Dale v. Janklow

• Decision Date: 28 October 1987
• Docket Number: 86-5384,Nos. 86-5247,s. 86-5247
• Citation: 828 F.2d 481
• Parties: Byron Chastain DALE, Appellant, v. William J. JANKLOW, Jerry Baum, Patrick James Murphy, Larry Zwemke, Individually & in their official capacities, Appellees. Byron C. DALE and Judith Dale, Appellants, v. William JANKLOW, individually and in his official capacity; Jerry Baum, individually and in his official capacity; Larry Zwemke, individually and in his official capacity; James Patrick Murphy, individually and in his official capacity; Mark Meierhenry, individually and in his official capacity; Dennis Holmes, individually and in his official capacity; Douglas Kludt, individually and in his official capacity; Thomas Del Grasso, individually and in his official capacity; Thomas Fahey, individually and in his official capacity; Ronald Johnson, individually; Northwestern Production Credit Association, individually; Don Gromer, individually and in his official capacity, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 481

828 F.2d 481

Byron Chastain DALE, Appellant, v. William J. JANKLOW, Jerry Baum, Patrick James Murphy, Larry

Zwemke, Individually & in their official

capacities, Appellees.

Byron C. DALE and Judith Dale, Appellants, v. William JANKLOW, individually and in his official capacity;

Jerry Baum, individually and in his official capacity;

Larry Zwemke, individually and in his official capacity;

James Patrick Murphy, individually and in his official

capacity; Mark Meierhenry, individually and in his official

capacity; Dennis Holmes, individually and in his official

capacity; Douglas Kludt, individually and in his official

capacity; Thomas Del Grasso, individually and in his

official capacity; Thomas Fahey, individually and in his

official capacity; Ronald Johnson, individually;

Northwestern Production Credit Association, individually;

Don Gromer, individually and in his official capacity, Appellees.

Nos. 86-5247, 86-5384.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 11, 1987.

Decided Sept. 10, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 28, 1987.

Wendy Alison Nora, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellants.

Mark W. Barnett, Pierre, S.D., for State of S.D.

Reed Rasmussen, Aberdeen, S.D., for Ronald R. Johnson.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Circuit Judge and LARSON, ^* Senior District Judge.

LAY, Chief Judge.

These are consolidated appeals arising out of civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982). Byron Dale is a South Dakota rancher who was indebted to the Production Credit Association (PCA) for some $400,000 arising out of loans provided by PCA to Dale. Under the terms of the loans, PCA could come onto Dale's property at a reasonable time and inspect the secured collateral (cattle and calves) without trespassing. The record shows that after Dale was granted the loans, he began branding calves with a new brand and laundering them through his son's ranch, thereby selling them free of the PCA lien. Dale also determined not to repay the loans in money but instead attempted in 1983 to tender a note payable in hay and silage. PCA rejected the tender and attempted to inspect the cattle. Dale refused to allow PCA officials onto his ranch, stating that "blood would run" before he would allow them on his property.

PCA brought suit in state court on October 18, 1982, to enforce its inspection rights and alternatively for possession of the cattle should the inspection reveal a default. Dale was served with an order to show cause and a temporary restraining order. At the hearing, Dale defended by asserting his "payment-in-kind" ¹ note and PCA's refusal to accept tender. The court ordered Dale to allow PCA officials onto his property.

On October 28, 1982, Dale was again served with a state court order granting PCA a preliminary injunction and a restraining order specifically enjoining Dale from disposing of the secured collateral, including the calves. The same day, Dale told PCA officials to come to the ranch on November 3, 1982, rather than the previously scheduled October 29. Dale then began removing calves from his ranch. PCA eventually inspected the collateral and found a considerable shortage of livestock. It amended its complaint alleging a foreclosure action. By a state court order dated November 9, 1982, Dale was again enjoined from disposing of any secured collateral. At the subsequent hearing on December 8, 1982, Dale took the position that the order did not apply to the calves and that he did not have to account for them. The state court then granted PCA's application for appointment of a receiver.

