Dahlin v. Kroening, A09–1800.

• Decision Date: 27 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. A09–1800.,A09–1800.
• Citation: Dahlin v. Kroening, 796 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. 2011)
• Parties: Linda Marie LaDonna DAHLIN, Respondent,v.Randall Earl Thomas KROENING, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

796 N.W.2d 503

Linda Marie LaDonna DAHLIN, Respondent,

v.Randall Earl Thomas KROENING, Appellant.

No. A09–1800.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 27, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

Minnesota Statutes § 541.04 (2010) does not limit an action on a judgment to one renewal.

C. Thomas Wilson, Mary Kay Mages, Matthew C. Berger, Gislason & Hunter LLP, New Ulm, Minnesota, for respondent.Jared D. Peterson, Tricia M. Niebuhr, Berens, Rodenberg & O'Connor, Chtd., New Ulm, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

The issue presented in this case is whether a judgment creditor, by bringing an action on a previously renewed judgment, may renew the judgment for an additional ten years pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 541.04 (2010). The district court concluded that section 541.04 limits an action on a judgment to one renewal and the court of appeals reversed. We affirm the court of appeals.

In 1988, respondent Linda Dahlin obtained a $7,000 judgment for unpaid spousal maintenance against appellant Randall Kroening. In 1998, the 1988 judgment was extended for an additional ten years pursuant to section 541.04. In 2008, Dahlin filed a summons and complaint requesting the court to renew and extend the 1998 judgment for an additional ten years, but the district court denied ¹ that request on the basis that a judgment cannot be renewed more than ten years after its entry. Concluding that the 1998 judgment was an extension of the 1988 judgment, the district court determined that the judgment could not be renewed. A divided court of appeals reversed in a published opinion, holding that a judgment creditor may obtain a new judgment by civil action within ten years of the entry of an existing judgment, including a judgment that has been previously renewed. Dahlin v. Kroening, 784 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn.App.2010). We granted Kroening's petition for further review.

Kroening argues that the district court properly concluded that the April 1998 judgment could not be renewed in 2008 for an additional ten years. On appeal from summary judgment, we must review the record to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the law. McIntosh Cnty. Bank v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 745 N.W.2d 538, 544–45 (Minn.2008).

Under Minnesota law, a civil judgment survives for a period of ten years after entry of judgment. Minn.Stat. § 548.09, subd. 1 (2010); see also In re Sitarz, 150 B.R. 710, 724 n. 20 (Bankr.D.Minn.1993). But section 541.04 provides that an action on a judgment may be brought within ten years after the entry of a judgment resulting in a renewal of the judgment for an additional ten years.² See Sitarz, 150 B.R. at 724 n. 20; Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 380 n. 2 (Minn.2008). This statute states that:

No action shall be maintained upon a judgment or decree of a court of the United States, or of any state or territory thereof, unless begun within ten years after the entry of such judgment or, in the case of a judgment for child support, including a judgment by operation of law, unless begun within 20 years after entry of the judgment.Minn.Stat. § 541.04. Given the language in section 541.04, Kroening does not dispute that Minnesota law provides a cause of action to renew a judgment. Rather, he argues that Minnesota law prohibits the renewal of a judgment more than once.

First, Kroening argues that under the common law, an action on a judgment is confined to one renewal. We presume that statutes are consistent with the common law unless there is express wording or necessary implication of the intent to abrogate the common law. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn.2000). With regard to section 541.04, the text shows no intent to abrogate the common law; therefore, we may look to the common law for further guidance as to whether multiple renewals of a judgment are permitted.

