Dakovitz v. Arrow Road Const. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 73--252,73--252
• Citation: 324 N.E.2d 444,26 Ill.App.3d 56
• Parties: Dorothy D. DAKOVITZ, also known as Dorothy D. Day, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARROW ROAD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 444

324 N.E.2d 444

26 Ill.App.3d 56

Dorothy D. DAKOVITZ, also known as Dorothy D. Day, et al Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARROW ROAD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a corporation, et al Defendants-Appellees.

No. 73--252.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, Second Division.

March 7, 1975.

Alexander J. Ross, Sam F. Adler, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago, Corrigan, Mackay, Quetsch & O'Reilly, Wheaton, for defendants-appellees.

RECHENMACHER, Presiding Justice:

This is an appeal from a summary judgment for the defendants, Arrow Road Construction Company, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as 'Arrow' and R. W. Dunteman Company, an Illinois corporation, hereinafter referred to as 'Dunteman.' This is a suit for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of an automobile accident. The plaintiffs are the mother, on her own behalf and the father, as administrator of the estate of their child, Rosemary, and as father and next friend of their child, Jean.

The plaintiff, Dorothy Dakovitz, with her two young children, Rosemary and Jean, was driving her automobile in an easterly direction on Route 64 (North Avenue) approaching the intersection of Goodrich avenue in Glen Ellyn, Illinois, when her vehicle left the pavement, ran several hundred feet along the shoulder of the highway and then crossed over into the westbound lane of the highway and collided with two other cars, causing the death of her child, Rosemary, and personal injury to herself and her child, Jean.

Inasmuch as this is an appeal from a summary judgment the pleadings are of critical importance and certain language therefrom will be quoted verbatim. The complaint alleges that at the time of the accident the defendants, road contractors, were performing a contract with the State of Illinois 'to repair, widen and resurface Illinois Route 64 between Illinois Route 59 and Villa Park, Illinois, and more particularly Illinois Route 64 which included the intersection of Goodrich Avenue as aforesaid.' The complaint goes on to allege that:

'(I)n pursuance of the work they contracted to perform, (defendants) did negligently and carelessly create divers large holes, depressions, irregular road payments (sic) and did tear up divers parts of the road pavement and did otherwise negligently and carelessly excavate and permit said pavement to become in great disrepair, all in violation of their duty to exercise reasonable care in and about the maintenance and control of said public highway while said pavement was being repaired and resurfaced.'

The complaint also alleges that the defendants violated certain statutes in failing to erect suitable signs and barriers along the portion of the road being repaired and resurfaced warning that said portion of the highway was closed or unsafe for travel.

It is alleged by the plaintiffs that because of the defendants negligence as indicated above, the plaintiff's car was 'caused to and did run into, upon and over a certain depression, dugout, hole, excavation or otherwise irregular highway in a disrepair condition, thereby causing the said plaintiff, DOROTHY D. DAKOVITZ, * * * to lose control of said motor vehicle whereby it was propelled against and did strike with great force and violence other motor vehicles * * *.'

After a general denial the defendants took discovery depositions bearing on the location of the portions of the road they were responsible for under their contracts with the State of Illinois, as well as plaintiff's deposition, and the deposition of the Deputy Sheriff as to where the plaintiff's vehicle first left the pavement. By these depositions the defendants, Arrow Road Construction Company and R. W. Dunteman Company, established (1) that certain portions of the road repair contract along Route 64 were not under their control and were not the responsibility of 'these' defendants, but were the responsibility of another defendant, Melahn, under a system whereby there were 'omissions' in the contracted repair job of the defendants, Arrow and Dunteman, and that these omissions were assumed by and were the responsibility of Melahn. By the same token the areas of the defendants' (Arrow and Dunteman) responsibility were 'omissions' in Melahn's contract, and (2) that the exact spot--within a few feet as admitted by the plaintiff--where the plaintiff's automobile first left the pavement, was west of and outside the defendants' area of responsibility under their contract with the State of Illinois. On this basis defendants moved for and were granted summary judgment in their favor.