On March 7, 1983, the state court granted PCA's motion for summary judgment, dismissed Dale's counterclaim, and denied Dale's motion for summary judgment. On March 13, after Dale had received the court's order, the calves were "rustled" from Dale's ranch. The receiver learned of their disappearance and reported it to the court. Noting that Dale had made widespread public threats about what would happen if PCA attempted to foreclose, the court directed county and state law enforcement officials to provide protection for the receiver. Officials informed the court that they could not ensure the receiver's safety in light of Dale's threats of violence and bloodshed. ² The court then determined, on the basis of the entire record, to issue an ex parte order directing the receiver to take immediate possession of the property already in the receiver's legal possession and to expedite the sale of the cattle without waiting for a regular execution sale. ³

On March 18, 1983, state officials including Governor Janklow, State Highway Patrol Director Baum, and Officer Murphy, devised a plan to draw Dale away from the ranch so that the order could be executed peacefully. Dale learned of the plan, however, and returned to the ranch. Governor Janklow then telephoned Dale and attempted to dissuade him from resisting. Dale insisted that he would defend his property with his life. Director Baum and Officer Murphy arrived at the ranch to serve the court's order and ensure the safety of the receiver in executing that order. At the time that Director Baum and Officer Murphy were present, Dale was armed. During the course of their conversation, Officer Murphy hit Dale with a catsup bottle and after a struggle Dale was subdued.

On January 16, 1984, Dale initiated a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota (Civil Case No. 84-3004). The suit named several defendants, including PCA, its various officers, directors, and employees. On January 23, 1984, Dale filed a pleading captioned "Amended Complaint" which included ninety-four named and unnamed defendants. The complaint was denied by United States District Judge Andrew Bogue under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that the complaint was "muddled, confusing, ambiguous, redundant, vague, verbose[; it was] impossible * * * to understand Plaintiff's alleged claim or claims." On March 30, 1984, Dale filed a second amended complaint which omitted PCA as a defendant. Thereafter, extended discovery and trial preparation took place on this complaint. PCA did not participate in any proceedings because it was not named as a party. In April of 1986, on the eve of trial, Dale filed a third amended complaint in which he named as additional defendants PCA and its officers and employees. Attached to it was a letter dated March 10, 1983, written by an attorney of PCA to an assistant attorney general of South Dakota, outlining means to enforce its foreclosure action. Dale's counsel relies upon this letter, not discovered by Dale until 1984, as having been fraudulently withheld. He alleges under this complaint a continuing conspiracy against him by the various party defendants. The federal district court, the Honorable Richard H. Battey, denied leave to amend. Thereafter, Dale filed a new complaint with the same allegations contained in his third amended complaint. ⁴ Judge Battey dismissed this complaint as being barred under the South Dakota statute of limitations. Trial proceeded on the merits of the March 30, 1984 complaint. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the trial court directed a verdict against Dale.

On these consolidated appeals, four essential issues are raised: (1) whether there was abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing leave to amend the complaint; (2) whether the trial court judge erred in refusing to recuse himself; (3) whether the trial court erred in dismissing the new complaint- ; and (4) whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict.

The focus of Dale's appeal is that the district court erred in granting the motions for a directed verdict against him in his suit based primarily on use of excessive force by the officers when securing the cattle for the receiver's possession. ⁵ This issue presents a close question on review. ⁶ As noted by the district court, the better practice, as a general rule, would have been for the district court to permit the trial to be completed. As we have stated on prior occasions, if the jury reached an incorrect verdict, the trial court could still issue a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and we would thereby obviate the need for a new trial if error had, in fact, been committed. See, e.g., Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 379 n. 9 (8th Cir.1983).

The standards for granting a directed verdict and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict are the same under federal law. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin Power, Inc., 773 F.2d 960, 968 (8th Cir.1985); SCNO Barge Lines, Inc. v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 745 F.2d 1188, 1192 n. 5 (8th Cir.1984). A directed verdict "should be granted only when all the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the nonmoving party." Bell v. Gas Serv. Co., 778 F.2d 512, 514 (8th Cir.1985). See also Barclay v. Burlington N., Inc., 536 F.2d 263, 267 (8th Cir.1976); Gabauer v. Woodcock, 520 F.2d 1084, 1091 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061, 96 S.Ct. 800, 46 L.Ed.2d 653 (1976). On review by this court, the lower court's grant of a directed verdict is not accorded the usual presumption in favor of correctness. Wilson v. City of N. Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir.1986).

The guidelines for evaluating whether excessive force has been used are clearly set forth in this circuit:

In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.

Bauer v. Norris, 713 F.2d 408, 412 (8th Cir.1983) (quoting Putman v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 420 (8th Cir.1981)) (quoting in turn Johnson v. Glick, ...