Dale v. Quarterman

Citation553 F.3d 876
Decision Date19 December 2008
Docket NumberNo. 05-41747.,05-41747.
PartiesMichael Stuart DALE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Gretchen Berumen Merenda, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, for Quarterman.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and GARWOOD and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Stuart Dale, a Texas prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his deferred adjudication probation revocation hearing. Because the state courts did not unreasonably apply the Strickland test to the facts in this case, we affirm the district court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

Dale was charged with and tried for aggravated sexual assault in 1997. While the jury was deliberating, he pled guilty to the offense and was sentenced to five years of deferred adjudication probation. During the next 14 months, he violated the terms and conditions of his probation by missing appointments with his scheduled supervision officer, refusing to submit to electronic monitoring, failing to attend treatment sessions, and failing to perform the required amount of community service. The state moved to enter a final adjudication of his guilt. Dale retained Wayne Ames as counsel for the deferred adjudication probation revocation hearing, during which Dale and his roommate both testified. The court adjudicated Dale guilty and immediately moved to sentencing.

Although Ames was given the opportunity, he called no more witnesses and offered only a three-sentence plea that the court return Dale to probation. The court, however, sentenced Dale to 20 years in prison, the statutory maximum. Dale exhausted his state appellate remedies without success.

Dale then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Texas court alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his probation revocation hearing. Dale asserted that Ames's failure to introduce available mitigation evidence resulted in a significantly harsher sentence than he would have otherwise received. In support, Dale presented eleven affidavits of family members or friends who stated that they would have testified to his good character had Ames contacted them. The affidavits are nearly identical.1 Ames also signed an affidavit admitting that Dale informed him about these witnesses and that his failure to call them was not based on trial strategy.

At a hearing, an experienced local criminal defense attorney testified, based on hypothetical facts resembling Dale's case, that Dale's punishment was excessive and that Ames's failure to investigate and call witnesses and his failure to explore additional punishment options constituted objectively deficient representation. Finally, Ames's sister testified about Ames's deteriorating mental acuity.

The state trial court denied Dale's petition. It found that the substantially identical and conclusory nature of these affidavits detracted from their credibility. In addition, none of the affidavits contained specific facts suggesting how the judge should have found Dale "humanized," nor, according to the state habeas court, did any evidence discuss whether this testimony would have been susceptible to impeachment. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed without opinion.

Dale then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The district court denied relief, and this Court issued a certificate of appealability.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus for Dale unless the Texas court's adjudication of his claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The legal application must be "objectively unreasonable," meaning more than merely "erroneous or incorrect." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1521, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tucker v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 617, 620 (5th Cir.2001). For example, a decision unreasonably applies clearly established law if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. at 1520. The focus of this objective reasonableness inquiry is on the state court's ultimate decision, not whether the state court "discussed every angle of the evidence." Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc).

A state habeas court's findings of facts and its credibility determinations are presumed correct, but may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 871-72 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). In addition, this Court reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error and issues of law de novo using the same standards applied below. Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 750 (5th Cir.2000).

DISCUSSION

Dale's petition claims that the Texas habeas court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that counsel was deficient, and the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel's representation is deficient if it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" measured by "prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. "The reviewing court must strongly presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and that the challenged conduct was the product of reasoned trial strategy." Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Prejudice "is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" and is less than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. In the state sentencing context, the relevant inquiry is whether, absent counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant's sentence would have been "significantly less harsh," Spriggs v. Collins, 993 F.2d 85, 88-89 (5th Cir.1993), taking into account "such factors as the defendant's actual sentence, the potential minimum and maximum sentences that could have been received, the placement of the actual sentence within the range of potential sentences, and any relevant mitigating or aggravating circumstances." United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir.1994) (citing Spriggs, 993 F.2d at 88).2

Even assuming arguendo that Ames's performance was deficient, Dale has failed to show that the state courts acted unreasonably in determining that there is no reasonable probability that his sentence would have been significantly less harsh absent Ames's errors.

Some evidence relevant to mitigation was offered during the adjudication phase, which the sentencing judge must have considered. See Pearson v. State, 994 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.1999). Much of Dale's and his roommate's testimony was directed at Dale's effort to comply with the terms of his probation. Dale testified to his continuing efforts to finish his college degree and to pursue a master's degree in divinity school. His explanation why he fell short of his probation obligations also addresses punishment on resentencing. Dale's roommate corroborated his efforts...

To continue reading

Request your trial
52 cases
  • Caldwell v. Thaler
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 31 Enero 2011
    ...is on the state court's ultimate decision, not whether the state court “discussed every angle of the evidence.” Dale v. Quarterman, 553 F.3d 876, 879 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc)). Thus, a federal habeas corpus court's inquiry under § 2......
  • Sturgeon v. Quarterman
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 12 Mayo 2009
    ...is on the state court's ultimate decision, not whether the state court "discussed every angle of the evidence." Dale v. Quarterman, 553 F.3d 876, 879 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir.2002) (en A federal habeas corpus court's inquiry under § 2254(d)(1) is n......
  • Mendez v. Quarterman
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 4 Junio 2009
    ...is on the state court's ultimate decision, not whether the state court "discussed every angle of the evidence." Dale v. Quarterman, 553 F.3d 876, 879 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir.2002) (en A federal habeas corpus court's inquiry under § 2254(d)(1) is n......
  • Cruz v. Commissioner of Correction
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • 6 Enero 2020
    ... ... 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). It ... appears, however, that the Fifth Circuit has not altered its ... standard post- Booker ... Dale v. Quarterman, ... 553 F.3d 876 (5th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, at least one ... other federal circuit has recognized the ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT