Dahlin v. Holmquist

Decision Date25 January 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-308,88-308
Citation46 St.Rep. 2127,766 P.2d 239,235 Mont. 17
Parties, 57 USLW 2391 Catherine DAHLIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Janice HOLMQUIST, Defendant and Respondent.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Hoyt & Blewett, Michael J. George, Great Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

Donald L. Harris, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole and Dietrich, Billings, for defendant and respondent.

GULBRANDSON, Justice.

Catherine Dahlin appeals from the denial of her motion for a new trial by the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

Appellant raises the following issues upon appeal:

1. Did the District Court's denial of plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude the secondary gain testimony of Dr. Lovitt deny plaintiff her right to a fair trial?

2. Was plaintiff denied a fair trial by the District Court's denial of plaintiff's request to inform the jury of defendant's insurance coverage following defendant's allusion to a lack of insurance by the comment "we paid"?

3. Was plaintiff denied a fair and impartial jury by the District Court's refusal to permit plaintiff to voir dire potential jurors about any bias resulting after media exposure to articles or advertisements on the "liability crisis"?

On February 26, 1984, the parties to this case were involved in an automobile accident in Lewistown, Montana. Catherine Dahlin suffered neck and shoulder injuries in the accident. She was subsequently seen by Dr. James Lovitt, an orthopedic surgeon, in March of 1984. He diagnosed her as suffering from a cervical and lumbar strain. To date, Dahlin continues to experience headaches and neck pain, even though the normal healing period for such an injury is six to twelve weeks.

On February 23, 1987, Dahlin filed a complaint alleging that the defendant's negligent vehicular operation caused the collision which resulted in her physical injury, pain and suffering, loss of established course of life, and lost earning capacity. The District Court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability after determining that defendant's negligence caused the accident. The court scheduled a jury trial on the issue of damages to begin February 16, 1988.

Prior to trial, plaintiff notified the court of her intent to question potential jurors about whether they believe, and consequently would be biased because of anything they had heard or read indicating that jury verdicts for plaintiffs in personal injury cases result in higher insurance premiums. On the morning of trial, plaintiff generally asserted that the extensive "media blitz" on the issue of "tort reform" and the "liability crisis" was sufficient to warrant such questioning. Plaintiff then offered four articles, generally published two years prior to trial, as proof of this "media blitz." The court held such articles were too remote in time to have any potential prejudicial effect on the jurors, and consequently it denied plaintiff's request to conduct such questioning.

Plaintiff filed a motion in limine four days prior to trial, requesting the court to exclude, among other things, all "secondary gain" testimony by Dr. Lovitt. The doctor defined such secondary gain as that financial, emotional, or other type of benefit received by virtue of the injury which serves to encourage the continuation of an injury. The court delayed ruling on this motion the first morning of trial, stating that it would review the deposition containing the secondary gain testimony prior to its presentation to the jury. The court later ruled, without having read the contested deposition testimony, that all of the deposition was admissible. Both parties subsequently read portions of Dr. Lovitt's deposition, including the testimony about "secondary gain," to the jury. Plaintiff then renewed her objection and the court repeated its former ruling. However, the court did strike and admonish the jury to disregard the following highly prejudicial comment espoused by Dr. Lovitt when asked for a definition of secondary gain:

It frequently is intentional, and we all know the--you know, the situation in which, you know, somebody stands to make a bunch of money if they have a liberal, nonperceptive jury that gives them a big award based on only subjective symptoms and findings.

Plaintiff also objected at the conclusion of defendant's closing argument to defense counsel's remark that, "[w]e paid." Plaintiff asserted that this allusion to insurance effectively "opened the door" on the subject of insurance. Therefore, the court should permit plaintiff to also comment on insurance coverage. The court denied this request.

The jury subsequently returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff $10,000 in damages. After subtracting those medical costs previously paid by the defendant's insurer, the court entered a judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $8,048.05.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial on March 18, 1988, alleging that she was denied her right to a fair trial. The court denied the motion for a new trial on April 26, 1988. This appeal followed.

The first issue raised upon appeal challenges the District Court's decision to allow the admission of the secondary gain testimony in Dr. Lovitt's deposition. Appellant alleges that all testimony of secondary gain was irrelevant and highly prejudicial, and that its admission denied plaintiff her right to a fair trial.

Evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible. Rule...

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12 cases
  • Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • November 18, 1993
    ...Rule 401, M.R.Evid. Trial judges have the discretion to determine the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Dahlin v. Holmquist (1988), 235 Mont. 17, 20, 766 P.2d 239, 241. However, the admission of irrelevant evidence is an abuse of discretion and warrants a new trial if it affects the ......
  • Ferebee v. Hobart
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • November 24, 2009
    ...Trailer Co., Inc., 2009 SD 62, ¶ 8, 769 N.W.2d 843, 846. This applies as well to rulings on motions in limine. See Dahlin v. Holmquist, 235 Mont. 17, 766 P.2d 239, 241 (1988); Gray v. Allen, 677 S.E.2d 862, 865 (N.C.Ct.App.2009). Although relevant evidence is generally admissible, SDCL 19-1......
  • Jas Enters., Inc. v. BBS Enters., Inc.
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • July 17, 2013
    ...Inc., 2009 S.D. 62, ¶ 8, 769 N.W.2d 843, 846). “This applies as well to rulings on motions in limine.” Id. (citing Dahlin v. Holmquist, 235 Mont. 17, 766 P.2d 239, 241 (1988); Gray v. Allen, 197 N.C.App. 349, 677 S.E.2d 862, 865 (2009)). “With regard to the rules of evidence, abuse of discr......
  • Waller v. Hayden
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1994
    ...of discretion. Welnel v. Hall (1985), 215 Mont. 78, 694 P.2d 1346, Kimes v. Herrin (1985), 217 Mont. 330, 705 P.2d 108, Dahlin v. Holmquist, (1988), 766 P.2d 239. In this case, we cannot conclude that the District Court manifestly abused its discretion when it held that the evidence of disc......
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