Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Drum
Decision Date | 29 August 1977 |
Docket Number | No. C-919,C-919 |
Citation | 193 Colo. 519,568 P.2d 459 |
Parties | DAIRYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY and Leo D. Miller, Petitioners, v. Raymond Joseph DRUM and Colorado Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Walberg & Pryor, W. Randolph Barnhart, Denver, for petitioners.
DeMoulin, Anderson, Campbell & Laugesen, Laird Campbell, Denver, for respondents.
We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Drum v. Dairyland Insurance Co., Colo.App., 546 P.2d 1283 (1975). We reverse and remand with directions.
Petitioner Miller's truck became disabled on the highway, and he obtained a tow from respondent Drum. Drum was driving his own vehicle, and Miller was steering his. Drum attempted to make a U-turn, but stopped as he was about to go into a barrow pit, leaving Miller's vehicle in the center of the road. A third vehicle traveling down the highway ran into the Miller truck. The driver and two other occupants of the third vehicle were severely injured. 1
Miller carried insurance on his vehicle with Dairyland Insurance Company (Dairyland), with limits for personal injury of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per occurrence. Drum was insured by Colorado Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), with limits of $50,000 per person and a limitation of $100,000 for any one accident.
The two policies contained similar provisions. Each agreed to pay, on behalf of the "insured," all sums which the insured "shall become legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury . . . caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the automobile." Each policy defined an insured as "any person who is using the automobile." Under the policies, until there is a determination or stipulation that an insured was negligent and liable for the injuries, no judgment can be awarded against either insurer. Each policy provided that, in the event the insured had other insurance against a loss covered by the policy, the company's liability was limited to the proportion of the loss that the applicable limit of liability stated in that policy bore to the total amount of all valid and collectible insurance covering the loss. Each policy also contained an "excess" clause, which provided that if a loss occurred while the insured was driving a non-owned vehicle, the coverage available under his policy would be limited to excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance covering the loss.
A declaratory judgment action was brought, with Miller, Drum, and their insurance companies as parties, to determine the insurance coverage provided by the respective policies. Judgment was entered upon stipulated facts. The district court found that under the terms of the policies, Miller (steering the towed vehicle) was using both his and Drum's towing vehicle; and Drum was using his own vehicle, but not Miller's. The court also found that Miller was insured under both his Dairyland policy and Drum's Farm Bureau Policy; but that Drum was only insured under the Farm Bureau Policy. The declaratory judgment held that Farm Bureau provided primary coverage to Drum and Miller and that Dairyland provided only excess coverage for Miller beyond the primary coverage afforded him by Farm Bureau.
Subsequently, Farm Bureau, having given notice to Dairyland, settled claims against Drum in the amount of $61,212.54. There is no dispute as to the propriety of these settlements.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. That court upheld the district court's finding that Miller was "using" both vehicles and that Drum was "using" only his own. We reverse and hold that, while he was towing Miller's truck, Drum was a "person . . . using the vehicle" and came within the ambit of coverage provided by the Dairyland policy.
Although this court has previously interpreted similar "use" provisions in automobile insurance policies, we have not previously considered the question now before us. See Mason v. Celina Mutual Insurance Co., 161 Colo. 442, 423 P.2d 24 (1967). Courts in other jurisdictions have been presented with similar factual situations, and we turn to their decisions for guidance.
In American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 214 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1954), Kramer was using a Chrysler automobile to tow a jeep. He owned both vehicles. Kramer swerved across the centerline of the highway and collided with an oncoming vehicle, resulting in injuries. Allstate, which insured the Chrysler, settled the claims and sought contribution from American Fire and Casualty, which insured the jeep. American Fire and Casualty denied liability on the ground that the personal injuries had not arisen from Kramer's "use" of the jeep. The court rejected this argument, holding that:
In Howard v. Ponthieux, 326 So.2d 911 (La.App.1976), a pickup truck broke loose from the truck which was towing it and collided with traffic in the opposing lane. The court held that the driver of the tow truck was "using" the pickup truck for the purpose of qualifying him as an insured under the pickup truck's liability policy. That court quoted 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobile Insurance § 110:
"The term 'use' . . . is not limited to those actually operating or driving the motor vehicle but extends to those who have such a right over the vehicle as to impose a legal responsibility upon them for the use of the vehicle."
In Baudin v. Traders & General Insurance Co., 201 So.2d 379 (La.App.1967), the court made an extensive review of prior case law and found that the following tests had been applied to determine use:
"(1) The dangerous situation causing injury must have its source in the use of the automobile; (2) The chain of events resulting in the accident must originate in the use of the automobile and be unbroken by the intervention of any event which has no direct or substantial relation to the use of the vehicle; (3) The accident must be a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle for the purposes contemplated by the policy, although not necessarily foreseen or expected; (4) The accident must be one which can be 'immediately identified' with the use of the automobile as contemplated by the parties to the policy; (5) The accident must be of a type reasonably associated with the use of the automobile as contemplated by the contracting parties; (6) The accident must be one which would not have happened 'but for' the use of the automobile."
Although we express no opinion as to the result reached by the court in Baudin, we are in general agreement with the reasoning it used to arrive at its decision. Accord, Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 375 F.2d 183 (10th Cir. 1967); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 244 Cal.App.2d 826, 53 Cal.Rptr. 650 (1966); Esfeld Trucking, Inc. v. Metropolitan Insurance Co., 193 Kan. 7, 392 P.2d 107 (1964) (Robb, J. dissenting); Wiebel v. American Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 1 Storey 151, 140 A.2d 712 (Del.Super.1958).
There is a common principle in these decisions which can be applied to Drum's actions in this case. Each of the above cases found a "use" in insurance policy terms where the vehicle was dealt with in a manner that created or had the potential of creating an unreasonably dangerous situation. When Drum towed Miller's vehicle, he assumed the responsibility of doing so in a safe and reasonable manner. Accidents arising from towing situations are neither rare nor unforeseeable. It is obvious that Drum's actions in towing the Miller vehicle carried the potential of creating an unreasonable risk of injury. That potential arose as much from Drum's use of Miller's vehicle as from the use of his own. We, therefore, hold that both vehicles were being used by both Miller and Drum.
This conclusion results in the following insurance coverage:
Dairyland :
(a) Miller's use of his own truck primary.
(b) Miller's use of Drum's truck primary subject to excess insurance clause.
(c) Drum's use of Miller's truck primary.
Farm Bureau :
(d) Drum's use of his own truck primary.
(e) Drum's use of Miller's truck primary subject to excess insurance clause.
(f) Miller's use of Drum's truck primary.
The remaining issue to be resolved concerns the manner of apportioning any potential loss between the two insurers if liability should be found to exist. We cannot apportion the settlement entered into by Farm Bureau, since there exists neither a stipulation as to negligence nor a finding of negligence by any court on the part of either Miller or Drum.
The Court of Appeals applied the minority rule under which apportionment is done on an equal...
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