Dahlin v. Amoco Oil Corp.
Decision Date | 26 February 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 45A03-8911-CV-477,45A03-8911-CV-477 |
Citation | 567 N.E.2d 806 |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Parties | Carl L. DAHLIN, and Mary Dahlin, Appellants (Defendants Below), v. AMOCO OIL CORPORATION, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Lonnie M. Randolph, East Chicago, for appellants.
Nick Katich, Karen L. Hughes, Lucas, Holcomb & Medrea, Merrillville, for appellee.
Carl L. and Mary Dahlin appeal a grant of specific performance and an award of nominal damages on their counterclaim for breach of contract. Their appeal raises eight issues, which we have consolidated and rephrased as follows:
I. Whether the trial court erred by granting Amoco Oil's motion for summary judgment on the issue of specific performance.
II. Whether the trial court erred in only permitting the recovery of nominal damages in the sum of one dollar for Amoco's breach of contract.
III. Whether the trial judge erred in not excusing himself for alleged bias and imposing sanctions upon the Dahlins for pursuing the claim of bias through discovery requests to nonparties.
The appellees raise an additional issue:
IV. Whether Amoco is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Indiana Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 15(G).
We affirm.
On July 5, 1968, Carl L. and Mary Dahlin agreed to lease a certain parcel of real property to Amoco Oil Co. for a period of ten years, with three optional five year extensions. Amoco owned a tract of land which adjoined the Dahlins' parcel. One provision of the lease was a restrictive covenant which prevented Amoco from erecting buildings on the leased land. The lease also gave Amoco the option to purchase the leased property at any date after October 8, 1978 for $100,000. The Dahlins were given the option to purchase Amoco's adjoining tract of land for $32,000, to be exercised in the last three months of the lease period or any extension period.
In early 1984, Carl Dahlin, Jr., the son of the appellants, noticed that a building being built by Amoco appeared to encroach upon the leased land in violation of the covenant against buildings. He called this to Amoco's attention in an attempt to "straighten the problem out." Amoco sent a letter in reply which indicated that Amoco wished to exercise its option to purchase the Dahlins' land.
The Dahlins refused to close the deal, and Amoco filed this action for specific performance. The Dahlins counterclaimed for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Amoco on its specific performance claim, for the Dahlins on their claim for breach of lease, and against the Dahlins on their claim for unjust enrichment. At trial, judgment on the evidence was granted against the Dahlins on all forms of damages except nominal damages. The jury returned a verdict for the Dahlins in the sum of $200,000, and the trial court remitted the verdict to the sum of $1. The court denied the Dahlins' post-trial petitions for attorney's fees and prejudgment interest, as well as their motion to correct errors. This appeal followed.
The Dahlins first argue that the trial court erred in granting specific performance of the option to purchase the leased real estate. We do not reach the merits of this issue because we find it to be moot.
If a party to a judgment voluntarily acquiesces in or recognizes the validity of such judgment or otherwise takes a position which would be inconsistent with any theory other than the validity of the judgment, he has impliedly waived his right to contest the validity of the judgment on appeal. Arnold v. Haberstock, 213 Ind. 98, 10 N.E.2d 591, 593 rehearing denied (1937), 213 Ind. 98, 11 N.E.2d 682. Thus, any subsequent appeal of that judgment becomes moot. Buck v. K.G. Schmidt Brewing Co. (1952), 123 Ind.App. 217, 105 N.E.2d 823, 825.
After summary judgment was rendered on the specific performance issue in this case, the Dahlins sold the real estate to Amoco on July 28, 1989 for the sum of $83,900.00. That sum represented the $100,000 option price minus $16,100 in rent payments which Amoco had made since it had communicated its desire to the Dahlins to exercise the option to purchase. In closing the real estate transaction with Amoco, the Dahlins took a position inconsistent with any theory other than the validity of the judgment for specific performance. They could have forestalled selling the property to Amoco pending this appeal. Buck, supra, 105 N.E.2d at 824-825. By electing instead to sell the property, they have waived their right to argue on appeal that the specific performance decree was invalid and unenforceable, and therefore their appeal on this issue is moot.
At the close of the Dahlins' case, the trial judge denied Amoco's judgment on the evidence with respect to compensatory damages, but granted it with respect to punitive damages. At the close of Amoco's case, the trial judge granted judgment on the evidence with respect to compensatory damages. The matter went to the jury on the issue of nominal damages, and the jury returned a verdict for the Dahlins for $200,000. The trial judge granted Amoco's motion for remittitur, and the verdict was reduced to $1. The trial judge also denied the Dahlins' petitions for attorney's fees and prejudgment interest. The Dahlins appeal each of these adverse rulings on damages.
