Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc.

Decision Date08 May 1980
Docket NumberNo. 77-2724,77-2724
Citation616 F.2d 825
PartiesDaniel F. DAIGLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. POINT LANDING, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

A. Gordon Grant, Jr., Stanley McDermott, III, New Orleans, La., for defendants-appellants.

Leon C. Vial, III, Hahnville, La., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before MORGAN, RONEY and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

In this rather unusual maritime personal injury case, we reverse the trial court's decision for the plaintiff. In a bifurcated trial on the issue of liability alone, the court made findings of fact which are virtually uncontested on appeal. We therefore set forth in full the findings of fact of the trial court and the conclusion of law which fixed liability on the defendant, and discuss why this conclusion of law was wrong under the circumstances.

Trial Court's Findings of Fact

1. On September 19, 1972, the towboat HARRY COLLINS, owned and operated by defendant Point Landing, Inc., brought a barge to a chemical loading dock owned by the Monsanto Company and located on the Mississippi River at Luling, Louisiana.

2. While in the process of maneuvering the barge into position at the dock, one of the propellers of the HARRY COLLINS became entangled in a barge haul cable which was attached to winches located on the dock.

3. The barge haul cable ran along the outboard edge of the dock and was suspended between two electrically operated winches, located respectively near the upstream and downstream ends of the dock. Monsanto normally used this cable to position vessels alongside the dock for loading and discharging.

4. The HARRY COLLINS attempted to maneuver free from the cable with assistance from the Mansanto personnel on the dock. Initially, the downstream winch was released to create slack in the cable and to afford the vessel maneuvering room. This was ineffective.

5. Acting on a request by the Master of the HARRY COLLINS for further assistance, plaintiff, a shift foreman employed by Mansanto, went to the dock to take charge of the dockside efforts to free the vessel.

6. Plaintiff was accompanied to the dock by third party defendant Charles Gillen who was the night superintendent of the Monsanto plant. Gillen was present as an observer and did not participate in the activities on the dock.

7. Third party defendant Don Cayard was the plant superintendent on September 19, 1972, and was not present on the Monsanto dock or at the Monsanto plant on the night of the accident.

8. When the plaintiff arrived at the dock, he first attempted to free the vessel by releasing the downstream winch, which was in proper working condition, thereby providing additional slack and more room for the vessel to maneuver. After this action proved unsuccessful, plaintiff proceeded to the upstream winch. He observed that this winch was not in proper working condition due to the absence of the brake mechanism which had been removed for repairs. A large Stillson wrench was attached to the drive shaft between the winch motor and the winch drum and functioned as a braking device.

9. Plaintiff removed the wrench and allowed cable to run from the upstream winch. He then stopped the drum from rotating by applying pressure on the winch coupling with his foot and resecured the wrench to the motor shaft.

10. Plaintiff determined that still more slack was needed and after notifying the Master of the HARRY COLLINS of his intentions, he again removed the wrench to allow more cable to roll.

11. After a short time plaintiff attempted to reposition the wrench as he previously had done. However, as he did this, the HARRY COLLINS applied power putting an immediate strain on the cable and causing the wrench to whip around and to strike plaintiff.

12. No warning was given to plaintiff by the Master of the HARRY COLLINS that sudden power would be applied.

13. The captain of the HARRY COLLINS was asleep and was not aroused to assist in the operations.

Trial Court's Contested Conclusion of Law

The Master of the HARRY COLLINS was negligent in applying force to the cable without prior warning to plaintiff and that negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.

Discussion

The trial court's conclusion of law rests on a premise which requires the existence of facts establishing a duty to warn. The findings of fact rendered by the trial court do not, however, include facts which establish such a duty.

In analyzing a maritime tort case, we rely on general principles of negligence law. S. C. Loveland, Inc. v. East West Towing, Inc., 608 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1979). The plaintiff is owed a duty of ordinary care. A defendant's failure to warn the plaintiff does not breach that duty, however, unless the resultant harm is reasonably foreseeable. Liability for a failure to warn thus arises from foreseeability, or the knowledge that particular conduct will create danger. As stated in 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 72 (1971), at 423:

(T)he care which must be exercised in any particular situation is in proportion to the actor's knowledge, actual or imputed, of the danger to another in the act to be performed. The degree of care necessary to constitute the ordinary care required of a person upon any particular occasion is measured by reference to the circumstances...

To continue reading

Request your trial
122 cases
  • Mylonakis v. Georgios M.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • December 3, 2012
    ...2009)). "Under maritime law, a plaintiff is owed a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances." Id. (citing Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1980)). "[A] defendant's failure to fulfill a duty of care under maritime law 'does not breach that duty, . . . unless th......
  • McAllister Towing of Virginia, Inc. v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • April 23, 2012
    ...when injury is foreseeable. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 5-2, at 254 (5th ed. 2011) (citing Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1980)).8. The mere occurrence of an allision83 does not automatically impart liability to the vessel or her owner. Liability ......
  • Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • October 23, 1981
    ...79 S.Ct. 406, 409-10, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, 554-555 (1959) (shipowner's liability to nontrespasser on board ship); Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1980) (shipowner's liability to another's dockside employee); Branch v. Schumann, 445 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1971) (shipown......
  • McMellon v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • August 1, 2003
    ...care includes, of course, a duty to warn of harm that is reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances."); Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir.1980) ("In analyzing a maritime tort case, we rely on general principles of negligence law. The plaintiff is owed a duty of o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT