Daleiden v. Jefferson County Joint School District No. 251, 2003 Opinion No. 118 (Idaho 11/24/2003)
| Decision Date | 24 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 29036. |
| Citation | 2003 Opinion No. 118 |
| Parties | SUSAN DALEIDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 251, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Jefferson County. Hon. Brent J. Moss, District Judge.
Order on summary judgment dismissing claims against the school district; Affirmed.
Stucki Law Office, Idaho Falls, for appellant. Marvin Rodney Stucki argued.
Anderson, Nelson, Hall, Smith, Idaho Falls, for respondent. Blake Hall argued.
Plaintiff Susan Daleiden (Daleiden) appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Jefferson County Joint School District No. 251 (School District). Daleiden, a physical therapist contracted by the School District to work with children with special needs, brought a negligence claim against the School District for a back injury she suffered while assisting a student off a school bus. The trial court granted summary judgment for the School District on the ground that Daleiden was covered by Idaho Code § 72-205 of the Worker's Compensation Act (the Act) and was, therefore, barred from bringing a tort action against the School District. Daleiden appeals, arguing that she is an independent contractor and therefore is not covered by the Act.
Daleiden is a physical therapist who provided services on contract to the School District. Daleiden injured her back in August 2000 while assisting a student in a wheelchair off a bus. In February 2001 Daleiden filed a Notice of Tort Claim with the School District, claiming damages arising from negligence on the part of the School District in failing to provide a bus with a wheel chair lift. After the School District did not respond to this notice, Daleiden filed a complaint in the Seventh Judicial District Court again alleging negligence on the part of the School District and seeking damages.
The School District filed an answer and subsequently moved the court for summary judgment, arguing that 1) Daleiden has worker's compensation coverage because she was in the service of the School District under I.C. § 72-205 and is thereby precluded by the Act from any other legal remedy, 2) the School District is immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and 3) the School District owed no duty to Daleiden upon which she could base a tort claim. Daleiden responded by arguing that she was an independent contractor and was thereby excluded from worker's compensation coverage. Daleiden also responded to the School District's other issues and raised an equitable estoppel argument.
The trial court granted the School District's motion for summary judgment in August 2002 finding that Daleiden was covered by worker's compensation under I.C. §72-205 and was therefore precluded from pursuing any other remedy. The district court did not address any of the other issues presented, including whether Daleiden was an employee of the School District or an independent contractor. Daleiden subsequently filed this appeal.
"When questions of law are presented, this Court exercises free review and is not bound by findings of the district court but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented." Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2002). "Furthermore, the construction of a legislative act, such as the worker's compensation statutes, presents a pure question of law for free review by the Court." Crawford v. Department of Corrections, 133 Idaho 633, 635, 991 P.2d 358, 360 (1999).
As to summary judgment, Sacred Heart Medical Center v. Boundary County, ___ Idaho ___, 66 P.3d 238, 239 (2003).
In granting summary judgment for the School District, the district court interpreted the language of I.C. §72-205, which defines public employment for purposes of worker's compensation coverage, to grant coverage to independent contractors, who would otherwise not be covered by worker's compensation if engaged in private employment. The district court found that regardless of whether Daleiden was an employee of the School District or an independent contractor, she was covered by worker's compensation and accordingly was precluded from bringing her tort cause of action.
I.C. §72-205 reads in part:
The following shall constitute employees in public employment and their employers subject to the provisions of this law:
(1) Every person in the service of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, under any contract of hire, express or implied, and every official or officer thereof, whether elected or appointed, while performing his official duties, except officials of athletic contests involving secondary schools, as defined by section 33-119, Idaho Code.
(2) Every person in the service of a county, city, or any political subdivision thereof, or of any municipal corporation.
The district court read this statute, particularly subsection (2), which provides coverage to "[e]very person in the service of a county, city, or any political subdivision thereof, or of any municipal corporation", to apply to independent contractors working for the State. Such a reading, however, gives meaning to phrases used in the Act that is contrary to the well-established meanings and terms of employment found in Idaho's worker's compensation law, and would potentially extend coverage to a large class of persons not intended to be covered by the legislature.
The phrase "contract of hire" found in I.C. § 72-205(1) is also found in I.C. §72-204, which covers private employment. I.C. §72-204(2) states that "[a] person ... in the service of an employer under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied ... shall constitute [an] employee[] and their employer [shall be] subject to the provisions of [Idaho's worker's compensation law]."
This term—"contract of hire"—is a term typically associated with employment as used in the context of worker's compensation. Using an older definition, "[a] `contract of hire' is usually defined as an agreement in which an employee provides labor or personal services to an employer for wages or remuneration or other thing of value supplied by the employer." Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, §47.10 at 8 (1973). Black's Law Dictionary defines an employee as "[a] person who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of work performance," and an employer as "[a] person who controls and directs a worker under an express or implied contract of hire and who pays the worker's salary or wages." (7th ed.) (emphasis added). A majority of state worker's compensation statutes similarly reflect Idaho's definition of employment—both public and private—using the term "contract of hire."1
Additional insight on why "contract of hire" and employment are frequently linked in worker's compensation law is provided in Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation. First, due to the vicarious liability consequences of an employer/employee relationship, there must be mutual consent between master and servant to the employment as embodied by a contract. Second, the employment must be gainful for the employee because the underlying purpose of workers' compensation statutes is to reimburse employees their lost wages when they become injured or otherwise unable to work. Therefore, the contract must be one "of hire" and cannot be purely gratuitous. Larson, §64.01 (1999). Because vicarious liability does not typically attach with independent contractors (Restatement 2d Torts § 409), use of the phrase "contract of hire" implies an employer/employee relationship.
As such, the term "contract of hire" in Idaho's worker's compensation statutes is used in the same manner as a majority of jurisdictions in the nation, and this use is predominantly associated with an employment relationship. Thus, we find that the term "contract of hire" in I.C. §72-205(1), in the context of the worker's compensation law, denotes an employer/employee relationship, and not simply any contractual hiring arrangement.
Idaho law has consistently precluded independent contractors from coverage under worker's compensation. "Coverage under the worker's compensation laws is dependent upon the existence of an employer-employee relationship." Livingston v. Ireland Bank, 128 Idaho 66, 68, 910 P.2d 738, 740 (1995). "Independent contractors are outside of the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Law while employees are ordinarily within it." Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 820, 555 P.2d 144, 150 (1976). I.C. §72-203 specifically sets forth that the worker's compensation laws are to only apply to "all public employment and to all private employment...." In light of the term "contract of hire" used in I.C. §72-205(1) and the corresponding requirement that there be a relationship of employment for worker's compensation coverage, we find that independent contractors are excluded from coverage under this subsection.
The School District additionally argues that under I.C. §72-205(2) independent contractors are covered under the Act because the language of this subsection does not require a contract of hire but only that the individual be "in the service of a county, city, or any political subdivision thereof, or of any municipal corporation" (...
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