Dahlquist v. Nevada Industrial Commission
| Citation | 206 P. 197,46 Nev. 107 |
| Decision Date | 04 May 1922 |
| Docket Number | 2527. [a1] |
| Parties | DAHLQUIST v. NEVADA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nevada |
Appeal from District Court, Nye County; Mark R. Averill, Judge.
Action by Hilma Dahlquist against the Nevada Industrial Commission. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
L. B Fowler, Atty. Gen., and Robert Richards, Deputy Atty. Gen for appellant.
Harry Dunseath and Alexander M. Hardy, both of Tonapah, for respondent.
We will refer to the parties as they were designated in the trial court.
Paragraph 1 of the complaint alleges the creation of the defendant Nevada Industrial Commission, under and by virtue of the provisions of an act of the Legislature approved March 15 1913 (Stats. 1913, p. 137), as amended (Stats. 1915, p. 279; Stats. 1917, p. 436; Stats. 1919, p. 305). The complaint also alleges that one Alfred Dahlquist, while employed by the Tonopah Belmont Development Company, which had elected to avail itself of the terms of the act mentioned, on the 2d day of February, 1920, received injuries resulting in his death; that on or about March 1, 1918, plaintiff became the common-law wife of the said Alfred Dahlquist; that thereafter, on February 3, 1920, a ceremonial marriage was entered into between them; that she had filed with the defendant her claim for compensation under the terms of the act mentioned, had done and performed all other things required of her by said act, and that her said claim had been rejected. The complaint concludes with a prayer for relief.
An answer was filed, denying the allegation of a common-law marriage, admitting that the plaintiff had filed with the defendant a claim for compensation as the widow of the deceased, but alleging that said claim was based upon a ceremonial marriage between the plaintiff and Alfred Dahlquist entered into on February 3, 1920, the day following that upon which he had been injured. The answer admits the rejection of the claim, but alleges that it was rejected because it appeared from the claim itself that the marriage between plaintiff and the deceased had been entered into after the injuries had been sustained.
The action was tried to the court, which filed a written opinion, and ordered findings to be prepared favorable to the plaintiff. Judgment was rendered accordingly; hence this appeal.
Counsel for defendant present two contentions: First, that there was no common-law marriage; and, secondly, that, the ceremonial marriage having been entered into after the injuries had been sustained by Dahlquist, plaintiff does not come within the provisions of the act. In determining the latter contention we must, of course, look to the intention of the Legislature as it is expressed in the act. Counsel for plaintiff contends that she comes within the provisions of the act, and relies to sustain his position chiefly upon the case of Crockett v. International Ry. Co., 176 A.D. 45, 162 N.Y.S. 357. We do not think this case is controlling. It turned upon the point that the wife, who had married the deceased after the injury, did not fall within the class designated as dependents, but that she was entitled to recover because of the legal and moral responsibility of the husband to support the wife. The New York act does not read as does ours, and hence the authority is no guide to us. Our statute provides in express language the terms upon which a wife shall be entitled to contribution. It reads:
Section 26 reads:
Hence we see that, under section 25 of our statute, to be entitled to compensation, in case of the death of the injured person, the one claiming such compensation must be a dependent as defined in section 26. By this section it is provided that a wife who has not at the time of the injury voluntarily abandoned her husband shall be conclusively presumed to be a dependent, and, in determining who constitutes a dependent, we must look to the relationship existing at the date of the accident or injury, irrespective of any subsequent change. This language is plain and unequivocal; nothing could be more clearly put. In fact, apparently through a superabundance of precaution, the Legislature, after saying that the question of dependents shall be determined as of the date of the accident or injury, to reinforce that idea, and to put its expression beyond all cavil, provided that such should be the case "irrespective of any subsequent change in conditions."
In view of this unequivocal language, why should we grope around for some theory upon which to base an interpretation squarely contrary to that expressed? There is no room for interpretation of the language used. Rules of interpretation are resorted to only where doubt exists as to the idea sought to be expressed. We are confronted with no such situation. It is clear that plaintiff cannot recover because of her ceremonial marriage. This view finds support in the case of Kuetbach v. Industrial Commission, 166 Wis. 378, 165 N.W. 302, L. R. A. 1918F, 476. Indeed, we think plaintiff's counsel must have taken this view upon the trial, since no evidence was offered by him as to the ceremonial marriage.
This brings us to a consideration of the case as made by the plaintiff relative to the alleged common-law marriage. It is said by defendant that no common-law marriage has been established by the evidence, the main point to sustain this contention being couched in the following statement in the brief:
"The parties cohabited, but not on any agreement then and there to become husband and wife."
This of course, was a question of fact to be determined by the lower court. There is very little conflict in the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dahlquist v. Nevada Industrial Commission
...1922 Appeal from District Court, Nye County; Mark R. Averill, Judge. On petition for rehearing. Petition denied. For former opinion, see 206 P. 197. L. Fowler, Atty. Gen., and Robert Richards, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellant. Harry Dunseath and A. M. Hardy, both of Tonopah, for respondent.......