Daley v. License Appeal Commission

• Citation: 205 N.E.2d 269,55 Ill.App.2d 474
• Decision Date: 04 February 1965
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 49865
• Parties: Richard J. DALEY, Mayor, as Local Liquor Control Commissioner, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LICENSE APPEAL COMMISSION et al., A. L. Cromin, Chairman, Clyde Burnette, Applicant, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 269

205 N.E.2d 269

55 Ill.App.2d 474

Richard J. DALEY, Mayor, as Local Liquor Control Commissioner, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LICENSE APPEAL COMMISSION et al., A. L. Cromin, Chairman Clyde Burnette, Applicant, Defendants-Appellees.

Gen. No. 49865.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Feb. 4, 1965.

John C. Melaniphy, Sydney R. Drebin, Marvin E. Aspen, Chicago, for appellant.

Howard T. Savage, Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

DEMPSEY, Presiding Justice.

Clyde Burnette, a defendant-appellee, has moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the case has become moot.

Burnette applied for a retail license for a package liquor store located at 7857 South Halsted Street, Chicago. The local liquor control commissioner refused to issue the license on the ground that Burnette lacked good moral character. Burnette appealed to the License Appeal Commission of the City of Chicago. The commission reversed the commissioner and denied his motion for a rehearing. The commissioner, in a proceeding under the Administrative Review Act, appealed to the Circuit Court. The court sustained the findings of the commission. The commissioner has appealed to this court.

The motion to dismiss the appeal states that events which occurred subsequent to the entry of the judgment have rendered the issues moot. The motion relates that Burnette has withdrawn his application for the retail liquor license, has requested the refund of his license fee and has relinquished the possession of, and all right, title and interest in, the premises at 7857 South Halsted Street.

The plaintiff opposes the dismissal and aruges that an 'important question of public policy' is involved and that 'It is no longer a question of whether Burnette desires to operate a liquor store at 7857 South Halsted Street. The question now is whether Burnette is a proper individual to possess a liquor license at any time in the future.'

The general rule pertaining to mootness is that where the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist, the reviewing court will dismiss the appeal. People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736. In Blue Bird Air Service, Inc., v. City of Chilcago, 321 Ill.App. 531, 540, 53 N.E.2d 471, 475, the court said:

'It has been repeatedly held that a reviewing court should not be called upon to decide questions that no longer exist, merely for the sake of making a precedent or of deciding a case to settle a simple matter of costs, even though when the action was instituted an actual controversy existed, a change in circumstances rendering the issues moot or abstract requires a dismissal of the appeal.'

Public interest is a recognized exception to the doctrine of mootness. If there is a compelling and substantial reason for public interest an appeal concerning a moot question need not be dismissed. In determining if there is the requisite degree of public interest certain criterions must be considered such as the 'public and private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the question.' People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769.

Judged by these standards, the contention of the plaintiff that an 'important question of public policy' is involved must fall. The question really is a very narrow one concerning one individual's right to a license for a liquor store at the address stated in his application. Furthermore, it would be farfetched to say that a determination of this question is needed for the future guidance of public officials.

Burnette, although victorious before the appeal commission and the Circuit Court, has voluntarily withdrawn his application and no question is raised about his motive or intent in doing so.

If the zeal to brand him as an improper person to possess a liquor license at any time in the future is because of the fear that the judgment of the Circuit Court may be res judicata as to his fitness, should be again apply for a license, the fear is unfounded. If Burnette should apply for...