be as necessary to provide transportation for pupils attending school in an independent district as it would be in the...