Dahlstrom v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am.
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-01465-JHC |
| Decision Date | 01 August 2023 |
| Parties | RAJU A.T. DAHLSTROM, Plaintiff, v. LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC. ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Before the Court are three motions. See Dkt. ## 11, 16, 87.
First under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendant Mt Vernon Operations, LLC (MVO) moves to dismiss the claims against it. Dkt. # 11. Defendants Life Care Centers of America, Inc. (LCCA), Kelley Falcon, Nancy Butner, Tara Travers, and Jennifer Scott (collectively, the LCCA Defendants) join in MVO's motion. See Dkt. ## 50, 85 (notices of joinder).
Second also under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants Sunrise Care Services Inc. (SCS) and current and former SCS employees, Janelle Saville, Margaret Pattok, and Sharon Anderson (collectively, the Sunrise Defendants) move to dismiss the claims against them. Dkt. # 87.
And third, under Rule 12(e), Defendants Department of Social and Health Services, Donald Clintsman, Cheryl Strange, Aging and Long-Term Support Administration, William Moss, Adult Protective Services, James Riccardi, Division of Residential Care Services, Cynthia Southerly, Developmental Disability Administration, and Tia Yvette Mathew (collectively, the State Defendants) move for a more definite statement. Dkt. # 16.
The Court has reviewed the parties' submissions in connection with the motions, the balance of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised, the Court: (1) GRANTS MVO's motion to dismiss, Dkt. # 11; (2) GRANTS the Sunrise Defendants' motion to dismiss, Dkt. # 87; and (3) GRANTS the State Defendants' motion for a more definite statement, Dkt. # 16. The Court also GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend.
Plaintiff alleges as follows: On October 25, 2016, he began working at the Life Care Center of Mount Vernon (LCCMV) as its Director of Social Services.[1]Dkt. # 1-2 at 22-23, 46. Plaintiff asserts that, once LCCMV hired Defendant Travers, he “was subjected to unrelenting harassment from her in the form of being compelled to comply with demands that were made illegal by LCCA [and] federal and state laws governing the care of resident[s]/patient[s] at LCCA's facility.” Id. at 46. Between May and August 2018, Plaintiff “was actively engaged in protected activities.”[2]Id. Plaintiff contends that his supervisors, Defendants Travers, Butner, and Scott, “ordered” him “to violate certain LCCA[] policies,”[3]but that Plaintiff refused because he believed such conduct would violate federal law. Id. at 46-47. On August 1, 2018, Plaintiff told his supervisors “that he would need to take some time off to address some legal matters, including utilizing time-off for FMLA-related care.” Id. at 46.
At some point later, Plaintiff's supervisors imposed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP). Id. at 48. According to Plaintiff, because of the CAP, he was subjected to “further disciplinary actions” and “increase[d] workplace surveillance[].” Id. Thus, “due to the hostile work environment and retaliation,” Plaintiff “felt compelled to resign and was constructively discharged on . . . August 31, 2018.” Id. at 48, 51. Plaintiff “filed both oral and written complaints of employer and employee []misconduct” throughout his employment at LCCMV, and he believes he was “constructively discharged[] because he participated in whistleblowing against Defendants' . . . misconduct.” Id. at 5.
Almost three years later, on August 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed his complaint in Washington state court,[4] id. at 1, and MVO removed the case to the Western District of Washington, Dkt. # 1. The complaint purports to assert 14 causes of action: (1) a constructive wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, Dkt. # 1-2 at 50-52 (Claim 1); (2) another constructive wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, id. at 52-53 (Claim 2); (3) violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), Rev. Code. Wash. (RCW) 49.60 et seq., for retaliation, id. at 52-53 (Claim 3); (4) an interference claim under Washington's Family Leave Act (WFLA), RCW 49.78 et seq., id. at 53-54 (Claim 4); (5) WLAD violations for hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation, id. at 54-60 (Claim 5); (6) violation of RCW 49.12.250 for “refusal to permit review of personnel file,” id. at 60-61 (Claim 6); (7) WLAD violation for “aiding and abetting,” id. at 61 (Claim 7); (8) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim under the First Amendment, id. at 61-63 (Claim 8); (9) two § 1983 claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 63-65 (Claims 9 and 10); (10) a § 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 65-67 (Claim 11); (11) defamation and invasion of privacy claims under Washington law, id. at 67 (Claim 12); (12) “outrage / intentional infliction / negligent infliction of emotional distress,” id. at 67-68 (Claim 13); and (13) “blacklisting” in violation of RCW 49.44.010, id. at 68-69 (Claim 14).
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court liberally construes his pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). That said, “courts should not have to serve as advocates for pro se litigants.” Noll v Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). District courts should “not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). Pro se pleadings “must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). “[I]t is axiomatic that pro se litigants, whatever their ability level, are subject to the same procedural requirements as other litigants.” Munoz v. United States, 28 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2022).
MVO moves to dismiss all claims against it. Dkt. # 11. The LCCA Defendants join in the motion. Dkt. ## 50, 85.
Rule 8(a) requires plaintiffs to plead each claim with enough specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). A complaint that falls short of Rule 8(a)'s requirements may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal is proper when a complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Courts need not accept as true “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. A court must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true, Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Off. of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009), but it need not accept as true a “legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain well-pleaded factual allegations, such that a plaintiff may “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Thus, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004). A court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005), and it “must consider the complaint in its entirety . . . when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions,” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 310 (2007).
“Traditionally, the requirements for relief under [§] 1983 have been articulated as: (1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person' (4) acting under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. A plaintiff must allege facts showing how the individually named defendants caused or personally participated in causing the alleged harm. Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). Vague, conclusory allegations of participation in civil rights violations do not state a claim for relief. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff fails to allege the requisite causal connection between an alleged violation of his constitutional rights and the conduct of MVO or the LCCA Defendants. Each section 1983 claim contains vague, conclusory allegations of wrongdoing asserted against all Defendants collectively and identifies no individual acts or omissions by any Defendants to support a...
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