At common law, a plaintiff who obtained a judgment against the defendant was required to execute the judgment within a year and a day after judgment was entered, otherwise the judgment was assumed to be “satisfied and extinct.” 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *422. However, there were two alternatives to this strict rule: either the court could grant a writ of scire facias, ³ or the plaintiff could bring an action of debt—what we refer to in Minnesota as an action on a judgment. See id. The common law action of debt allowed the plaintiff to extend the life of a judgment beyond the strict year and a day limitation. Id. Blackstone explained:

Whatever, therefore, the laws order anyone to pay, that becomes instantly a debt, which he hath beforehand contracted to discharge. And this implied agreement it is, that gives the plaintiff a right to institute a second action.... So that if he hath once obtained a judgment against another for a certain sum, and neglects to take out execution thereupon, he may afterwards bring an action of debt upon this judgment, and shall not be put upon the proof of the original cause of action; but upon showing the judgment once obtained, still in full force, and yet unsatisfied, the law immediately implies that by the original contract of society the defendant hath contracted a debt, and is bound to pay it.Id. at *159. But Blackstone does not indicate whether a judgment creditor is allowed to bring an action of debt for a judgment that has been previously renewed. Thus, we turn to the language of the statute and our relevant case law.

Kroening argues that because there is no legislative direction within section 541.04 regarding multiple renewals, the issue “lies in Minnesota common law.” He asserts that there is no case law in this state that supports the conclusion that a judgment creditor can bring an action on a judgment that is brought more than ten years after the original judgment. We disagree. In Sandwich Manufacturing Co. v. Earl, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant in March of 1883, then commenced an action upon the judgment in February of 1893. 56 Minn. 390, 393, 57 N.W. 938, 938 (1894). The defendant argued that the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's cause of action because, according to the defendant, the plaintiff “must conclude, finish, or complete the action, and all proceedings there under, within ... 10 years.” Id. at 396–97, 57 N.W. at 940 (citing the statute of limitations provision, which provided that “such judgment shall survive and the lien thereof continue for a period of ten years and no longer”). Accordingly, under the defendant's argument, the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's cause of action because the plaintiff did not complete the action by March of 1893. See id. at 397, 57 N.W. at 940. We noted, however, that a section in the same chapter of the statute provided that “an action may be commenced upon a judgment or decree of a court of the United States, or any state or territory of the United States, within 10 years.” Id. at 397, 57 N.W. at 940. Because construing the statute of limitations provision as the defendant suggested would render the latter statute inoperative, we concluded that the statute of limitations had not run on the plaintiff's action. 56 Minn. at 397, 57 N.W. at 940. We further explained:

A judgment constitutes, of itself, a cause of action, and, like other causes of action, a suit may be brought upon it within the time limited by statute, and such suit may proceed to trial and judgment even after the expiration of the ten years limited for commencing actions upon such judgments.

Id. at 397, 57 N.W. at 940. In stating that a judgment constitutes an action that “may proceed to trial and judgment,” this passage suggests that an action on a judgment results in a new judgment, which would then form the basis for a subsequent action, and so forth, so long as the action was brought within the statutory limitations period. Earl supports the argument that a judgment creditor may bring a cause of action, based on a previous judgment, more than ten years after the original judgment, and we therefore reject Kroening's assertion.

Next, Kroening contends that section 541.04 provides for a procedural mechanism, “not a process for establishing a new cause of action and a new judgment.” He points to the language of the statute, arguing that the operative words of the statute are “unless begun within ten years after the entry of such judgment.” Minn.Stat. § 541.04. By setting forth the time period in which to bring an action, Kroening claims that the statute is only procedural and does not create a new cause of action.

We disagree with Kroening's interpretation of the statute. In providing a limitations period in which to bring an action on a judgment, we read nothing in section 541.04 that suggests that a judgment creditor is prohibited from renewing a previously renewed judgment. Rather, as indicated above, our decision in Earl supports the conclusion that an action on a judgment results in a new judgment, which may then serve as the basis for a subsequent action on a judgment. We therefore hold that section 541.04 does not limit an action on a judgment to one renewal and affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Kroening argues, however, that the Legislature's intent to prohibit multiple renewals is implied from other provisions of Minnesota law. In particular, he notes that section 548.09 states:

The judgment survives, and the lien continues, for ten years after its entry or, in the case of a judgment for child support, including a judgment by operation of law, for 20 years after its entry. Child support judgments may be renewed pursuant to section 548.091.

Minn.Stat. § 548.09, subd. 1. Accordingly, Minn.Stat. § 548.091 (2010) provides that a “[c]hild support judgment[ ] may be renewed multiple times until paid.” Minn.Stat. § 548.091, subd. 3b. Therefore, because “distinctions in language in the same context are presumed to be...