Dahl v. Swift Distributions Inc. D/B/A Ultimate Support Sys. Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. CV 10–00551 SJO(RZX).,CV 10–00551 SJO(RZX).
• Citation: 757 F.Supp.2d 976
• Parties: Gary–Michael DAHL, an individual, Plaintiff,v.SWIFT DISTRIBUTIONS, INC. d/b/a Ultimate Support Systems, Inc., a California corporation; Michael Belitz, an individual; Robin Slaton, an individual; Does 1–20, inclusive, Defendants.And Related Counterclaims.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

757 F.Supp.2d 976

Gary–Michael DAHL, an individual, Plaintiff,

v.SWIFT DISTRIBUTIONS, INC. d/b/a Ultimate Support Systems, Inc., a California corporation; Michael Belitz, an individual; Robin Slaton, an individual; Does 1–20, inclusive, Defendants.And Related Counterclaims.

No. CV 10–00551 SJO(RZX).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Nov. 19, 2010.

John K. Buche, Sean Michael Sullivan, Buche & Associates PC, Mark A. Vasallo, Mark Vasallo PA, La Jolla, CA, for Plaintiff.John W. Holcomb, Nicholas Matthew Zovko, Knobbe Martens Olson and Bear LLP, Riverside, CA, Craig S. Summers, Knobbe Martens Olson Bear LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS AND COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF NONINFRINGEMENT OF THE PATENTS–IN–SUIT

S. JAMES OTERO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants and Counterclaimants Swift Distribution, Inc. d/b/a Ultimate Support Systems, Inc. (“Ultimate”), Michael Belitz, and Robin Slaton's (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Adjudication for Noninfringement of the Patents–in–Suit (“Motion”), filed on October 4, 2010. Plaintiff Gary–Michael Dahl (“Plaintiff”) filed an Opposition on October 8, 2010 (“Opposition”), which Defendants replied on October 18, 2010 (“Reply”). The Court held oral argument for the Motion on November 5, 2010. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a professional musician who created a collapsible cart (“Cart”) to move vast amounts of music, sound and video equipment quickly and easily. (Compl. ¶ 13.) The Cart is allegedly capable of being manipulated into eight different configurations, depending on the item to be transported. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff owns two patents, United States Patent Nos. 5,476,282 (“'282 Patent”) and 5,228,716 (“'716 Patent”) (collectively, “Patents–in–Suit”), which are directed at a convertible transport cart. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11; Decl. of Thomas R. Bewley in Supp. of Opp'n (“Bewley Decl.”) Exs. H, J.) Through various distributors, Plaintiff markets and sells the Cart for use in the music and broadcast industries. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 13.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants manufacture, promote, and sell carts which are covered by the Patents–in–Suit (“Products”) in the United States. (Compl. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff claims he first discovered in January of 2010 that Defendants were promoting the Products at the National Association of Music Merchants trade show. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 23.) Based on Defendants' alleged activities, on January 26, 2010, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants for: (1) patent infringement; (2) trademark infringement; (3) unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act; (4) trademark dilution; (5) false advertising in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17500; (6) unfair competition in violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200; (7) unfair competition in violation of common law; (8) breach of contract; (9) promissory estoppel; (10) fraudulent inducement; (11) civil conspiracy; and (12) misappropriation of trade secrets. ( See generally Compl.)

Soon after, Plaintiff filed an Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (“Application”) on February 12, 2010. (Docket No. 8.) The Court took the Application under submission and denied it on April 1, 2010, 2010 WL 1458957, because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of any of his claims or that he will suffer irreparable harm if the Application were not granted. (Order Denying Application 19:16–18.) Thereafter, at a scheduling conference on April 26, 2010, the parties agreed to set an earlier deadline for crossmotions for summary adjudication on patent infringement and invalidity. (Decl. of John W. Holcomb in Supp. of Mot. (“Holcomb Decl.”) Ex. 18, at 10:4–9, 10:12–18, 12:14–19.) On August 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Extension of Time to File Crossmotions for Summary Adjudication on Patent Infringement. (Docket No. 43.) The Court took that motion under submission and denied it because Plaintiff failed to show good cause for the extension. (Docket No. 70.) On October 4, 2010, Defendants filed the instant Motion, praying the Court to find that Defendants' activities do not infringe, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, any claim of the Patents–in–Suit. (Mot. 20:16–19.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDA. Summary Adjudication

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56(c) mandates that summary adjudication “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To meet its burden, the moving party does not need to produce any evidence or prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Rather, the moving party's initial burden “may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, Rule 56(e) shifts the burden to the nonmoving party and requires it to “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial” beyond those alleged in its pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party]'s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); accord Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (“[O]pponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (citation omitted). Further, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit ... will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment [and][f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citation omitted).

“Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part ... ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ ” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 1). “[S]ummary judgment under Rule 56 ... is entirely appropriate[ ] in a patent [case] as in any other case....” SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1116 (Fed.Cir.1985) (en banc). A court may enter summary adjudication on infringement issues alone even though other issues remain in the case. See Syntex Pharm. Int'l, Ltd. v. K–Line Pharm., Ltd., 905 F.2d 1525, 1525–26 (Fed.Cir.1990). “[N]othing more is required [from an accused infringer] than the filing of a summary judgment motion stating that the patentee had no evidence of infringement and pointing to the specific ways in which accused [products] did not meet the claim limitations.” Exigent Tech., Inc. v. Atrana Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed.Cir.2006). That being said, at the summary adjudication stage, a court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A court is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citation omitted).

B. Infringement

“An infringement analysis entails two steps. The first step is determining the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc) (citation omitted), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). “The second step is comparing the properly construed claims to the device accused of infringing.” Id.

1. Claim Construction

Claim construction is a question of law for the Court. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2004). Under Federal Circuit precedent, there is a presumption that claim terms “mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.” Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed.Cir.2002) (citation omitted). “It has [also] been long recognized in [Federal Circuit] precedent ... that dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining the ordinary and customary meanings of claim terms.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the parties agree that the Court does not need to construe any claim terms and that the plain and ordinary meaning applies. (Mot. 11:26–12:1; Holcomb Decl. Ex. 31.)

2. Determination of Infringement

Once the claims are properly construed, the Court may proceed to compare the Patents–in–Suit to the Products to determine whether the Defendants are guilty of patent infringement. See Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1247 (Fed.Cir.2000). Patent infringement is a question of fact. Id. (citing Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 161 F.3d 688, 692 (Fed.Cir.1998)). “To prevail, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused device infringes one or more claims of the patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Warner–Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997).

i. Literal...