Dairy Belle Farms v. Brock

• Decision Date: 25 April 1950
• Citation: 217 P.2d 704,97 Cal.App.2d 146
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: DAIRY BELLE FARMS v. BROCK. Civ. 14275.

Page 704

217 P.2d 704

97 Cal.App.2d 146

DAIRY BELLE FARMS v.BROCK.

Civ. 14275.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

April 25, 1950.

Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, W. R. Augustine, Deputy Attorney General, for appellant.

Walter McGovern, San Francisco, for respondent.

Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, William F. Bourne, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, amicus curiae in support of respondent.

BRAY, Justice.

The superior court, in a mandate proceeding brought by respondent herein, Dairy Belle Farms, against appellant, the Director of Agriculture, entered judgment directing appellant to set aside his order suspending respondent's milk license for three days, and remanding certain proceedings to the appellant for further consideration.The director appealed.

Questions Presented.

1.Does section 736.13 of the Agricultural Code require a schedule of prices to be on file with the director for a period of five days before an offer may be made to sell dairy products?2.If so, does the section apply to offers to sell dairy products to the chartered municipality of San Francisco?3.If so, is the section unconstitutional as an unlawful interference with a purely municipal affair?

Summary of Proceedings.

An accusation was filed with the director charging that respondent had violated the provisions of section 736.13 of the Agricultural Code.After a hearing, the director found respondent guilty of the violation charged, and ordered respondent's distribution license suspended for three days.Respondent thereupon filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court and obtained an alternative writ staying the operation of the order of suspension.Return was made by demurrer and answer.The court overruled the demurrer and proceeded to decide the matter on the facts alleged in the petition and admitted in the answer.It made certain findings which will hereafter be discussed, and then entered judgment vacating the director's order of suspension, and remanding the proceedings to the director 'for further consideration and determination in accordance with the Findings and the opinion of the court * * *.'As sated, the director appealed.

Facts and Court's Findings.

The facts are not disputed.The City and County of San Francisco called for sealed bids for furnishing to it fluid milk, fluid cream and other dairy products for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1948, said bids to be opened April23rd at 2 p. m. At one minute before 2 p. m. on April 23rd, respondent, in accordance with the city charter ¹ submitted its sealed bid and at 2:14 p. m. filed a schedule of prices (similar to those in the bid) with the director.The court in the mandate proceeding found that the allegations in the petition that respondent had filed its proposed schedule of prices at the earliest moment possible without violating the requirements of a secret and sealed bid, and that the sealed bid provisions of the San Francisco Charter (under which respondent had filed its bid) prevailed over any conflicting provisions of the Milk Control Law, ² were untrue.It further found that respondent filed its bid approximately 15 minutes before it filed its prices with the director; that its offer made in the bid to sell fluid milk and other dairy products was not to be effective until July 1, and 'that there was, therefore, no sale at a price not then effective.'As conclusions of law the court found (1) that the regulation of the dairy business in the manner prescribed by section 736.13 of the Agricultural Code, is not a municipal affair and that the respondent in dealing with San Francisco is bound by the statute; (2) that section 736.13 does not require the schedule of prices to be on file with the director for a period of five days before an offer may be made to sell dairy products to the city and county; on the contrary, all that is required is that such schedule be on file at the time an offer to sell is submitted; (3) that filing the schedule of prices 14 minutes after its bid was submitted was a substantial compliance with the requirement that the schedule be on file at the time of the offer to sell; (4) that the findings upon which the director's order of suspension was based were not supported by the evidence; and (5) that the proceedings should be remanded to the director for further consideration and determination.

1.Meaning of Section 736.13.

Probably the first question that should be considered is whether the trial court's interpretation of the section, to the effect that the distributor of fluid milk and cream is not required to file the schedule of prices five days before offering for sale, is correct.

The section reads in part: '* * * Every distributor * * * shall file with the director schedules and any amendments thereto setting forth the prices at which each such distributor is selling or offering or agreeing to sell fluid milk, fluid cream and dairy products.* * * Such prices shall not become effective until the fifth day after filing.Evidence of any sale of, or offer or agreement to sell such fluid milk, * * * made as part of, or in connection with the sale of, or offer or agreement to sell fluid milk * * * at less than the prices theretofore filed with the director by such distributor pursuant to the provisions of this section, shall constitute prima facie proof of a violation of this section.'

A mere reading of the above section shows that the schedule of prices must be on file five days before the products are offered for sale.Any other interpretation disregards the italicized portion of said section, and renders completely meaningless 'at less than the prices theretofore filed with the director by such distributor pursuant to the provisions of this section * * *.'(Emphasis added.)The history of the section shows that 'pursuant to the provisions of this section' can only refer to the requirement that the schedule be filed five days prior to the offer to sell.The first part of the section(not quoted here) provides that no distributor shall sell any fluid milk or fluid cream at less than the prices established by the director under the provisions of the section.Prior to 1941the section did not have the five day provision, but provided merely that the director might require distributors to file with him schedules and any amendments thereto setting forth the prices at which such distributor 'is selling or offering to sell * * *.'In 1941the section was amended to read as above set forth.Even though now there is no requirement that prices of the excluded products, butter, cheese, etc. (respondent's bid here included cottage cheese), be on file, it is obvious that the section was amended to prevent cutthroat competition in the sale of fluid milk and cream.Apparently the purpose of the amendment was to reach the very situation present in this case.

Even though, in this case, the dairy products were not to be delivered until after July 1, the offer of sale was made the moment the bid was filed.The obvious purpose of the section is to prevent competitive bidding and to permit other distributors to meet the prices filed.The last sentence of the section reads: 'Any other distributor in the marketing area may meet any such prices so filed; provided that such distributor shall file with the director a schedule of prices not exceeding the prices so met by him within 24 hours after meeting the same.'If a distributor could sell or offer to sell immediately after his schedule is filed this provision would be useless.The section specifically includes offers and agreements to sell which are conditional.

As the section plainly requires that the schedule of prices be on file with the director five days prior to an offer of sale, it becomes unnecessary to discuss respondent's contention of substantial compliance, as that is based upon the assumption that the five day provision does not apply.

2.Section Applies to Chartered Municipality.

Respondent contends, and the brief filed by the City and County of San Francisco as amicus curiae argues, that section 736.13 was not intended by the Legislature to apply to offers to sell dairy products to chartered municipalities, as the Legislature did not intend to invalidate existing charter provisions which required sealed bids by persons offering to sell to the municipalities.This contention, as well as the claimed unconstitutionality of the section, discussed hereafter, were made both to the director and in the trial court, and both found against respondent on both points.Respondent did not appeal, and therefore, contends appellant, this court is precluded from considering respondent's contentions.However, we are more concerned with the correctness of the court's judgment than with the reasons given by the court for its final determination.We have the right to determine if the court's judgment is right and may be sustained upon any theory of law applicable to the case.As said in Lincoln v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.2d 304, at page 315, 139 P.2d 13, 19, quoting from2 Cal.Jur. 810, "it is judicial action, and not judicial reasoning or argument, which is the subject of review.'[Citations.]'Here the court's findings and conclusions on the interpretation of the section and its applicability, were not findings of fact but conclusions on questions of law.

That the Legislature intended that so far as sales to the municipality of dairy products were concerned, charter provisions for sealed bids were not to apply, appears from the fact that destructive trade practices in selling to a municipality would be as much an evil as selling to any other consumer,--the stabilizing effect of knowledge of prices by competing distributors would be lost.

The normal rule of statutory construction is that general words in a statute do not apply to the state or its subdivisions.Balthasar v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 187 Cal. 302, 305, 306, 202 P. 37, ...