Daigle v. Hall

Decision Date07 January 1975
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 74-4783-S.
Citation387 F. Supp. 652
PartiesRobert DAIGLE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Frank A. HALL, Commissioner of Correction for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Richard E. Shapiro, Timothy J. Wilton, Prisoner's Rights Project, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.

Michael C. Donahue, William T. Harrod III, Asst. Attys. Gen., Robert H. Quinn, Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., for defendants.

REVISED OPINION AND ORDER

SKINNER, District Judge.

The Opinion and Order of December 20, 1974 is hereby withdrawn and vacated on the basis of the rehearing hereinafter mentioned in the following is substituted therefor.

The plaintiffs are three inmates of Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, the maximum security state prison operated by the Massachusetts Department of Correction. They allege that they have been confined in the Departmental Segregation Unit (DSU) in Cell Block 10 without the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The matter has been presented on affidavits of the plaintiffs, of members of the Prisoners Rights Project, and of the defendants, together with copies of notices given to the plaintiffs of hearings, departmental minutes of hearings, and various intradepartmental orders and memoranda. There does not appear to be any material issue of fact.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. ROBERT DAIGLE

Robert Daigle was placed in segregation in the prison infirmary on January 14, 1974, allegedly as a result of having held a guard hostage on that day. On January 25, the Departmental Classification Committee (the Committee)* met to consider Daigle's classification status. Daigle was not given any prior notice of this meeting, but was permitted to be present. The alleged incident with the guard was not discussed, nor was any evidence heard. The subject of the discussion was the possibility of transferring Daigle to Bridgewater. He was placed in Cell Block 10, however, on the grounds that (a) he was not psychotic and (b) that he was a threat to the safety of others. It was reported that he had a history of epilepsy.

No reclassification hearing was held within the 90 days required by Departmental Order 4450.1, Section 4.3. A reclassification hearing was held on May 22 at which Daigle was represented. The Committee determined that the hearing on January 25 was inadequate and ordered a new hearing.

On July 2, 1974, Daigle received written notice of a hearing to be held on July 9. The notice was substantially in the form hereinafter described. The Committee did not hear any evidence with respect to Daigle's initial transfer to Cell Block 10. The focus of attention was on an incident occurring on June 11, 1974, in which Daigle had seriously injured two correctional officers, and had subsequently been found unconscious in his room. He had been taken to Beth Israel Hospital, where his condition had been diagnosed as psychomotor temporal lobe epilepsy.

The Committee made a recommendation to Commissioner Hall on September 19, in which they described the medical report and then recommended his retention in Cell Block 10. The recommendation included the following comment:

"Reviewing Mr. Daigle's behavior pattern during this incarceration was a difficult task. The three negative highlights of this period could not be adequately discussed because they are all pending action in the judicial system. These include an alleged hostage incident at Norfolk in 1973; alleged hostage incident at Walpole in January, 1974; and an alleged assault of two corrections officials in June, 1974."

These "highlights" were not established by any evidentiary hearing, nor were they discussed at the meeting of July 9, except that the prison medical officer expressed an opinion that the June 1974 assault was the result of an epileptic seizure.

It was the opinion of the medical officer, expressed in a report to the Commissioner dated July 12, 1974, that Daigle's epilepsy could be suitably controlled by medication and that continued detention in Cell Block 10 would not serve any purpose and would be detrimental.

On October 3, the Commissioner approved the retention of Daigle in Cell Block 10 with the following comment:

"Unfortunately, until the medical and psychiatric evaluations are complete, we don't seem to have an alternative placement other than Block 10 at MCI Walpole."

Daigle's detention in the DSU in Cell Block 10 has not been reviewed since that time. Between the middle of September and the first of November, however, the three plaintiffs conducted a hunger strike which resulted in their hospitalization.