The general principles governing the granting or denying of a motion for summary judgment are well established. While it is generally recognized that summary judgment is a salutary procedure in the administration of justice, (Green v. McClelland, 10 Ill.App.3d 350, 293 N.E.2d 629.) It is not to be used 'when a genuine issue of material fact has been raised by the pleadings and other supporting papers filed in connection with the motion for summary judgment'. Washington v. Draper and Kramer, Inc., 11 Ill.App.3d 952, 956, 298 N.E.2d 270, 273.

If there is such an issue of fact, summary judgment must be denied. The right to summary judgment must be free from doubt. (LaSalle Nat. Ins. v. Executive Auto Leasing, 121 Ill.App.2d 430, 257 N.E.2d 508.) On the other hand, if there is actually No genuine issue as to any material fact, summary judgment should be granted. (Gelsumino v. E. W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill.App.3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110.) While these statements are helpful in defining the scope and purpose of summary judgment, they do not of course, settle any particular case--the trial judge must still determine whether there is any genuine issue as to a material fact in the specific case before him.

A close examination of the pleadings and affidavits in the case before us is therefore necessary before applying the general principles adverted to above. With respect to pleadings in cases involving summary judgment it is generally accepted that a mere allegation in a complaint is not sufficient to overcome the specific contrary averments of an affidavit and the mere discrepancy between the two is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact. Where the affidavit states particular facts contrary to the allegations of the complaint it will overcome the allegations of the complaint. (Schoen v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 Ill.App.2d 197, 243 N.E.2d 31. Pefferle v. Prairie Mills, Inc., 72 Ill.App.2d 440, 218 N.E.2d 247.) If, therefore, defendants' affidavits contradict or deny the allegations of the complaint, such allegations do not raise a genuine issue of fact merely because they are at odds with the affidavit. In this case an analysis of the complaint discloses that it is not necessarily overcome as a statement of fact by the facts recited in the defendants' affidavits. The complaint states that the defendants were doing repair work on Route 64 near Goodrich Avenue; that in doing such work they left the pavement and shoulder in a dangerous condition and without any warning signs as to the disrepaired condition; that the plaintiff was driving on Route 64 and that at or near Goodrich Avenue she lost control because of holes, obstructions, uneven pavement and so forth, a condition negligently caused by the defendants and that as a consequence plaintiff was propelled across the road and ran into other vehicles going in the opposite direction.

The defendants made a general denial thus raising a genuine issue of fact. Defendants' affidavits and the depositions may be taken as proving (1) that the plaintiff first left the pavement, on the right side, near a certain spruce tree and (2) that the defendants were not responsible for the roadwork in the area within 50 to 100 feet of said spruce tree. If these affidavits and depositions were uncontroverted do they remove from the case any genuine issue of material fact? We think not. The plaintiff does not pinpoint, nor do the defendants, just where she lost control of her vehicle. The accident occurred within 500 feet from where she first left the pavement, accepting defendants' evidence, but this is not necessarily where she lost control. It must be remembered that the plaintiff does not in her complaint make any allegations about where she first left the pavement--her allegations are: (a) that the defendants caused a negligent and dangerous condition of Route 64 to exist in the vicinity of Goodrich Avenue and Ki's Restaurant (a landmark opposite Goodrich Avenue), (b) that plaintiff, while driving her automobile at or near said point, ran over or into a hole, excavation, depression or other irregularity in the pavement created by defendants' negligence and (c) that as a result of running over, into, onto or upon said hole, irregularity and so forth plaintiff lost control of her automobile and collided with other cars going in the opposite direction.

The defendants' theory apparently is that the point at which the plaintiff first left the highway is the only point at which liability can attach to the defendants for negligence in connection with any holes, drop-offs or irregularities in the surface of the highway. If there was any other possibility, then the defendants' argument that plaintiff...