Daley v. Los Laureles, Inc., 57818

• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: HALLETT
• Citation: 318 N.E.2d 159,22 Ill.App.3d 441
• Parties: Richard J. DALEY, Mayor and Local Liquor Control Commissioner of the City of Chicago, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOS LAURELES, INC., Applicant, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 57818,57818
• Decision Date: 16 September 1974

Page 159

318 N.E.2d 159 22 Ill.App.3d 441 Richard J. DALEY, Mayor and Local Liquor Control
Commissioner of the City of Chicago, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LOS LAURELES, INC., Applicant, et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 57818. Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division. Sept. 16, 1974.

Page 160

[22 Ill.App.3d 442] Richard L. Curry, Corp. Counsel of the City of Chicago, Chicago (William R. Quinlan, Robert R. Retke, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Manuel Reyes, Chicago, for Los Laureles.

HALLETT, Justice:

The plaintiff, as Local Liquor Control Commissioner, refused to grant a retail liquor license to the applicant, Los Laureles, Inc. On appeal, the License Appeal Commission, after a Trial de novo, reversed the Commissioner's order and, on administrative review, the circuit court affirmed that reversal. The Commissioner has appealed.

The defendants have not seen fit to appear as appellees or to file briefs. Where, as here, an appellee has not filed a brief in the reviewing court, it may reverse without considering the case in detail but reversal is not required and the reviewing court may if it chooses consider and determine the case on its merits. (2 I.L.P. Appeal and Error, ch. 10, § 560; Perez v. Janota (1969), 107 Ill.App.2d 90, 246 N.E.2d 42; Daley v. Jack's Tivoli Liquor Lounge, Inc. (1969), 118 Ill.App.2d 264--275, 254 N.E.2d 814; Lynch v. Wolverine Ins. Co. (1970), 126 Ill.App.2d 192, 193, 261 N.E.2d 466; People v. Giannopoulos, (Ill.App.1974), 314 N.E.2d 237.) We elect to follow the latter course here.

The Commissioner contends: 1) that, on the very sketchy evidence presented to him, he properly refused to issue the license applied for; and 2) that, on an appeal from his action, 'the only issue * * * is the propriety of * * * (his) decision on the evidence placed before him by the applicant,' and that the Commission therefore 'went beyond the bounds of the function defined in the statute' when it permitted the president of the applicant 'to directly supply the License Appeal Commission with detailed data on the finances of Los Laureles, Inc.' and, based on that data, reversed the Commissioner's action.

We disagree with the Commissioner's second contention and affirm; thus rendering the first contention moot.

The Illinois Liquor Control Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 43, pars. 120(15), 123), defines who may and may not be granted a retail liquor license, and, in sections 111 through 114, empowers local liquor control commissioners to administer said act and to grant, refuse or suspend licenses. In section 153, two very different types of appeals from orders of such local commissioners [22 Ill.App.3d 443] are provided. From certain orders, a Trial de novo before the appeal commission is provided. From others, only a 'review' of the record before the local commissioner, at which 'no new or additional evidence shall be admitted or considered,' is provided.

Insofar as is pertinent here (an appeal from an order of a local liquor control commissioner in a city of 500,000 or more Refusing to grant a license) the statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 43, par. 153), in pertinent parts, provides as follows:

'In the event such appeal is from an order of a local liquor...