Daigle v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 February 2022
• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-59,3:16-cr-13`
• Parties: Brent Daigle, Petitioner, v. United States of America, Respondent. United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Brent Daigle, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota

Brent Daigle, Petitioner,
v.
United States of America, Respondent.

United States of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Brent Daigle, Defendant.

Nos. 3:21-cv-59, 3:16-cr-13`

United States District Court, D. North Dakota

February 18, 2022

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE

Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge United States District Court

Before the Court is Defendant Brent Daigle's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed on March 15, 2021. Doc. No. 152. The Government responded in opposition to the motion on July 30, 2021. Doc. No. 164. Daigle filed a reply on August 13, 2021. Doc. No. 166.

In addition to his § 2255 motion, Daigle also filed a flurry of ancillary motions and supporting documents, including a “Motion for Discovery and to Produce Documents” (Doc. No. 160), “Motion for Expansion of Record” (Doc. No. 162), a “Motion for Evidentiary Hearing” (Doc. No. 167), two “Motions to Appoint Counsel” (Doc. Nos. 168, 171), a “Motion for Status Report and Hearing” (Doc. Nos. 169, 171), and a “Motion to Amend or Correct” (Doc. No. 170). For the reasons below, all the motions are denied.

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I. BACKGROUND

On November 9, 2015, Daigle's wife, Celetra, made a report to Griggs County, North Dakota Sheriff Robert Hook that she believed her twelve-year-daughter, R.M., had been sexually abused by Daigle, the minor's stepfather. See Doc. No. 66. Following the report, a forensic interview was arranged at the Red River Children's Advocacy Center on November 12, 2015. Id. During the interview, R.M. stated that Daigle had been sexually abusing her since she was seven years old. Id. She provided clear details concerning the sexual abuse and stated Daigle would take video recordings with his cell phone of the abuse. Id. To that end, she also provided a description of Daigle's cell phone - a silver phone in a camouflage case with tan rubber parts. Id.

The next day, November 13, 2015, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant from a State of North Dakota district court judge and conducted a search of the family residence. Id. They recovered several electronic devices; however, Daigle's cell phone - which R.M. had described as a silver phone in a camouflage case - was not among the devices because Daigle was in Louisiana. Id. Later that day, though, Daigle was arrested in Louisiana on North Dakota state charges because of R.M.'s forensic interview. Id. The arresting officers seized a silver LG cell phone in a camouflage case with tan rubber parts from Daigle. Id. In December 2015, the same State of North Dakota district court judge issued a warrant to search Daigle's cell phone. Id. Ultimately, the forensic examination of Daigle's cell phone found deleted videos of Daigle sexually abusing R.M. Id.

Daigle was indicted by a federal grand jury on January 21, 2016. Doc. No. 1. A superseding indictment was filed on June 15, 2016, charging Daigle with three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e) and one count of possession of materials involving the exploitation of minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). Doc. No. 29. Daigle was represented by Assistant Federal Public Defender Christopher Lancaster.

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Daigle filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to the search warrant on February 3, 2017. Doc. No. 52. An evidentiary hearing was held (Doc. No. 65), and the Court denied Daigle's motion. Doc. No. 66.

On October 23, 2017, Daigle entered into a plea agreement with the United States. Doc. No. 91, 92. In the plea agreement, Daigle agreed to plead guilty to the superseding indictment but expressly reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Id.

Daigle entered his guilty plea on January 26, 2018. Doc. No. 102. United States District Court Judge Daniel L. Hovland presided over the change of plea hearing. At the hearing, the Court reviewed the superseding indictment with Daigle and informed him of the applicable penalties. Doc. No. 124. Daigle affirmed he had spoken with his attorney about his potential sentencing guidelines range and indicated he had no criticism or complaints about the legal assistance and advice he had received from his attorney. Id. at 11-13. Daigle verified he had read, understood, and wanted to enter into the plea agreement and accompanying supplement. Id. at 13. Daigle also stated that no one had threatened him or made any assurances beyond those in the plea agreement to entice him to plead guilty. Id. at 14. He also confirmed he made a “conscious, voluntary decision” to plead guilty. Id. at 13.

Judge Hovland held a sentencing hearing on July 19, 2018. Doc. No. 118. The Court adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSIR”) and calculated the total offense level at ¶ 43. Doc. No. 130. The PSIR designated Daigle in criminal history category I. Doc. No. 110. The advisory guideline range therefore rested at life imprisonment. The Court sentenced Daigle to 360 months' imprisonment on counts one and two to run consecutive with each other; 360 months' imprisonment on count three to run concurrent with counts one and two; and, 120 months on count 4 to run consecutive to counts one and two, for a total of 840 months' imprisonment. Doc. No. 119.

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Consistent with his plea agreement, which reserved the right for Daigle to appeal the suppression motion, Daigle appealed the judgment. Doc. No. 121. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the suppression motion and Daigle's sentence on January 14, 2020 (Doc. No. 149) and issued a mandate on March 17, 2020. Doc. No. 150. Daigle timely submitted his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion on March 15, 2021. Doc. No. 152.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 affords relief “in several circumstances, including cases shown to contain jurisdictional errors, constitutional errors, and errors of law.” Raymond v. United States, 933 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)). “Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.” Fletcher v. United States, 858 F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jennings v. United States, 696 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2012)). An evidentiary hearing is required unless the allegations in the motion are inherently incredible, contradicted by the record, merely conclusory, or would not entitle the petitioner to relief even if true. Roundtree v. United States, 751 F.3d 923, 926-27 (8th Cir. 2014). The movant bears the burden to demonstrate an entitlement to relief. Golinveaux v. United States, 915 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2019).

III. DISCUSSION

In his § 2255 motion, Daigle raises four claims - (1) the Court committed “plain error” in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 by accepting his guilty plea; (2) Judge Hovland “abandoned his judicial role an acted with actual or apparent bias and did not perform the duties of the office impartially;” (3) his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel; and, (4) the Court committed “plain error” affecting his substantial rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The Court addresses each claim below.

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A. Knowing and Voluntary Plea

Daigle first challenges his plea by asserting his plea was not knowing and voluntary. He appears to argue that when a plea is not knowing and intelligent, the Court must review it for plain error. However, the plain error standard of review applies to arguments raised for the first time on direct appeal. United States v. Ochoa-Gonzalez, 598 F.3d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating, on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, “Because she did not make this argument in the district court, this Court reviews only for plain error.”). Daigle has completed the direct appeal process and now seeks collateral postconviction relief under § 2255.^[1]

The standard of review applicable to a claim for collateral relief requires a prisoner to “clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982). And notably, “the circumstances under which a guilty plea may be attacked on collateral review” are “strictly limited.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). In Bousley, the Supreme Court stated it is “well settled” that a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea “may not be collaterally attacked.” Id. (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984)). Moreover, because habeas review “is an extraordinary remedy, ” that “will...