2. ARTHUR MORROW

Plaintiff Morrow was placed in segregation on October 24, 1973, after he was accused of being drunk. He was first placed in Cell Block 9 and later that night moved to Cell Block 10. Morrow did not receive any notice regarding his placement in Cell Block 10 until February 15, 1974, when he received a letter cancelling a hearing schedule for that day. On February 25, 1974, plaintiff received a notice, substantially in the form hereinafter described, of a hearing before the Committee on March 1, 1974. At this hearing no evidence was introduced other than Morrow's disciplinary record. For the first time since he was confined in Cell Block 10 on October 24, 1973, Morrow was officially informed that the decision to place him in Cell Block 10 was related to a stabbing incident which had occurred in his cell block. On March 6, 1974, plaintiff Morrow received a copy of the recommendations of the Board which, inter alia, included continued retention in Cell Block 10 for various personality, psychological and medical tests.

On May 10, 1974, plaintiff Morrow received a notice of another hearing to be held on May 15, 1974. Morrow was present at this meeting, without counsel, but no evidence was presented concerning his alleged offense. Plaintiff later received a memorandum which recommended that he be placed in DSU. This recommendation was not based on conduct or acts but was predicated on "Mr. Morrow's progress, and the opportunities for the individualized attention and treatment Mr. Morrow warrants." On May 30, 1974, Mr. Morrow received notice that Commissioner Hall concurred in the recommendation of the Board.

On August 29, 1974, plaintiff received a similar notice from defendant Solomon that a hearing would be held on September 4, 1974. The hearing solely concerned Mr. Morrow's progress in DSU and did not focus on any specific acts or conduct. The hearing was terminated and continued to September 11, 1974, at which time the stabbing incident and various disciplinary reports were discussed.

Morrow had the opportunity to explain these incidents, but no evidence concerning the charges was presented. Discussion of the stabbing incident was conducted over the protest of Morrow's counsel. Morrow has remained in DSU status since that date, but has never been informed of the recommendation of the Board from the September 4 and 11 hearings, the statement of reasons for his continued retention in DSU or of the final decision of the Commissioner.

On October 1, 1974, defendant Solomon, in a letter to defendant Hall, explicitly relied on a letter from Mr. H. Workman, a social worker, as presenting "the best rationale why continued retention for both Morrow and Sousa in segregation . . . is appropriate." Mr. Workman was not present at either the September 4 or the September 11 meeting. So much of his letter as relates to Morrow reads as follows:

"Since he was last reviewed by the D. C.C. he has received three disciplinary reports for threatening officers on 7-11-1974, for disobeying an order of the Superintendent, Order 4310.1 Sec. S.18B, on 8-6-1974, and for Assault on a Correction Officer on 8-4-1974. He was pleased to be found Not Guilty on the 8-6-1974 incident.
"His behavior is such that he should be continued in D.S.U. status for another 90 day period.
"On the positive side, he recently requested counseling from Mr. William Clark, Staff Psychologist, and should be encouraged to pursue this. Also, he continues his strong interest in education. Mr. Frank Weaver, Head of the MCI-Walpole school staff, has indicated that he will try to develop an educational program for him beginning in early October."
3. GERALD SOUSA

Plaintiff Sousa was placed in segregation on October 24, 1973, after he was accused of being involved in the stabbing of another inmate. The factual circumstances of his case as to notice and hearing are substantially the same as those of plaintiff Morrow up to the hearing of March 1, 1974. At the hearing on March 1, Sousa was presented with the option of either choosing DSU with an education program and a ninety-day review, or of facing an indefinite stay in DSU. At this hearing no evidence was introduced. On March 6, Sousa received a letter from defendant Hall concurring in the recommendation of the Committee that he be placed in DSU status.

The basis of this recommendation was as follows:

"Inmate is a character disorder of long standing sic. He denied his guilt in the offense for which he is committed to a life sentence, and has been described as very bitter. While imprisoned he has sought to lead other inmates in rebellion against authority and has also acted out on his own in a violent and provocative manner, even to inflicting severe injury on Officers and possibly even to the relatively recent vicious murder by stabbing of an inmate. His associates have always been of an undesirable nature. It appears that, when he is in population, he presents a threat to the safety of both other inmates and officers and potentially to the institution, and that this threat should be minimized by housing him in a Segregated status."

On June 5, 1974, another hearing was conducted and on June 11, 1974, Sousa was informed that he was to remain confined in DSU.

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