Dahmer v. Blackburn
| Decision Date | 11 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 44917,2018 Unpublished Opinion No. 445 |
| Parties | MICHAEL D. DAHMER, P.E., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JONATHAN BLACKBURN; STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation; DAVID E. BICE, personally and in his capacity as Claims Adjuster for STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Respondents, and JOHN DOES I through V, and JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS I through V, Defendants. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Jerome County. Hon. Jonathan P. Brody, District Judge.
Judgment dismissing complaint, affirmed.
Michael D. Dahmer, P.E., Jerome, pro se appellant.
Elam & Burke, P.A.; Jeffery A. Thomson, Boise, for respondents State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and David E. Bice.
Anthony M. Valdez, Twin Falls, for respondent Jonathan Blackburn.
____________________
Michael D. Dahmer appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his complaint as to all parties pursuant to the jury's verdict that defendant Jonathan Blackburn was not negligent. We affirm.
Dahmer and Blackburn collided in an uncontrolled intersection within the city limits of Jerome, Idaho. Dahmer filed a complaint against Blackburn, Blackburn's insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), and State Farm's claims adjuster, David Bice. Both State Farm and Bice filed motions to dismiss and motions for sanctions. Dahmer, who prosecuted the action pro se, filed a memorandum in opposition to those motions and an affidavit in support of his opposition. State Farm and Bice filed a memorandum in support of their motions. Dahmer filed a second memorandum in opposition. In response, Bice and State Farm filed reply briefs in support of their motions.
A hearing was held to address the motions to dismiss and motions for sanctions. At that hearing, the court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and instructed the parties to provide additional briefing on the sanctions issue. The court signed an order granting the defendants' motions to dismiss. Dahmer then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was never set for a hearing. Following a status hearing in which the court was made aware of Dahmer's motion for reconsideration, the motion for reconsideration was taken under advisement and subsequently denied. On the same day that it denied Dahmer's motion for reconsideration, the district court granted the defendants' motions for sanctions.
The case proceeded to trial. At trial, Dahmer called an expert witness. This witness concluded that Blackburn was speeding. Dahmer also called the officer who responded to the accident and wrote Blackburn a failure to yield citation, which was ultimately dismissed by the State. Dahmer wished to question the officer regarding this citation, but was prevented by the district court's prior ruling addressing Blackburn's motion in limine concerning the citation. Other witnesses were called and then closing arguments were given. The jury returned a verdict finding that Blackburn was not negligent. The district court entered a judgment dismissing Dahmer's complaint as to all parties. Dahmer timely appealed.
Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as those litigants represented by counsel. Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009). Pro se litigants are not excused from abiding by procedural rules simply because they are appearing pro se and may not be aware of the applicable rules. Id.
Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991). Even if an issue was raised below, a party waives that issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct. App. 1997). Furthermore, appellate review is limited to the arguments and theories presented below. Obenchain v. McAlvain Const., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443, 444 (2006).
In dealing with issues subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, the party raising the issue must indicate which of the three prongs of the abuse of discretion analysis it believes was implicated by the district court's action. Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 853, 380 P.3d 168, 174 (2016). The abuse of discretion analysis requires this Court to look at whether the lower court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
In 1980, the Idaho Supreme Court established the "no direct action" rule, which provides that absent a contractual or statutory provision authorizing the action, an insurance carrier cannot be sued directly and cannot be joined as a party defendant. Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 791, 621 P.2d 399, 407 (1980). Under the no direct action rule, only a first-party insured can sue an insurance company; injured third parties can only sue insureds. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 908, 980 P.2d 566, 572 (1999) (); Downing v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 511, 514-15, 691 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1984) ().
Dahmer contends that the no direct action rule does not apply in this case because he is not suing State Farm as the tortfeasor's insurer, but rather as an independent tortfeasor. In support of his position, Dahmer cites to Justice Bistline's partial dissent in Hettwer v. Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, 118 Idaho 373, 797 P.2d 81 (1990). In Hettwer, the Hettwers sued the alleged tortfeasor's insurance company directly because the company had intentionally and tortiously denied or delayed payment on the claims. Id. at 373, 797 P.2d at 81. The Hettwers argued that their case was different from prior no direct action rule cases because Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho was also their insurer, meaning they had privity supporting an independent bad faith claim. Id. at 375, 797 P.2d at 83 (Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the Hettwers' claim was a third-party action, meaning it was barred by the no direct action rule.
As an appellate court, we will affirm a trial court's grant of an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss where the record demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the case can be decided as a matter of law. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). When reviewing an order of the district court dismissing a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the nonmoving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record and pleadings viewed in its favor, and only then may the question be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated. Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 398, 987 P.2d at 310. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995).
Dahmer's factual pleadings belie his assertion that he is suing State Farm and Bice for independent intentional torts. In his original complaint, Dahmer merely alleged that Bice "acted with criminal intent and malice in reviewing and ultimately denying Michael's claim." The no direct action rule clearly prohibits lawsuits by third parties based on denial of claims. Even with all inferences from the record and pleadings viewed in Dahmer's favor, a claim for relief has not been stated.1
Before the district court, State Farm and Bice moved for sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11, which allows for an award of sanctions for bringing an action that is not grounded in fact and is not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or is interposed for an improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. State Farm and Bice argued that Dahmer's claims, however characterized, were barred by the no direct action rule. Dahmer opposed the motion for sanctions, arguing that he believed "the case law purporting the total immunity of State Farm and defendant Bice to the laws of the State of Idaho and the jurisdiction of this court is not on point." Dahmer then cited to portions of the Hettwer decision, including the majority's citation to Bean v. Allstate Ins. Co., 403 A.2d 793 (Md. 1979), which in turn cites to Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York, 250 So. 2d 259, 262-64 (Fla. 1971), holding that a judgment creditor may maintain suit directly against a tortfeasor's liability insurer for recovery of the judgment in excess of the policy limits based upon the alleged fraud or bad faith of the insurer in conducting or handling the suit. Moreover, Dahmer cited to Justice Bistline's partial dissent, which includes the statement, "I am persuaded that one day this Court, differently constituted one may be certain, will see merit in the Hettwers' contention that their action against Farmers is not so far fetched as others may think." Hettwer, 118 Idaho at 374, 797 P.2d at 82 (Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In determining whether a district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions...
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