Dahlen Transport, Inc. v. Hahne, 38333
| Decision Date | 27 October 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 38333,38333 |
| Citation | 112 N.W.2d 630,261 Minn. 218 |
| Parties | DAHLEN TRANSPORT, INC., protestant, Appellant, v. Newton G. HAHNE, d.b.a. Hahne Oil Company, applicant, Respondent. Newton G. HAHNE, d.b.a. Hahne Oil Company, applicant, Respondent, v. QUICKIE TRANSPORT COMPANY, protestant, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The scope of judicial review of an order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission on issues of fact is limited to an inquiry as to whether there is evidentiary support for an inference upon which the finding of fact could reasonably be made.
2. On appeal to this court we will examine all the evidence to ascertain whether the district court's determination that the evidence sustains the commission's finding is correct.
3. In determining whether a certificate of convenience and necessity should be granted to a petroleum carrier, ability of presently certificated carriers to handle the business in a given area is an important criterion but is not exclusive.
4. The term 'necessity' as used in our statute is an elastic one. The mere existence of adequate transportation in an area does not deprive the commission of all authority to issue additional certificates of convenience and necessity if it is for the public good to do so.
5. Under the facts of this case the commission acted within its discretion in issuing a certificate of convenience and necessity to respondent.
Peterson & Popovich, St. Paul, for Dahlen Transport, Inc.
Gordon Rosenmeier, Little Falls, for Quickie Transport Co.
Larson, Lindquist, Fraser & Magnuson, Gerald E. Magnuson and Richard E. Kossow, Minneapolis, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court affirming an order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission granting to respondent a certificate of convenience and necessity.
Respondent, Newton G. Hahne, is an individual doing business as Hahne Oil Company out of Virginia, Minnesota, and for some time has held authority from the Railroad and Warehouse Commission as a petroleum carrier for the transportation of petroleum products from terminals at New Brighton to various points on the Iron Range and from the origin point of Wrenshall to St. Louis County excluding the city of Duluth, to Itasca County, and to a part of Crow Wing County.
Under this authority, respondent normally transported approximately 3 1/2 million gallons of petroleum products annually. Practically all of the gallonage hauled was from the Wrenshall origin point, and 85 to 90 percent of the entire amount was hauled for the account of Phillips Petroleum Company. The remaining 10 to 15 percent was for Western Oil & Fuel Company. Approximately 400,000 gallons, or 11 percent, were transported to his own service station. About 1 3/4 million gallons, or 50 percent, were transported for Phillips Petroleum Company to a bulk plant in Virginia, Minnesota, which respondent operates. The remainder of respondent's transportation was to mining companies throughout his destination area. He has been hauling petroleum products to these accounts for over 10 years and, as a result, was described as 'controlling' these accounts.
In 1957, Phillips Petroleum Company and three other oil companies constructed a new terminal in St. Louis County known as the Duluth Petroleum Products Terminal. As a result of the establishment of this new terminal, Phillips stopped using the Wrenshall terminal from which respondent previously was authorized to haul and from which practically all of respondent's hauling commenced.
In late 1957, various Minnesota intrastate petroleum carriers, including the two appellants herein, petitioned for authority to operate from the new terminal. An order was issued on December 4, 1957, granting such authority to eight petroleum carriers. On November 26, 1957, 8 days before said order, respondent applied for authority to haul from this new terminal to a destination limited to an area identical with his former rights to haul from the Wrenshall terminal. Hearing on respondent's petition was held on December 17, 1957, only 13 days after appellants were granted rights to haul from the new terminal. The commission, having in mind that respondent was seeking authority to haul from the new terminal only throughout the same area to which he had formerly been authorized to haul from the Wrenshall terminal and was asking for substantially the same rights as had been granted to the eight other carriers, namely, the right to continue to haul in the same area from a different terminal, granted his petition. The commission found:
'* * * The result (of the relocation of Phillips' terminal) will be that Applicant will be forced out of business unless his petition is granted.
'That these consignees, who are members of the public, will be adversely affected by the denial of this application; that the transportation service being furnished by any railroad will not be affected by the granting of the certificate and the granting of the certificate will not have an adverse effect upon any other transportation service essential to the communities which might be affected by the granting of the certificate.
'We find that the applicant is fit and able to perform the service proposed and that public convenience and necessity requires the granting of all of the application.'
Appellants offered no evidence at the hearing. They appealed to the district court and at the trial thereof offered no evidence whatsoever but rested the appeal entirely on the record made before the commission. The order of the commission was affirmed by the district court, and the appeal here is from the judgment of affirmance.
Apparently it is appellants' position that, inasmuch as the record establishes that those granted authority to haul from the new terminal a few days before respondent was granted such right are able to haul all the petroleum products required in the area in which respondent seeks authority to continue his business, the commission exceeded its authority in granting him such right.
Minn.St. 221.071, which governs the issuance of certificates of authority to petroleum haulers, as far as pertinent here, reads:
The governing statute with respect to appeal from an order of the commission granting such authority is § 216.25, 1 which, as far as pertinent here, reads:
It is apparent from the findings of the commission that it took into consideration the fact that respondent was simply asking for authority to continue his business along the same line and within the same area as he had formerly been authorized to do and that to deny him such right would effectively ruin his business. Respondent testified that if he were not granted authority to haul from the new terminal he would lose the business he had formerly enjoyed in hauling for Phillips Petroleum Company, which constituted 85 to 90 percent of his business. Those whom he had formerly served testified that they desired to continue to do business with him but that if he were denied authority to haul from the new terminal they could conceivably obtain delivery of their products from other carriers. It is upon that testimony that appellants rest their appeal. Essentially, the question here is whether the commission, acting within its discretionary powers, could grant authority to respondent to haul from the new terminal in the area in which he formerly had authority to haul from the Wrenshall terminal when other certificated carriers are able to supply the necessary equipment to service the customers within that area.
1. A judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of the commission seems at first blush to be wholly inconsistent with the statutory rule which declares that the findings of the commission 'shall be prima facie Evidence of the matters therein stated, and the order shall be prima facie reasonable.' (Italics supplied.) But it need not be so if we are mindful of the judicial function in this...
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