The Dahlins contend that the trial court erred in granting Amoco's motion for judgment on the evidence on the issue of punitive damages. 1 In reviewing a grant of judgment on the evidence, we employ the same standard which governs the trial court. Watkins v. Alvey (1990), Ind.App., 549 N.E.2d 74, 76. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. The motion should be granted only when there is a complete failure of proof because there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference supporting an essential element of the claim. Id. Neither this court nor the trial court may weigh conflicting evidence when reviewing the propriety of the motion. First Bank & Trust Co. of Clay County v. Bunch (1984), Ind.App., 460 N.E.2d 517, 519, transfer denied.
In Indiana, punitive damages are not generally recoverable for a breach of contract. Arlington State Bank v. Colvin (1989), Ind.App., 545 N.E.2d 572, 579, transfer denied. In order to recover punitive damages in a breach of contract case, the plaintiff is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions in breaching the contract were accompanied by malice, fraud, gross negligence, or oppressive conduct. Id; IC 34-4-34-2 (Supp.1990). This standard does not contemplate recovery when the evidence merely is consistent with the hypothesis of such conduct. Dow Chemical v. St. Vincent's Hospital (1990), Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 144, 150, transfer pending. Rather, the plaintiff must provide some evidence "that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the tortious conduct was the result of a mistake of law or fact, honest error of judgment, overzealousness, mere negligence, or other such noniniquitous human failing." Id.
Here, the trial court correctly found that this burdensome standard could not be met by the evidence which the Dahlins introduced. No evidence whatsoever of fraudulent or malicious conduct on the part of Amoco appears in the record. The Dahlins argue that gross negligence or intentional conduct was shown by the fact that Amoco did not notify the Dahlins that it was building on the leased property, and that after Amoco was given notice of the breach, it continued to build the building and did nothing to remedy the breach. They contend that the evidence shows that "Amoco was hoping that the Dahlins would not find out about the new building because of the possibility that the building would increase the value of the land and thus force the renegotiation of the lease agreement." Appellants' Brief at 26. However, the lease provides an option to purchase the land for $100,000.00, regardless of the value of the land. Amoco was entitled to enforce that price under the lease without the necessity of "renegotiation."
The evidence also shows that Amoco informed the Dahlins that they intended to exercise the purchase option two months after it was notified in writing of the breach. Although this response perhaps could not be characterized as prompt, it represented an acceptable method under the lease by which the dispute could have been resolved.
The lease is a standard form contract, obviously prepared by Amoco. The second page of the form contains a provision which allows Amoco to construct buildings on the leased premises. In the Dahlins' lease, the language referring to buildings is crossed out and the parenthetical words "(except buildings)" are typed in at the end of the paragraph. Record, p. 26. At trial, the Dahlins presented no evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that Amoco merely relied on the fact that the lease was no different from the countless other leases which it had entered into with other parties across the country which allowed the construction of buildings on the leased premises. Certainly, such reliance would not excuse Amoco's breach of the lease, and its failure to check the lease for a deviation from the normal language could be characterized as negligent. Such a failure to act, however, is neither grossly negligent or intentional so as to warrant imposition of punitive damages.
The Dahlins finally contend that public policy would be served in assessing punitive damages against Amoco because "it would aid in deterring multi-million dollar corporations like Amoco Oil to respect the sanctity of contract terms a little more strictly." Appellant's Brief, p. 27. The mere breach of a contract, without more, does not justify punitive damages. The fact that a corporation has deep pockets does not discharge the party claiming punitive damages from proving...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Leisure v. Leisure
...review of a trial judge's decision not to disqualify himself, we presume that the trial judge is unbiased. 1 Dahlin v. Amoco Oil Corp. (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 806, 813. In order to overcome that presumption, the appellant must demonstrate actual personal bias. Id. Unless presented with......
-
Watters v. Dinn
...normal recourse against a party who abuses the discovery process is to seek sanctions in the trial court. See Dahlin v. Amoco Oil Corp. (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 806, 814, trans. denied. The trial court has discretion to impose sanctions under appropriate circumstances. Id. When discover......
-
Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc.
...or other "non-iniquitous human failing." Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349, 362; Dahlin v. Amoco Oil Corp. (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 806, 810. On review of a punitive damage award, however, we do not employ some heightened standard of review or overreachin......
-
First Federal Sav. Bank of Indiana v. Galvin
...use the same standard of review as the trial court in determining the propriety of a judgment on the evidence. Dahlin v. Amoco Oil Corp. (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 806, 810, trans. denied. When the trial court considers a motion for judgment on the evidence, it must view the evidence in a......