DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. G-Tech Professional Staffing, Inc.

Decision Date13 November 2003
Docket NumberNo. 241109.,241109.
Citation260 Mich. App. 183,678 N.W.2d 647
PartiesDAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. G-TECH PROFESSIONAL STAFFING, INC, a/k/a G-Tech Services, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, and Valley Forge Insurance Company, Defendant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

DeNardis, McCandless & Miller, P.C. (by William McCandless), Mt. Clemens, for the plaintiff.

Vandeveer Garzia (by Hal O. Carroll), Troy, for the defendant.

Before: SMOLENSKI, P.J., and MARKEY and WILDER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant G-Tech Professional Staffing, Inc. (G-Tech), appeals by right the judgment of Wayne Circuit Judge William Giovan granting plaintiff DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC) summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm. DCC sued to enforce an indemnity clause in a written contract it had with G-Tech for "supplemental" workers. The underlying claim arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred when a worker supplied by G-Tech, Shane Smith,1 while driving a Jeep owned by DCC, struck and killed a pedestrian, Ronald Pilon. G-Tech's insurance carrier is not a party to this appeal.2

On the basis of the undisputed material facts, the trial court did not err by concluding as a matter of law that the claim against DCC by Pilon's estate came within the unambiguous indemnity clause of the parties' contract, and that DCC was entitled to judgment against G-Tech. MCR 2.116(C)(10); Hubbell, Roth & Clark, Inc. v. Jay Dee Contractors, Inc., 249 Mich. App. 288, 291, 642 N.W.2d 700 (2002). This Court reviews de novo a trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition. Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 468 Mich. 459, 463, 663 N.W.2d 447 (2003). The interpretation of a contract is also a question of law this Court reviews de novo on appeal, including whether the language of a contract is ambiguous and requires resolution by the trier of fact. Id. at 463, 469, 480, 663 N.W.2d 447; Mahnick v. Bell Co., 256 Mich.App. 154, 159, 662 N.W.2d 830 (2003). An unambiguous contract must be enforced according to its terms. Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 41, 51-52, 664 N.W.2d 776 (2003).

An indemnity contract is construed in the same manner as other contracts. Hubbell, supra at 291, 642 N.W.2d 700; Zurich Ins. Co. v. CCR & Co. (On Rehearing), 226 Mich.App. 599, 603, 576 N.W.2d 392 (1997). Thus, an unambiguous written indemnity contract must be enforced according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the instrument. Zurich, supra at 604-605, 576 N.W.2d 392. The parties may, of course, specifically assign a different meaning to the words used in a contract. Id. at 605, n. 3, 576 N.W.2d 392. And the circumstances may clearly indicate a word used in a contract has a meaning contrary to its ordinary usage. Id. at 608, n. 4, 576 N.W.2d 392.

Affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence must support a motion for summary disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(10). MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b); Patterson v. Kleiman, 447 Mich. 429, 432, 526 N.W.2d 879 (1994). The moving party must specifically identify the undisputed factual issues and support its position with evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(4), Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 120, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). The trial court must consider the submitted evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Mahnick, supra at 157, 662 N.W.2d 830. If the moving party fulfills its initial burden, the party opposing the motion then must demonstrate with supporting evidence that a genuine and material issue of disputed fact exists. MCR 2.116(G)(4); Crown Technology Park v. D & N Bank, FSB, 242 Mich.App. 538, 547, 619 N.W.2d 66 (2000). If there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10); Mahnick, supra.

G-Tech, in essence, argues that it must indemnify DCC only for personal injuries that occur when the workers it supplied to DCC are actually performing tasks for DCC. Given the undisputed facts and the unambiguous contract language, G-Tech's position lacks merit. The parties do not dispute: (1) that G-Tech supplied Smith to DCC pursuant to their contract, (2) that Smith was driving a DCC-owned Jeep with the permission of DCC, and (3) that Smith would not have been driving the DCC Jeep but for working for DCC at its TAP engineering department. The parties also do not dispute that the contract at issue provides that G-Tech "shall assume all risk of ... bodily injury ... in connection with the work, and ... bodily injury ... wherever located, resulting from or arising out of any action, omission or operation under the contract or in connection with the work." Further, the contract requires G-Tech to indemnify DCC "from and against any and all ... claims, or legal actions ... arising out of the bodily injury ... arising out of or related to the performance of any work in connection with this contract...."

The plain language of the indemnity clause does not require that personal injury occur while work is being performed. It only requires that the personal injury arise out of, or be related to, the performance of any work in connection with the contract. The trial court correctly concluded that the contract language is expansive. The word "related" ordinarily means being "associated" or "connected." See Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2d ed., 1997). Likewise, "connection," in the context clearly employed here, plainly means "logical association or development... to make a connection between two events." Id. The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • Bragg v. Abn Amro North America, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • 30 d2 Setembro d2 2008
    ...(1998); Royce v. Citizens Ins. Co., 219 Mich.App. 537, 542, 557 N.W.2d 144 (1996). See also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. G-Tech Professional Staffing, Inc., 260 Mich.App. 183, 185, 678 N.W.2d 647 (2003) ("[I]f a contract is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced according to its terms."); V......
  • Residential Funding Co. v. Saurman.Bank of New York Trust Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 21 d4 Abril d4 2011
    ...“The interpretation of a contract is also a question of law this Court reviews de novo....” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. G–Tech Prof. Staffing, Inc., 260 Mich.App. 183, 184–185, 678 N.W.2d 647 (2003). A contract must be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Holmes v. Holmes, ......
  • Clark v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 8 d4 Dezembro d4 2005
    ...proper interpretation of a contract is a matter of law that this Court reviews de novo. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. G-Tech. Professional Staffing, Inc., 260 Mich.App. 183, 184-185, 678 N.W.2d 647 (2003). Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by applying the shortened six-month limitati......
  • Hamade v. Sunoco Inc. (R & M)
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 25 d4 Maio d4 2006
    ...776 (2003). When a contract is unambiguous, it must be enforced according to its terms. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. G-Tech Professional Staffing, Inc., 260 Mich.App. 183, 185, 678 N.W.2d 647 (2003). Plaintiff argued in the trial court that Sunoco breached the 1997 Agreement when it permitted a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT